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Abstract 
Human-wildlife conflict is a growing obstacle to biodiversity conservation, 
while the resulting consequences continue to hamper sustainable 
development. The Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve in the Western Ghats in South 
India, characterises a mosaic of land use and biodiversity conservation, 
human privilege and poverty, and is a case-study for a wide range of 
conflicts with endangered large mammals such as tiger and Asian elephant.  
This thesis explored the social, ecological and economic contexts to conflicts 
with wildlife over livelihood production systems, namely agriculture and 
livestock, taking an interdisciplinary approach to determine key drivers of 
conflict losses and perceptions, ascertain the effectiveness of and decision-
making process behind the choices of mitigation measures, and understand 
how the implementation of more effective community-based solutions may 
be established.  
The presence and intensity of conflict is driven by habitat degradation, forest 
proximity, and crop or livestock holding extent, while perceptions are 
strongly linked to proportional loss and economic investment. The most 
effective intervention methods were electric fences to protect crops, and 
guarding or the use of sheds and corrals to protect livestock. Households 
prefer to establish electric fences around fields, given the institutional failings 
in effectively maintaining electric fences around protected areas; or to utilise 
more effective guarding practices, but are hampered by issues of cost and 
labour effort. The majority of households believe that the government Forest 
Department should be responsible for managing conflicts, accepting very 
little personal responsibility. 
Collective action through community co-operatives can enable access to 
expensive but effective technologies such as electric fencing, and co-
operation can be improved if schemes recognise the importance of 
landholder demographics in assessing costs and benefits, base 
contributions on risk, minimise pre-imposed constraints, and understand the 
problems of community heterogeneity. Reducing risks from conflict and 
improving livelihood production systems can be a potential and powerful 
incentive for biodiversity conservation. 
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Chapter 1 
“It’s conflicts all the way down”: interdisciplinary 
approaches to the problem of human-wildlife conflict  
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“Human-wildlife conflict occurs when the needs and behavior of wildlife 
impact negatively on the goals of humans or when the goals of humans 
negatively impact the needs of wildlife. These conflicts may result when 
wildlife damage crops, injure or kill domestic animals, threaten or kill people”.  
- Recommendation 5.20, 2003 
World Parks Congress 
 
Conservation conflicts are “situations that occur when two or more parties 
with strongly held opinions clash over conservation objectives and when one 
party is perceived to assert its interests at the expense of another”... 
recognising “that conservation conflicts occur fundamentally between 
humans”. 
- Redpath et al. (in press) TREE 
1.1  The nature of the beast  
Conflicts over biodiversity conservation, specifically human-wildlife conflicts 
(HWC), are increasingly recognised as one of the most important and 
seemingly insolvable issues for conservation today. Conflict is a major 
obstacle to wildlife conservation, particularly for large and endangered 
mammals, whilst the underlying causes of conflict and resulting 
consequences have negative socio-economic implications which hamper 
sustainable development for those who bear the costs.  
There is a wealth of individual case-studies in the literature collated, 
reviewed and described to great extent in various books (Woodroffe 2005), 
papers (Osborn and Parker 2003, Dublin and Hoare 2004b, Graham et al. 
2005, Treves et al. 2006c, Inskip and Zimmermann 2009a) and theses 
(Dickman 2009), but it is only very recently that studies have explored the 
nature of conflict and attempted to establish a theoretical basis for our 
understanding and management of  conflict that draws on an 
interdisciplinary understanding of the problem (Young et al. 2010, Redpath 
et al. in press). 
This movement towards a unified approach to conflict has highlighted a 
central problem with the study of conflict amongst researchers and 
practitioners: the accepted terminology of conflicts. The initial definition of 
conflict as defined by the WPC (2003; listed above) suggests active negative 
actions by both parties (people and wildlife) usually manifesting as problems 
such as crop raiding or livestock depredation, a definition which has been 
typically adopted by biologists (Gubbi 2012, Guerbois et al. 2012). However, 
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it is notable that in some cases the term conflict has rarely been explicitly 
defined at all (Dickman 2010). There is now a cautious move towards the 
social sciences perspective on conflict theories which stem from conflicts 
over social, political or economic inequalities between stakeholder groups 
and emphasise that conflicts are between people over wildlife (Marshall et 
al. 2007a), such as conflicts being a trigger for local issues of settlement and 
resource access as epitomised by the people and parks problem 
(Schwartzman et al. 2000). Distinctions have been made with the former 
referred to as ‘biodiversity impacts’ and the latter as ‘biodiversity conflicts’ 
(Young et al. 2010), with more recent studies focusing on defining and 
understanding the diverse nature of both impacts and conflicts (Graham et 
al. 2011, Linnell 2011).  
Part of the difficulty in understanding conflict and addressing drivers of 
conflict when studying the impact of wildlife upon people, appears to arise 
because the conflict literature varies in the choice of variables used to 
measure or represent conflict, again often failing to clearly identify these at 
the outset of the study which limits the opportunities to compare across 
studies. Conflicts are described as being ‘perceived’ or ‘actual’, with diverse 
variation in measurements for both attributes. Actual conflict has been 
measured in terms of the presence or absence of conflict incidents; 
frequency of incidents; economic monetary value; absolute measures of loss 
such as area or trees or number of crops damaged, or numbers of livestock 
lost; or as representing a market value of economic loss; or can also include 
indirect costs such as investment and labour (Madhusudan 2003, Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009b, Gubbi 2012, Guerbois et al. 2012, Karanth et al. 2012). 
Perception of conflict has also been measured in a variety of ways, from 
attitudinal analyses to arbitrary levels (e.g. high, medium, low), or context 
dependent (e.g. ranked with other problems) (Sillero-Zubiri 2001, Hazzah et 
al. 2009, Dickman 2010, Karanth et al. 2012). Measurements are therefore 
often site-specific and not comparable between studies, because they may 
be monitored over time, or simply reported over a fixed past term, restricted 
to official reports (e.g. compensation claims) or measured directly from those 
experiencing conflict, including both verified and unverified incidents (Gubbi 
2012, Karanth et al. 2012). Given this diversity in measuring and 
understanding the terminology of conflict amongst conflict researchers, it is 
not unexpected that understanding and managing conflicts has made 
relatively slow progress.  
- 17 - 
1.2  Valuing the costs of conflict 
1.2.1 People and wildlife affected by conflicts 
The wildlife causing conflict and impacted by retaliation are often those 
species which have suffered the greatest loss in habitat and are unable to 
adapt to changing land uses (Sunquist 2001), vulnerable to extinction due to 
their typical life history characteristics of size, density, and specialisation 
(Madhusudan and Mishra 2003), and generally confined to protected areas 
too small to hold them (Belovsky 1987). Consequently, these taxa are often 
those of greatest conservation concern, with diminishing populations. 
However, as more areas of land have been set aside as protected, or as 
reintroduction or translocation efforts have been made to aid in species 
recolonisation of natural ranges, this has led to the resurgence of previously 
reduced wildlife populations. This has generated more opportunities for 
HWC to occur as interactions between humans and wildlife increase, 
particularly at the interface between human and wild landscapes such as in 
areas where networks of protected areas and corridors lie in a mosaic of 
human development. The strong human opinions towards charismatic but 
large and potentially dangerous mammals has further polarised the issue.   
Humans suffering the consequences of wildlife conflict are often 
marginalised communities where subsistence or traditional livelihoods are 
threatened. This analogy is most appropriate in conflict situations in 
developing countries, but can still be extended to more developed countries 
where people are suffering an impact on their livelihoods or lifestyles, 
particularly where there is a minority or other divide, such as urban and rural. 
Often, conflict is exacerbated when people believe that wildlife is valued 
more highly than their needs due to conservation efforts and funds 
seemingly dedicated to preserving wildlife at the expense of community 
development. Furthermore, in developing countries there are in the majority 
of cases insufficient resources – funds, personnel and equipment – to 
address problems of HWC.   
In these circumstances, both wildlife conservation and sustainable 
development suffers. As global biodiversity becomes restricted to remaining 
tracts of habitat dwindling within a mosaic of human cultivation and 
development (Laurance 1997), competition for resources intensifies. The 
most  severe conflict cases occur in biodiversity-rich landscapes with high 
human densities, where problems of habitat and species loss are interwoven 
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with the desperate needs of impoverished local communities, who bear a 
high cost for conservation (Balmford and Whitten 2003). 
Human-wildlife conflict – and in some cases co-existence –  has existed 
since time immemorial (Kruuk 2002), but recent losses in biodiversity have 
brought it to the foreground as a cutting edge topic in conservation. Given 
the pervasiveness of global human disturbance, impacting on three-quarters 
of the earth's habitable land surface (Hannah 1994), active conservation 
management is necessary to maintain both biological and ecosystem 
diversity (Hutton and Leader-Williams 2003).  
1.2.2 The impacts of conflict 
The diversity of human-wildlife conflict is such that it occurs world-wide, in a 
range of human-influenced landscapes and with many different species. The 
main impacts of conflict can be categorised into five classes: predation upon 
livestock, predation upon game species, attacks on humans, crop raiding 
and disease transmission (Sillero-Zubiri 2001, Thirgood et al. 2005a). 
With the diversity of species involved, conflict situations tend to be more 
extreme when involving large mammals. For example, large carnivores 
compete with humans for game species and predate livestock, while large 
ungulates raid crops. Large mammals can also be an immediate threat to 
human life, engendering fear and hostility towards the presence of these 
species in close proximity to human settlement (Berg 2001, Sillero-Zubiri 
2001, Quammen 2003, Quigley 2005). 
1.2.3 Human dimensions of conflict 
The conservation of large mammals can thus incur significant costs through 
conflict, to local communities, industry and government authorities.  
Quantification of economic costs through direct loss of livelihoods or 
investment in damage control can and has been explored relatively broadly.  
Case-studies of direct crop and livestock depredation costs indicate 
significant economic consequences on local communities in the developing 
world, for example in southern India village households lost 12% of their 
holding to large felines, and 11% of annual grain production to elephants 
(Madhusudan 2003). Additionally, the cost of carnivore compensation 
schemes to government authorities can be substantial (Nyhus et al. 2005a); 
e.g. in 2000 the Norwegian government paid out over US$11.8m in 
carnivore compensation schemes (Swenson and Andren. 2005). Indirect 
economic costs are also incurred through investment in damage control 
strategies, such as husbandry, guarding, and animal control (Breitenmoser 
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2005, Osborn 2005, Thirgood et al. 2005a), and can sometimes be much 
greater than the cost of damage, particularly for high technology solutions 
such as electric fencing.  
Indirect effects with no obvious associated economic cost are more difficult 
to quantify, for example changes in husbandry such as stock corralling or 
crop-guarding at night (Ogada 2003), or having to share homes with 
livestock to protect against tigers (Saberwal 1994). The time required for 
husbandry can also limit time spent in education or harvesting (Norton-
Griffiths 1995). Finally, it is virtually impossible – and unethical – to quantify 
the loss of human life in economic terms. Furthermore, protected areas 
themselves can impose opportunity costs on local communities, restricting 
access to natural resources and antagonising local communities towards 
parks, authorities, and protected species (Schwartzman et al. 2000).   
There is a vast and growing body of mitigation techniques for human wildlife 
conflict, but these can be broadly categorised (Inskip and Zimmermann 
2009a) into: financial schemes (e.g. compensation, economic incentives, 
ecotourism, trophy hunting); improved protection of livestock and crops (e.g. 
husbandry, guarding, barriers and deterrents); community development and 
education initiatives; problem animal control (e.g. aversive conditioning, 
translocation, lethal control); and land management such as zoning; all of 
which have had varying levels of success and failure (Mishra et al. 2003, 
Osborn and Parker 2003, Bulte and Rondeau 2005, Shivik 2006). For large 
and dangerous mammals, lethal control to prevent conflict is often one of 
several methods used, and can be a major driver in population declines 
(Treves and Naughton-Treves 2005), as seen with the extirpation or 
reduction of many large mammal populations throughout the world (Treves 
and Naughton-Treves 2005). 
1.2.4 Investing in wildlife 
Biodiversity conservation recognises that large mammals are often keystone 
species in ecosystems. Large carnivores control mesopredator and prey 
numbers, including crop pests and species which depredate smaller 
livestock, while large ungulates shape and maintain habitats and vegetation 
structure, all are functional components of ecological communities (Terborgh 
1999). Non-use values of wildlife include bequest value; preserving species 
for the benefit of future generations; and existence value, the continued 
survival of a species (Attfield 1998, Edwards 1998). Many people place 
higher values on charismatic megafauna, and support international 
conservation efforts for these species (Walpole and Leader-Williams 2002). 
- 20 - 
Large mammals are often used as flagship species to coordinate landscape 
conservation efforts and protect smaller and less charismatic species (Caro 
2003, Sergio et al. 2008). 
Yet these intangible benefits may be outweighed by the potential direct 
benefits that wildlife conservation can bring to local communities. Direct use 
can be consumptive in a variety of ways. Trophy hunting can generate 
substantial revenues (Leader-Williams and Hutton 2005) although there are 
issues of equitable revenue distribution (Leader-Williams and Hutton 2005) 
and sustainability (Hoyt 1994).  Alternatively, species may be traditionally 
important for food and medicinal uses, or in traditional practices (Edwards 
1998).  
However, the majority of revenues can be obtained through direct non-
consumptive use such as tourism (Edwards 1998), and attempts have been 
made to value individual animals (Martin 1988). Some ecotourism schemes 
appear successful, generating revenue and enabling community 
development (Gosling 1999), though revenue sharing can again be a 
problem and there is the danger of habituating dangerous animals to people 
(Saberwal 1994).  Ecotourism requires participatory planning but can 
generate sufficient incentive for communities to tolerate conflict causing 
species (Lindsey et al. 2005). 
1.2.5 Protected areas are not enough 
Currently, protected areas cover over 11% of the world's surface (Chape 
2003), but this is likely to be insufficient for viable long-term conservation of 
many large mammals. Legal protection is not always effective at a local 
level, due to a lack of resources for law enforcement and/or a local need for 
natural resources that cannot be fulfilled elsewhere (Bruner et al. 2001). The 
home ranges of many large mammals are often significantly larger than that 
of most reserves (Belovsky 1987), and conflict situations on the borders of 
protected areas that result in increased mortality can drive population 
declines (Woodroffe 1998. ). Furthermore, the remnant ranges of many 
endangered  species do not fall within protected areas (Nowell 1996). 
Conservation of these species thus requires landscape level approaches 
over a mosaic of different land uses, which necessarily must involve human-
wildlife conflict mitigation measures to be successful. Maintaining corridors 
and permitting traditional migrations can help to ensure the conservation of 
viable populations of large mammals (Simberloff 1992). 
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1.3 Changing perspectives in human-wildlife conflict 
management 
There has been an increasing drive to address HWC, with a wealth of case-
specific literature throughout the years. Conservationists were the first to 
address HWC from an ecological perspective, though recently social 
scientists have explored the human dimensions of conflict amidst calls for 
greater interdisciplinarity of approaches. 
1.3.1 A question of biology 
Biological-based reviews have periodically attempted to focus, collate, and 
direct research on HWC in general (Woodroffe 2005), for felids (Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009a), and African elephants (Osborn and Parker 2003, 
Dublin and Hoare 2004b). In particular, a multitude of opinions, 
commentaries and perspectives have addressed human-carnivore conflict 
(Treves and Karanth 2003, Karanth and Chellam 2009).  
However, many solutions proposed to conflict have failed to successfully 
address conflict issues and resolve the situation, yet continue to be 
implemented without better success worldwide. Over the years many studies 
have described utilising a number of new and improved approaches, for 
example, more quantitative approaches calculating damage to estimate 
compensation or targeting resources to address localised issues (Woodroffe 
2005). Critics state that as yet limited success has been achieved as few 
studies measure the range and spatial distribution of damages, while the 
quantification of loss is counter-intuitively a poor prediction of human 
attitudes and responses to HWC (Borgerhoff-Mulder 2006).  
There has been significant recognition that top-down methods utilised and 
advocated by conservationists have failed to incorporate human dimensions 
and thus are unable to address HWC, for example the  enforcement of 
protected area laws and penalisation of retaliatory actions against wildlife 
(Schwartzman et al. 2000). It is evident that more advanced tools are 
necessary to deal with the human aspects of conflict, and for these it is 
becoming increasingly popular to look to other disciplines. Integrating 
biological science with economics and social science methods can allow the 
emergence of solutions that are widely accepted at all levels with a greater 
chance of success, and it is in this direction that conflict management is 
evolving.  
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1.3.2 The panacea of participation 
Socio-economic reviews of HWC have  linked policy process with carnivore 
conservation (Primm and Clark 1996), landholder participation in 
conservation (Kabii and Horwitz 2006), and evaluated investments reducing 
HWC (Gore et al. 2008). A change has been seen from previous top-down 
approaches, to a bottom-up approach which involves local communities in 
conservation planning and provides economic incentives or compensation 
for costs borne from living with wildlife. The premise here is that the bottom-
up approach with economic benefits will encourage local communities to 
have a more positive attitude towards wildlife conservation (Lewis 1990). 
Thus, participatory conservation incorporating stakeholders has gained 
ground as the new humane approach to conservation, an ideal way to 
mitigate conflicts between humans and wildlife while reconciling 
conservation with development (Lewis 1990, Gadgil 1992, Child 1993, 
Western 1994, Nepal 1995). In particular it has been taken on board by 
biologists, leading to the proposal of co-management of conflicts using 
biological research and participatory planning (Treves et al. 2006a, Treves et 
al. 2006c). Examples of initiatives include Community Based Conservation 
(Western 1994), Integrated Conservation and Development Programs 
(Barrett and Arcese 1995), and Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (Turner 1999). Further support comes from those who claim 
that HWC is not inevitable, and that evidence of cultural tolerance and 
coexistence can provide tools for use elsewhere (Madden 2004).  
Yet, very few successes have been reported (Lewis 1990), and these 
ventures have been widely criticised for a number of reasons due to their 
simplicity (Barrett and Arcese 1995, Songorwa 1999, Kellert et al. 2000). In 
many cases, the participation of local communities has been symbolic 
(Alpert 1995, Gibson and Marks 1995), or only as pawns for those in power 
(Gibson and Marks 1995, Kellert et al. 2000). It has also been apparent that 
of themselves, economic incentives alone are insufficient to change attitudes 
to achieve conservation (Gillingham and Lee 1999, Langholz 1999), some 
communities lack interest in participation (Songorwa 1999), whilst initiatives 
have failed to deliver promises or address the needs of the local 
communities (Songorwa 1999). There is evidence that communities fail to 
invest in the environment or act with restraint in natural resource use (Milner-
Gulland and Bennett 2003), and that traditional practices cannot be 
extrapolated to the scale of present use (Du Toit 2002). Galvin et al. (2006) 
claim that there has been a failure to test the basic economic hypothesis – 
- 23 - 
that economic benefits for local communities will provide an incentive to 
tolerate wildlife – as in the majority of cases revenues have not reached their 
destination. The idea of the 'noble savage', where primitive communities and 
cultures have lived peaceably with wildlife, is rapidly being discounted as 
attitudes change in today's world, and few communities voluntarily choose to 
eschew Western patterns of consumption (Balmford and Whitten 2003).  
Essentially, current community based conservation approaches tend to 
create divisions between people and the environment by failing to consider 
parties equally (Mara 2003, Homewood 2004). Critics claim that successful 
recoveries of endangered wildlife populations have been in locations where 
human population densities are relatively low and rural economies are not 
reliant on subsistence agriculture, and have even noted that recovery in 
other cases may be reliant on a history of expatriate colonialism (Borgerhoff-
Mulder 2006). With rising human densities, socio-economic and political 
problems of corruption, poverty, lack of access to education, and conflicts 
over land rights as land shortage grows more apparent, costly coexistence 
with large mammals that are a danger to life and livelihood can only be 
marred by conflict. Clearly the need to mitigate conflict is vital, otherwise 
conservation efforts will be in vain as those bearing the cost will ultimately 
refuse to do so. 
1.4 Integrating interdisciplinarity 
There are a multitude of difficulties in creating a successful stakeholder-
inclusive approach to resolving conservation conflicts, therefore there is 
scope for truly interdisciplinary approaches to integrate social, political and 
economic contexts with the ecological basis for conflict in order to find a way 
forward. However, there continue to be several issues with such an 
approach beyond the initially described problem of terminology, only one 
example of the potential conflict amongst researchers and practitioners.  
1.4.1 Conflicts between disciplines 
Human wildlife conflict falls into a particular type of identified interdisciplinary 
problem: “distinctly multidisciplinary problems generated increasingly by 
society and distinguished  by relatively short-time courses calling in some 
cases for a policy-action result and in other cases for a technological quick 
fix.”        - (Sigma 1988) 
The problems of an interdisciplinary approach are commensurate with the 
general problems ascribed to interdisciplinarity. Normative arguments that 
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support a disciplinary approach are the conceptual and theoretical 
framework, depth of inquiry, systematic rigour, academic values and shared 
language. Critics claim that they are self-limiting, repetitive, bound by 
academic social hierarchies, and unable to address real-world problems 
(Heberlein 1988), problems which can be overcome using an 
interdisciplinary approach. Despite the merits of interdisciplinary research, 
general acceptance has been slow, and disciplinary approaches continue to 
be traditional. This is also in part due to barriers of communication and 
conflicts in practice between different disciplinarians, particularly between 
the social and natural scientists (Campbell 2005, Fox et al. 2006). 
1.4.2 Reporting disparities and unevaluated outcomes 
A significant obstacle to the analysis and resolution of HWC is the lack of 
coherence and cohesiveness in the literature, with few systematic 
approaches to rationalising the choice and use of particular tools. The 
literature continues to be heavily case-specific – not always useful to 
conservation practitioners. Critics have raised issue with the efficiency of 
disseminating management information (Borgerhoff-Mulder 2006, Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009a). Many studies provide site-specific and locally 
appropriate recommendations and strategies, to be used as part of a toolbox 
of methods. Yet the range of HWC control methods are vast, and continually 
increasing, thus calls have been made for this knowledge to be made 
available in such a way as to aid in conflict management situations, to 
compare approaches implemented in similar circumstances (Borgerhoff-
Mulder 2006). 
Furthermore, few conservation initiatives evaluate the efficacy, success or 
otherwise of the measures taken, and publish this in the literature. For 
example, only 31% of implemented management strategies addressing 
human-felid conflict have been evaluated scientifically (Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009a), and the effectiveness of control methods for human-
elephant conflict has not been properly quantified with few cost-benefit 
analyses (Osborn and Parker 2003). A lack of systematic and standardised 
reporting of HWC is also evident in the literature (Inskip and Zimmermann 
2009a), and this must be addressed in order to enable identification and 
resolution of global patterns and trends in HWC, and to compare conflict 
between locations and species.  For conservation practitioners to deal with a 
HWC situation, there is no comprehensive toolbox available that can be 
utilised given the particular components that feature in individual HWC 
cases. 
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1.4.3 Transcending disciplines 
The trans- and inter-disciplinary nature of the problems facing humans and 
wildlife in HWC situations have been acknowledged. Many reviewers have 
called for greater collaboration with the social sciences (Manfredo and Dayer 
2004b, Treves et al. 2006c, Inskip and Zimmermann 2009a, Redpath et al. 
in press), that HWC solutions must be driven by both biological and social 
scientific data (Brown and Decker 2005, Redpath et al. in press), and while 
technological advances may lead to improvements in management, some of 
the tools most desperately needed are social ones (Treves and Karanth 
2003, Shivik 2006), with emphasis being placed on giving responsibility to 
the communities affected (Osborn and Parker 2003). Some have proposed 
approaches for exploring the social and cultural aspects of HWC in order to 
advance our understanding (Manfredo and Dayer 2004b). Fewer have noted 
that social science research can assess economic feasibility and 
sustainability of interventions (Treves et al. 2006c), particularly since the 
incorporation of economic costs and benefits into conservation planning can 
achieve larger gains given limited budgets (Naidoo et al. 2006). However, 
many still stress the vital role of ecologists in providing scientifically 
formulated interventions above and beyond a simple reliance on community 
based solutions (du Toit et al. 2004), particularly important in light of the 
previously described criticisms of these approaches.  
Although interdisciplinarity is emerging with some overlap between the 
sciences, there is still a significant division between the biological and social 
sciences in the conflict literature. Many studies of HWC continue to be 
predominantly ecological, conversely, socio-economic analysis of HWC is 
not often conducted from the perspective of conservation interests – more 
usually from a welfare perspective. For example, in a review on co-
managing conflicts (Treves et al. 2006b), less than a quarter of citations 
were from dedicated socio-economic journals; as opposed to a socio-
economic study (Galvin et al. 2006) that utilised an integrated modeling 
approach to resolve conflicts with pastoralists in East Africa, which cited only 
eleven papers from dedicated conservation biology journals out of 133 
citations. Thus, there is still some division between the disciplines in the 
literature, despite the topic being a recognised applied interdisciplinary 
problem.  
A more interdisciplinary approach to studying conflict is therefore a relatively 
recent phenomenon, but one interesting example is the focus on raptor-
grouse conflict which runs the gamut from biological data collection to social 
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studies in order to address the contentious issue of predation on grouse by 
raptors. Publications include ecological factors driving raptor predation on 
grouse (Thirgood et al. 2000a, Amar et al. 2004), as well as conflict and 
management analysis (Thirgood et al. 2000b), and social studies on 
stakeholders and decision-making (Redpath et al. 2004, Marshall et al. 
2007b), and evaluation of different mitigation techniques (Redpath et al. 
2001). This illustrates the utilisation of a suite of biological and social science 
methodology to understand and attempt to manage conflicts with 
landowners and other interest groups to reconcile hen harrier conservation 
with traditional game keeping (Redpath and Thirgood 2009).  
1.4.4 Models of management 
An interdisciplinary approach can allow the transfer and emergence of new 
types of tools for understanding and managing conflicts. For example, one 
potential option may be in the incorporation of modeling techniques as a tool 
to determine effective HWC management. Spatial modeling has already 
been proposed in the biological sciences to predict sites of conflict, such as 
in predicting regional human-wolf conflict in the US (Treves et al. 2004), or 
predicting spatial aspects of human-elephant conflict (Sitati et al. 2003), or 
for wildlife-vehicle collisions (Juan E. Malo 2004, Andreas 2005). Spatial 
simulations of Iberian wolf populations have further incorporated the impact 
of socio-economic trends through using road traffic density and urbanisation 
of habitat as key variables, to produce a more realistic model predicting 
future wolf depredation of livestock (Santos et al. 2007).  
Ecological economic modeling in the social sciences has been utilised to a 
much greater extent to model environmental and wildlife resource 
management decisions, although few explicitly deal with HWC. Significant 
advances have been made over the past few years in using models to study 
complex systems, where modeling can quantify processes and interactions 
within a system, and integrated models can incorporate the complexities of 
human-wildlife systems. Integrated models illustrate the relationships 
between the natural and social dimensions of natural resources economies 
and have been used to model problems such as the sustainability of 
bushmeat hunting (Ling and Milner-Gulland 2006), cost-benefit analysis of 
protected areas (Albers and Robinson 2007), and fishing stocks within 
marine reserves (Pezzey et al. 2000). Resource management models 
illustrate dynamic interactions between human management and an evolving 
natural resource within spatially structured landscapes, increasingly using 
bioeconomic modeling and game theory in a variety of settings (Bischi 2004, 
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Bhat and Huffaker 2007). The development of agent-based models enable 
modeling of multi-agent systems for ecosystem management (Bousquet and 
Le Page 2004), examples include hunting activities (Bousquet et al. 2001), 
the costs and benefits of protected areas (Albers and Robinson 2007), and 
management of deer as a resource and a pest (Touza et al. in press). 
Developing these bioeconomic modeling tools using both biological and 
socio-economic parameters therefore has potential to assist in modeling 
HWC management scenarios to determine best practice with limited funds.  
Some models have been explicitly developed to deal with HWC, but focused 
within the social and economic disciplines, such as purely theoretical 
mathematical economic approaches for modeling endangered large 
mammal pest species in a developing country (Skonhoft 2007). Another 
example incorporating more real world socio-economic values is an 
Integrated Modeling and Assessment System (IMAS) to explore tradeoffs 
among different conservation policies in East Africa to mitigate conflict 
(Galvin et al. 2006). Alternative models use a real options framework to 
analyse wildlife management policies for human-wolf conflict and 
reintroduction (Bakshi 2004), and for reconciling the conflicting goals of 
managing endangered caribou populations and commercial forestry 
exploitation (Morgan 2007, S.B. and P. 2007). In particular, forestry 
management is incorporating interdisciplinarity into modeling approaches 
(Papaik 2008). The economic costs of conserving certain species known to 
cause conflict can be assessed using functional response models from 
population ecology to estimate associated welfare costs, such as with 
carnivores in Sweden (Bostedt and Grahn 2008), useful for advising policy 
decisions on the costs and benefits of wildlife conservation. Similar studies 
have modeled fox predation and preventative measures on UK sheep farms 
to determine a financially optimal solution (Moberly et al. 2004). Multiple 
criteria analysis developed for use  in natural resource management is 
another approach that can be utilised to aid economic investments in 
environmental decision-making, to maximise conservation benefits within a 
limited budget (McCoy 2003, Marinoni et al. 2009). The scope and diversity 
of potential tools that could be borrowed from other disciplines indicates that 
true interdisciplinarity is only now emerging.  
1.5 Thesis questions and structure 
Although human wildlife conflict is an interdisciplinary problem in 
conservation biology, it is only recently that mitigation efforts and the 
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literature have begun to take a truly interdisciplinary approach that 
incorporates ecological, social and economic contexts in order to understand 
and effectively manage conflicts. Since many mitigation measures and 
conflict solutions have so far failed to successfully address and resolve 
conflict issues, exploration and utilisation of interdisciplinary approaches and 
methodologies can facilitate better understanding of conflict situations and 
enable the emergence of mitigation measures with greater chances for 
success. This thesis aimed to contribute to this gap in our understanding of 
conflict, through exploring the context to conflict in a particular region, to 
understand how communities relate to wildlife and other stakeholders given 
the impact of wildlife on their lives and livelihoods, and to understand the 
potential for uptake of more effective mitigation measures given particular 
socio-economic contexts.  
The Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve (NBR), c.7,500 sq. km. of the Western Ghats 
in South India, characterises an anthropogenic/protected area mosaic where 
some of the largest remaining populations of endangered Asian mammals 
interact with an ever-growing rural human population. The NBR is a diverse 
landscape in terms of people, land use, habitats and wildlife. The 
precipitation and altitudinal gradients support a vegetative gradient ranging 
from endangered semi-evergreen forests, to moist and dry deciduous forest 
and scrub and thorn jungles, with extensive riparian forests and the 
increasingly rare high elevation shola forests and grasslands. Land uses 
have changed over time from indigenous low productivity landscapes to 
efficient production landscapes in the time of the British. Now, plantations of 
timber, tea, coffee and spices mix with vegetable farms, along a gamut of 
commercial corporate plantations and private subsistence farmers, and 
pastoralists keeping small personal herds to those supplying organic dung 
for international coffee growers. An extensive protected area network runs 
through the NBR, dating back to British hunting and timber reserves, 
supporting high biodiversity and the last stronghold for many large 
carnivores and herbivores, including tiger and Asian elephant. This mosaic 
of land use and biodiversity conservation, privilege and poverty, is a case-
study for a wide range of human wildlife conflicts.  
The general aim of this research was to investigate the ecological and socio-
economic context to human-wildlife conflicts in the Nilgiri Biosphere 
Reserve, India in order to understand and propose management options for 
resolving these conflicts.  
Specifically, the research questions to be answered were: 
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(i) Given the difficulties in establishing a conflict terminology, and the 
diversity of aspects of conflict that are often reported in the 
literature (presence of loss, intensity of loss, economic loss, 
perception): 
a. What are the landscape-level social, economic and ecological 
drivers of different aspects of conflict across the region;  
b. How do these different aspects to conflict relate to each other;  
c. Can knowledge of these site-specific drivers and their 
relationships with different aspects of conflict provide lessons 
for conflicts in other areas; 
(ii) Considering the lack of studies on the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures, and on how individuals make their choices of which 
mitigation measures to implement: 
a. What are the most effective mitigation measures currently 
employed in the region;  
b. Which criteria are important in the household decision-making 
process whereby existing and potential future mitigation 
measures are chosen;  
c. Which stakeholder group or institution should bear most 
responsibility for managing conflict and how does this interact 
with the decision-making process;   
(iii) With an understanding of the main drivers of conflict in 
combination with identifying the most effective mitigation measure 
and how it might feasibly be implemented, an agent based model 
of co-operative conflict mitigation was constructed to: 
a. Understand some of the underlying mechanisms for the 
difficulties in achieving sufficient investment in community-
based conflict mitigation schemes; 
b. Suggest alternative designs to enhance participation in 
community-based schemes to reduce problems generated by 
human-wildlife conflict.  
Although this study is focused on a particular region and will inform effective 
conflict management both in the NBR and in India, the interdisciplinary 
approach taken is transferable and can permit a greater understanding of 
conflict in other sites. Not only that, but the theoretical studies of the 
relationships between different aspects of conflict, and the agent based 
model of co-operative conflict mitigation, as well as the practical study on 
mitigation effectiveness, are generic findings that will help in the 
understanding and management of conflicts in other areas.  
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Chapter 2 
People and wildlife in the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, India 
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2.1 The landscapes of the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, Western 
Ghats 
The Western Ghats in India is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots (Myers 
et al. 2000), with 58 Protected Areas covering 9.06% of the landscape 
(CEPF 2004). However, these are isolated islands embedded in a human-
dominated landscape, and some of the highest biodiversity in the Western 
Ghats exists outside protected areas in regions supporting some of the 
highest human densities globally (Das et al. 2006). Within the Western 
Ghats, the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve (NBR) typifies many conservation 
issues associated with problems of high human and wildlife densities. In an 
area of c.7,500km2, of which c.4,500 km2 is protected, the NBR 
encompasses all the topographic and climatic variation, all the major forest 
types and much of the species diversity found across the Western Ghats. 
2.1.1 Overview of the NBR 
The NBR is India’s first Biosphere Reserve, designated in 1986 under 
UNESCO’s Man and Biosphere Reserve program, and now under 
consideration as a World Heritage Site.  The NBR lies in the three Indian 
states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, from 11°15’ - 12°15’N, 76 - 77° 
15’ E (Appendix A1), and has been divided into six geo-climatically and 
culturally distinct units (Prabhakar 1994): the Nilgiri Wayanad Plateau, 
Nilambur Plain, Sigur Plateau, Nilgiri Plateau, Coimbatore Plains, Attapadi 
Plateau (Appendix A2). These units were used to aid in sampling across the 
NBR for this study, ensuring a representative selection of villages across 
socio-ecological gradients, and adapted further with some subdivision where 
necessary to facilitate a regional management approach to conflict for 
conservation practitioners. Each of these geo-climatic units is detailed in the 
following sections.  
The landscapes of the NBR includes over 30 indigenous communities known 
as Adivasis or tribals (Bird-David 1994, Daniels 1996) many of them forest 
dwellers and hunter gatherers, as well as settlers from the major Indian 
castes, religions and communities. Given this study’s interest in conflict 
impacts on rural communities, many villages included a significant 
percentage of Adivasis. Indigenous tribal groups have inhabited the Nilgiri 
Biosphere Reserve for many centuries, and before British occupation 
indigenous communities relied on settled and shifting agriculture, hunting 
and gathering. The lands were colonised by the British in the early 1800s, 
and over the past few centuries there has been an influx of settlers from the 
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plains, especially in the decades since independence. The consequences for 
indigenous communities have been displacement into less productive areas 
and land seizures; while exploitation has led to their alienation, 
dispossession of land and public disturbances. Further, within the rural 
communities across the NBR, many people are of castes listed as 
‘Scheduled’ or ‘Other Backward Castes’, recognised  by the Indian 
Government as historically discriminated against or economically backward, 
respectively, for the purposes of affirmative action. These changes have 
been coupled with widespread changes in land use, from an insular cultural 
landscape reliant on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism to one of 
commercial production. Nowadays, land ownership in the NBR ranges from 
small private holdings of less than a hectare, to giant corporate holdings of 
hundreds of hectares. Timber plantations range from exotic wattle Acacia 
spp., eucalyptus Eucalyptus spp. and pine Pinus spp. at higher elevations to 
more valuable species such as teak Tectona grandis forests at lower 
elevations, many of which were reserved by the British and local royalty for 
timber and for hunting. Plantations of tea Camellia sinensis, coffee Coffea 
spp. and spices such as cardamom Elettaria spp. and Amomum spp., are 
widespread, while many vegetable farms supply markets in the plains. For 
smaller farmers the main growing season is monsoon dependent, from May 
– November, although for those with irrigation dry season crops are also 
grown. Crops include staple millets such as Sorghum vulgare and Eleusine 
coracana, pulses such as Dolichos lablab, Cajanus cajan, Cicer arietinum, 
paddy Oryza sativa, arecanut Areca catechu, coconut Cocos nucifera, fruit 
trees such as banana Musa spp., and jackfruit Artocarpus heterophyllus. 
Pastoralists keep several types of cattle: milk cows, scrub cattle for dung 
which supplies major organic coffee and spice growers (Madhusudan 2005), 
and oxen for draft animals; as well as buffalo, goats, and sheep. Livestock 
graze in nearby forests during the agricultural growing season, and in both 
the forests and fallow croplands at other times.  
As is the case in the Western Ghats, there is a strong precipitation gradient 
of high westerly rainfall (up to 7000mm / year) to the drier east (as low as 
500mm / year), with three distinct ecoregions: the south Western Ghats 
moist deciduous forests, south Western Ghats montane rainforests, and 
south Deccan Plateau dry deciduous forests. Habitat types thus transition 
from westerly tropical semi evergreen and moist deciduous forests, through 
deciduous and dry deciduous forests, to the dry scrub and thorn forests of 
the east. There is also a strong altitudinal influence, with higher elevations 
associated with wet montane shola forests and grasslands.  
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As one of the critical catchment areas of peninsular India, several major 
watercourses such as the Bhavani, Moyar and Kabini rivers provide fresh 
water and hydroelectric power to the towns and cities within and surrounding 
the NBR, to the southern Deccan Peninsula, and the plains of southern 
Tamil Nadu. However, the multitude of dams and hydrological projects, 
particularly in the Kundah, Bhavani and Moyar basins, have changed the 
hydrology of the NBR. Part of the Western Ghats mountain range, the 
rugged terrain spans the main massifs, leveling out towards the eastern 
plains. For much of the NBR, the heavy showers of the north-east monsoon 
fall in October to December, while the south west showers are more 
intermittent between June to September, particularly in the easterly parts 
which lie in the rain shadow of the Western Ghats.   
Approximately 4,500km2 is protected at a high level (Table 1 and Appendix 
A2) as either National Parks (IUCN Category II Protected Area) that permit 
no anthropogenic use and are managed by the National Board for Wildlife; 
or as Wildlife Sanctuaries and designated Project Tiger Reserves (IUCN 
Category IV Protected Area) which may assign rights to indigenous groups 
under the State Board for Wildlife. More land is protected to a lesser extent 
in Reserve Forests, declared at the state government level, much of which 
forms a contiguous network across the NBR. Protected areas in India are 
managed under the Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972, as amended, and also 
falls under the remit of the Indian Forest Act 1927, Forest (Conservation) Act 
1989, Environment (Protection) Act 1986, Biological Diversity Act 2002, and 
the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of 
Forest Rights) Act 2006. Additional funding for protected areas is provided 
by the Ministry of Environment and Forests to State/Union Territory 
Governments under three main schemes: Integrated Development of Wildlife 
Habitats, Project Tiger and Project Elephant.   
A high proportion of the Western Ghats’ biodiversity is represented in the 
NBR (Daniels 1993), with several species endemic to the NBR: 23 species 
of fish, the Nilgiri laughing thrush Garrulax cachinnans and the mouse Mus 
famulus, while 156 of the 285 species of vertebrates endemic to the Western 
Ghats are found in the NBR. Rich in floral diversity, 132 flowering plant 
species are endemic to the NBR, including the genus Baeolepis and 8 
endemic orchids.  
The NBR hosts significant populations of large mammals, including some of 
the highest densities of large carnivore and herbivore species in Asia, and a 
last stronghold for the tiger Panthera tigris and Asian elephant Elephas 
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maximus (Karanth and Sunquist 1992, Kumar 1999, Karanth and Sunquist 
2000). With a diverse predator and prey assemblage, other carnivores 
include leopard Panthera pardus, dhole Cuon alpinus, sloth bear Melursus 
ursinus, and herbivores such as gaur Bos gaurus, sambar Cervus unicolour, 
chital Axis axis, wild pig Sus scrofa, and muntjac Muntiacus muntjak. Recent 
elephant and tiger censuses highlight the NBR mosaic of protected areas as 
containing the majority of the remaining Indian populations, holding between 
5,000 – 8,000 elephants (Rangarajan et al. 2010) and 382 tigers (Jhala et al. 
2011). It is becoming increasingly apparent that significant populations of 
wildlife are present outside of protected areas and moving throughout the 
wider landscape (Bhagwat et al. 2005, Bali et al. 2007).  
From February/March until May/June, in India’s summer months, large 
mammals migrate from Mudumalai Wildlife Sanctuary in Tamil Nadu (the 
easterly part of the NBR), through Bandipur Tiger Reserve in Karnataka, into 
Wayanad Sanctuary in Kerala (the westerly part of the NBR) following the 
availability of water (CEC 2000). However, with the loss of large areas of 
forest throughout the NBR, it appears that traditional migratory routes, such 
as for elephants, have been disturbed (Menon et al. 2005). The protected 
area network is thus increasingly fragmented, and much of the biodiversity 
rich areas in the Western Ghats falls outside protected areas (Das et al. 
2006) that still retain native vegetation, such as plantation landscapes of 
shade coffee and tea, or heterogenous farming or pastoral landscapes. 
These are also more likely to be subject to conflicts between people and 
wildlife. Villages surveyed for this study ranged from being within a Protected 
Area (PA) to up to 35km away, but given the mosaic nature of the 
landscape, were never more than 4km from a forested area, usually 
designated as Reserve Forest. 
Culturally, in India tolerance for wildlife has been a long-standing tradition, 
particularly towards large mammals (Sukumar 1994, Madhusudan and 
Mishra 2003) which continue to persist despite the highest human densities 
globally. Religious practices continue to revere and worship deities 
symbolised by wild animals, such as Ganesha the elephant god, and the 
tiger as the steed of the goddess Durga, as positive forces (Rangarajan 
1998). Hunting continues to be illegal in India, and although it is considered 
a serious threat (Velho et al. 2012) there is little Indian tradition of 
extermination or persecution, as opposed to European and North American 
histories (Schwartz et al. 2003); despite the best efforts of the British, who 
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established hunting preserves and bounties on pest species (Rangarajan 
2001).  
 
Table 1: Protected areas in the NBR (designation, area, and date 
established) 
State Protected Area Area 
(km2) 
Date 
designated 
Kerala Wayanad WLS & ER 364 1973 
Kerala Silent Valley WLS 237 1980 
Kerala Mukurthi NP 81 2001 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Mudumulai WLS & TR 344 1940 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Sathyamangalam WLS 1,412 2008 
(enlarged 
2011) 
Karnataka Nagharole / Rajiv Gandhi NP & TR 707 1988 
Karnataka Bandipur NP & TR 877 1973 
Karnataka Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple WLS & TR 540 1974 
(enlarged 
1987) 
Abbreviations: WLS = Wildlife Sanctuary; ER = Elephant Reserve; NP = 
National Park; TR = Tiger Reserve; 
 
Key threats to the NBR include habitat fragmentation and loss, over-
exploitation of forest resources, and large-scale development projects that 
have cleared large areas of wildlife habitat, for roads and major highways, 
hydroelectric dams and reservoirs.  
An ongoing influx of settlers and an increasing human population has led to 
significant changes in forest cover. Non-native monoculture plantations 
threaten many of the native tree species, with extensive timber plantations of 
Eucalyptus spp., and Acacia spp., and cash crops of tea Camellia sinensis 
and coffee Coffea spp., which are increasingly becoming less shade grown 
or reliant on non-native shade trees such as silver oak Grevillea robusta. 
Agricultural expansion is encroaching into both reserve forests and protected 
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areas. High altitude native habitats such as shola forests and grasslands are 
especially threatened by land use changes. Fuelwood collection has been 
cited as a major driver of forest degradation (Puyravaud et al. 2010) and 
there are claims that collection of non-timber forest products may also be 
unsustainable (Davidar et al. 2010). However, it is difficult to quantify the 
extent of forest degradation in India, given official government reports of 
increasing forest cover and the lack of rigorous independent studies 
(Davidar et al. 2010, Puyravaud et al. 2010), although there is some 
evidence that land use change has resulted in decreasing forest cover in the 
Western Ghats (Jha et al. 2000, Davidar et al. 2010).  
Livestock keeping is also a growing issue, with estimates of 65 cattle/km2 in 
the Sigur region (Ganesan 1993), to 236 animals/km2 on the northern 
boundary of Bandipur National Park (Madhusudan 2005). Livestock compete 
with wildlife for resources, depressing populations (Madhusudan 2004) and 
potentially reducing fodder availability (Baskaran et al. 2012).  
The hill stations and protected areas in the NBR are major tourist attractions, 
and unregulated tourism has led to a proliferation of resorts and the 
associated impacts on wildlife and habitats. This has been particularly 
noticeable with recent media and political attention on the 2012 temporary 
ban on tourism in tiger reserves1
Karanth and Karanth 2012
. Tourism proponents claimed banning 
tourism would cause the extinction of tigers without monitoring by tourist 
operators and the loss of public support fuelled by tiger tourism; while 
tourism opponents claimed tourism was the main threat to tigers due to the 
disturbances it caused and that tourist use of protected areas was favoured 
over the rights of local people ( ). This latter 
accusation has been further compounded by the 2006 Forest Rights Act, 
which has recently been implemented in practice to award local communities 
traditional rights and responsibilities over their local forests. This has divided 
personal opinions of conservationists and the urban population, many of 
whom strongly believe rural communities are unable to sustainably manage 
these resources2
                                            
1 The interim order of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition 12351/2010 (Ajay 
Dubey vs the National Tiger Conservation Authority) 
.  
2 http://www.conservationindia.org/articles/whose-forest-is-it-anyway 
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2.1.2 Nilgiri Wayanad Plateau 
The Nilgiri Wayanad Plateau extends for nearly 740 km2 in the north western 
part of the NBR, separated from the Nilgiri and Sigur Plateaux by the Moyar 
River. Since British times, the deciduous forests have been managed for 
teak and timber. Now, the eastern fringes of the plateau are protected within 
Wayanad Wildlife Sanctuary, Nagharole National Park, Bandipur National 
Park, and Mudumalai Wildlife Sanctuary. Human populations are highest in 
the central and western parts of the plateau, where shade coffee cultivation 
(Coffea arabica and C. robusta) is prevalent. Rice is grown in swampy 
valleys, and tea plantations are dispersed at higher elevations. The region 
sampled in this study focused on the villages located in Wayanad district, 
Kerala. The terrain in Wayanad is primarily hilly and mountainous, 
contributing to the isolation of this area over the centuries and the lack of 
railways. Ranging from 700 – 2100m asl with the average elevation on the 
plateau being 800m asl, annual rainfall varies from 1500-2500mm/yr. The 
forests comprise semi evergreen patches in the west, to moist and dry 
deciduous forests in the east. The entire district was heavily forested in the 
past, with much of the remaining forest located in the Wayanad Wildlife 
Sanctuary. The Sanctuary is split into North and South divisions, and is part 
of one of India’s largest elephant reserves. The Kabini River drains the entire 
district. 
The major Adivasi (tribal) groups include the Paniyas, Kattunaickens, 
Kuruchiars and the Mullu Kurumbas, many of which have been displaced 
into the hilly and least accessible parts of the district. Much of the forest was 
converted into estates of coffee, rubber, tea and other cash crops during 
land seizures. Human wildlife conflict in the area has been focused on 
agricultural crops (92% of damage), with low incidences of human injury 
(1.1%) and death (0.6%) (Bashir 2000). The livelihoods for most of the tribal 
communities is wage labour or forest product collection, except for the Mullu 
Kurumbas and Kuruchiars who own some land. Forest products are the 
primary livelihood, based on collecting honey, fruit of the Acacia 
concinna (shikakai), the ayurvedic herb Sida acuta (kurunthotti), tree and 
stone moss; particularly for commercial production, but also for personal and 
medicinal use. Although the forests are protected, they are intensively used, 
with grazing pressures from the Karnataka side. Many people from the 
northern part of Wayanad migrate to Coorg as estate workers, given limited 
labour opportunities. Wayanad is considered to be an important contributor 
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to foreign exchange earnings for Kerala, despite the problems of land and 
settlers.   
2.1.3 Nilambur Plain  
The 355km2 Nilambur Valley lies to the west of the Nilgiri Plateau, which 
descends from over 2500m asl to 80m asl. Precipitation is high, from 2500-
5000mm/yr, and coupled with the altitudinal variation has resulted in high 
botanical diversity with several forest types. The area includes two forest 
divisions, Nilambur North and South and the New Amarambalam Reserve 
Forests. Part of a forest belt running through Kerala, the Nilambur forests 
are contiguous with Silent Valley National Park to the south. West coast 
tropical evergreen forests are found at 800-1250m asl, with rainfall of over 
2500mm/yr, changing to west coast semi-evergreen Dipterocarp forests at 
500-800m asl. Moist deciduous forests eastwards experience more 
anthropogenic disturbances than the west coast forests. Southern sub-
tropical evergreen (hill) forests and southern montane wet temperate forests 
are found along the ridges and upper reaches, with shola forests and 
grasslands at the highest elevations. The extensive teak Tectona grandis 
plantations in the region are the oldest in the country, and most of the 
remaining forests have been used for timber production due to easy 
transport along the Chaliyar river. These remnant lowland evergreen forests 
are one of the most threatened forest types in the Western Ghats. The 
forests provide the western part of the district and much of Kerala with water, 
the most important rivers being the Chaliyar and the tributaries of 
Karimpuzha and Cherupuzha. 
The Adivasi tribes in Nilambur place great importance on the forests for 
social, cultural and economic purposes, major hill tribes being the 
Cholanaickens, Kattunaickens, Pathinaicken, Paniyas and Aranadans. For 
most of these communities, gathering for food has been replaced by 
gathering for income. Livelihoods are split into forest and non-forest 
activities. Forest products include honey, resin, bamboo, rattan, forest fruits, 
and roots with medicinal value. Other activities include wage work in 
agricultural fields and rubber estates, in plantations, bamboo cutting, 
collection of reeds, keeping livestock or practicing some agriculture. In this 
area, poaching is a major problem, usually attributed to outsiders entering 
the forest at night and hunting. Conflict with wildlife is increasing in the 
border regions of the forest and agricultural lands, including human injuries 
and death. Collection of non-timber forest products may be unsustainable, 
and human induced forest fires are increasing in some areas.  
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2.1.4 Sigur Plateau  
The Sigur Plateau lies in the north east of the NBR, covering 340km2 at an 
average elevation of 1000m asl. In the rain shadow of the Nilgiri Plateau, the 
average rainfall is approximately 1000mm/yr in the western parts to 
500mm/yr in the east, with a dry season of up to 8 months. Low rainfall and 
the prevalence of malaria have contributed to low human populations. This 
rainfall gradient is reflected in the botanical diversity, from deciduous forests 
and riparian tracts with mighty trees in the west to a stunted scrub vegetation 
in the east. The Sigur Plateau is connected to the deciduous forests of 
Bandipur National Park and Mudumulai Wildlife Sanctuary in the west, and 
Sathyamangalam Wildlife Sanctuary to the east. The Moyar gorge divides it 
from the Mysore plateau to the north.  
Within the Sigur Plateau, this study focused on two regions that include the 
major protected areas: the eastern edge of Mudumulai National Park in 
Tamil Nadu; and the region surrounding the Sathyamangalam Wildlife 
Sanctuary and Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Wildlife Sanctuary which 
overlaps Sathyamangalam in Tamil Nadu and Chamrajnagar in Karnataka. 
The landscape to the east of Mudumalai National Park links a number of 
protected areas, hence supports high densities of large mammals and is an 
important elephant corridor within the NBR. Threats include heavy 
overgrazing, invasive plants and human population growth. Before 
independence, the Nilgiri Game Association was formed in this area in 1877 
to regulate hunting, giving exclusive rights to the ruling elite and excluding 
the indigenous populations of Adivasis. After independence, there was a 
focus on hydropower projects across the plateau with numerous dams; and 
pastoralism, with cattle being reared for milk and dung in the savanna 
woodlands, most recently to provide manure for organic farming 
(Madhusudan 2005). The Sathyamangalam forests form a large tract that 
runs from the Moyar Valley to the Dhimbam hills, including Sathyamangalam 
Wildlife Sanctuary, under the Sathyamangalam Forest Division. Typifying the 
Eastern Ghat ecotype, the forests are tropical dry forests, part of the South 
Deccan Plateau dry deciduous forest ecoregion, and including thorn forest, 
dry deciduous, and tropical hill forest. The major Adivasi groups are the 
Irulas and the Soligas, traditional hunter-gatherers which are now primarily 
settled in isolated agricultural villages. The main crops are rainfed 
vegetables and ragi, and each family typically has 1-2 acres of land. 
Recently, drought has caused poor yields and food has become scarcer. 
The Adivasis also continue to depend on NTFPs (Non-Timber Forest 
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Products), predominantly amla and seemar; and work as wage labourers on 
nearby estates. Chamrajnagar district lies in the lee of the Nilgiris, mostly 
semi-arid rain-dependent flatlands and forested hills. Forest types range 
from scrub to deciduous and riparian, with extensive coffee plantations. The 
main protected area is the Biligiri Rangaswamy Temple Wildlife Sanctuary, 
contiguous with the forests of Sathyamangalam, where the Western Ghats 
ecotype meets the Eastern Ghats. The main Adivasi group is the Soligas, 
who depend on the forest for NTFPs, collecting honey, gooseberry 
Phyllanthus spp., Phoenix spp., and lichen. The Soligas also practice shifting 
cultivation to grow ragi as their staple diet.  
2.1.5 Nilgiri Plateau  
The Nilgiri Plateau is a gently rolling plateau with an average elevation of 
1800m asl, colonised for several centuries. In the 1800s the British 
established coffee and tea plantations, and replaced native species with pine 
Pinus spp., wattle Acacia spp., bluegum Eucalyptus spp.. Natural shola 
forests and grasslands are now restricted to the southwest, in Mukurti 
National Park. The plateau contains eight large reservoirs that provide water 
and electricity to more than a million people on the plains.  
Within the Nilgiri Plateau, data collection focused on the Kotagiri area in 
Tamil Nadu. The Kotagiri slopes rise dramatically from 300m asl in the 
valleys to 2000m asl on the plateau, with precipitation ranging from 800-
1500mm/yr, with much less rain in the easterly slopes. The Moyar river runs 
to the north, flowing through the gorges of the Sigur range, and to the west is 
the plateau of the Ooty region. The Kallar river valley separates the Kotagiri 
slope from the Coonoor slopes to the south. Much of the remaining forests 
are located on the slopes which support good wildlife populations, with the 
vegetation on the plateau fragmented by tea estates. On the slopes below 
1000m asl, there are dense dry deciduous forests and savanna woodland, 
and tracts of riparian forests which include the endangered Cycas circinalis. 
From 1000-1800m asl, species-rich semi-evergreen forests hosting the 
endangered Canarium strictum (Agasimami 2003) are under threat from 
expanding tea estates. The high altitude shola forests on the plateau, 
although protected as Reserve Forests, are highly fragmented and face 
pressures from fuel wood collection. There are several Adivasi groups in the 
region. The Irulas and Kurumas have forest settlements typically located at 
800-1000m asl. These groups practice shifting cultivation and collect NTFPs, 
including fruit of the Phyllanthus emblica, and leaves of the Phoenix humilis, 
and honey gatherers frequent the rock bee Apis dorsata nests in the cliffs of 
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the eastern slopes. There is also access to wage labour, which is on the 
increase. The Todas and Kotas live in hamlets on the plateau, as 
pastoralists, agriculturalists, and employed in government jobs. The Kotagiri 
region is the source of many major rivers which flow into the Bhavani and 
the Moyar rivers.   
2.1.6 Coimbatore Plains 
The Coimbatore Plains lie to the east of the NBR, extending for 525km2 at 
an average elevation of 300m asl. In the southwestern rain-shadow of the 
Nilgiri Plateau, rainfall ranges from 500-1250mm/yr during the northeast 
monsoon. Access from the plains of Tamil Nadu and the presence of 
Coimbatore, a large trading town, means that this region has been densely 
populated historically until the present day, and remnant forests are 
degraded, exploited for fuelwood, bamboo, sandalwood and other forest 
produce.  
Within the Coimbatore Plains, this study focused on Pillur, in an isolated part 
of Coimbatore district. It is densely forested and relatively less populated 
over hilly terrain. Pillur borders the Kerala forests to the west and the 
Coonoor slopes of the Nilgiris in the north. The botanically diverse forests 
range from dry deciduous to scrub savanna woodland, with riparian 
evergreen patches and bamboo breaks. Major groups in Pillur include 
several villages of Adivasi Irulas, some traders linking the tribal communities 
to the outside world, and a large village of recent settlers. Villages in this 
region are forest settlements close to the single major road passing through 
the area. Several of the more isolated villages have been provided with 
government solar fences to protect crops from raiding by elephants. The 
area is well supplied with water due to its westerly aspect, and some villages 
have access to irrigation. Land parcels are usually large with families 
typically owning 4-5 acres. Crops grown include sesame, horse gram, ragi, 
and many vegetables. The main Adivasi occupation is NTFP collection, 
especially honey gathering, and people depend on the forest for much of 
their needs, bartering forest products in markets for produce such as 
cereals. Other villages practice agriculture or take wage labour for richer 
farmers or tea estates, or are employed in government run projects or for the 
forest department.   
2.1.7 Attapadi Plateau  
The Attapadi Plateau covers c. 840 km2 at an average elevation of 800m asl, 
bordered by the Nilgiri Plateau and the Palghat Gap, a lowland separating 
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the Nilgiris from the southern Western Ghats. Rainfall varies from 800-
4000mm/yr across the west-east rainfall gradient. Vegetation varies along 
this gradient from westerly evergreen forest to scrub-savanna in the east. 
The forests have been extensively used for timber since the 1800s under 
British control, and there are plantations of eucalyptus and teak, although 
commercial timber extraction is now rare. Several tributaries drain into the 
major Bhavani river which flows through Tamil Nadu. This region contains 
Silent Valley National Park, still relatively undisturbed, with high floral and 
faunal diversity and described as the sole surviving major tract of evergreen 
forest in the Western Ghats. Towards the east of the plateau the vegetation 
is dry deciduous forest.  
The area surrounding Silent Valley National Park was the focus of this study. 
The landscape has been mostly fallow but recent development interventions 
have promoted cultivation with the establishment of teak and bamboo 
plantations. Indigenous Adivasis are primarily Irulas, with some Mudugas 
and Kurumbas; and settlers have also come from both Tamil Nadu and other 
parts of Kerala. Local communities have traditionally practiced shifting 
cultivation although this has diminished over time. Other livelihood activities 
include agriculture such as the cultivation of millets, NTFP collection and 
wage labour. Forest degradation and the lack of irrigation has affected the 
livelihoods of residents, particularly the tribal groups. 
2.2 Demographics of villages within the NBR 
2.2.1 Sample villages and survey methodology 
Across the NBR, 62 villages with differing community composition, 
population size, and ecological attributes were sampled to investigate levels 
of human-wildlife conflict (table 2, Appendix A2). These villages comprised 
both tribal and non-tribal communities, and were sampled based on variation 
in ecological and socio-economic attributes, but also for logistical reasons of 
access. Preliminary visits invited interested representatives to attend a group 
interview on behalf of the village as a whole. To standardise data collection, 
training workshops were held with the field staff who conducted the 
interviews, piloted in four villages and refined during the course of training. A 
village-level standardised semi-structured questionnaire survey was then 
conducted at each village with a small group of representatives to obtain 
data at a village level (appendix B), between May 2009 to August 2009. 
Villages selected for the village-level and household-level surveys are listed 
within their respective zone in Table 2 and also shown in Appendix A2.  
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Eighteen villages out of the original 62 surveyed were chosen for an in-depth 
assessment at the household level. These villages were chosen on the basis 
of a number of criteria, in the following order of importance: 1) dependence 
on livelihoods vulnerable to human-wildlife conflict (HWC); 2) perception of 
conflict combined with measures of actual and proportional loss (including 
retaliation and negative attitudes); 3) areas where large mammals of 
conservation concern are causing conflicts. Villages that fulfilled multiple 
criteria using data from the initial village level survey were prioritised. The 
villages chosen for the household-level survey included villages from all 
zones, excepting Attapadi, which was subsequently excluded for logistical 
reasons as access became too difficult over the course of the study. The 
selected villages were of different sizes, and covered a range of 
communities, generally divided into Adivasis and non-tribals (also known as 
settlers) for the purpose of this study. Ecologically, the villages covered the 
main precipitation, altitudinal and hence vegetation gradient. However, the 
subset of villages reflected the original sample size, focusing on villages 
near protected areas, and those with tribal communities.  
These final 18 villages were then the focus of a range of data gathering 
exercises, for which training was undertaken with the field staff to ensure a 
standardised approach across survey personnel. Households in each village 
were questioned using the household level survey (appendix C1). General 
data on the village was obtained, such as decision-making structures, 
infrastructure and development, resources and access to opportunities. A 
conflict monitoring scheme was set up at each village whereby incidents of 
conflict were reported to and recorded by field staff (appendix C2). This 
record of conflict incidents throughout the study period enables validation of 
actual losses against reported losses in the questionnaires, and allows for 
the measurement of the effectiveness of intervention measures.  
Full details of the data collected at both village and household level are 
given in the relevant data chapters. Contextual description of some of the 
results are presented in the following sections to characterise the conflict 
landscape of the NBR.  
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Table 2: Surveyed villages in which the Perception Survey and Evaluation 
Survey (in bold) were undertaken, classed in their respective regions  
Zone (from 
west to 
east) 
No. villages 
(village-level 
surveys) 
No. villages 
(household-
level surveys) 
Village Names 
Nilgiri 
Wayanad 
Plateau  
10 5 10th mile, Cheengod, 
Cheeyambam73, Chegadi, 
Chembra, Koloth, Pazhuppathur, 
Puthiyoor, Valluvadi, Varayal; 
Nilambur 
Plain  
9 2 Ettapara, Nedungayam, 
Nellikuttu/Randampadam, 
Palakayam, Pattakarimb, Pothukal, 
Punchakoli, Uchukulam/Theekady, 
Vallipoola; 
Attapadi 
Plain 
7 0 Chindakki, Kallamala, Karuvara, 
Puthuoor, Puthuvepadam, 
Thadikkundu, Uppalam; 
Coimbature 
Plain  
7 2 Baralikadu, Kadamankombei, 
Kandiyur, Kil sengalur, Kodiyur, 
Maanar, Poochamarathur; 
Nilgiri 
Plateau  
11 4 Bangalapadigai, Bikkapathy 
mund, Eelada, Garikiyur, 
Jakkanarai/Banagudi, 
Kambattikombei, Kilcoupe, 
Masakal, Mund(koduthen mund), 
Nedugula, Vellarikombei; 
Sigur  18 5 Anaikatti, Boothanatham, 
Chemmanatham, 
Kurumbarpallam, Singara, Siriyur, 
Vazhaithottam; 
   Bejalhatti, Bhudipadagai, 
Bhuthalapuram, Kaangarai, 
Kadambur, Mavalla, 
Odayarpalayam, Pulinjur, 
Pulinjur/Muneeswara Colony, 
Ramaranai, Talamalai; 
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2.2.2 Social attributes 
The villages sampled covered a range of demographics (Table 3). 
Population and household numbers were variable, although household size 
was fairly consistent. Villages and individuals were asked which community 
they belonged to, and volunteered the level of detail they were willing to 
provide, although the resulting data were presented as split by Adivasi and 
non-tribal. Specific details on caste were not asked or presented to follow 
ethical guidelines. The proportions of Adivasis and non-tribal or settler 
communities were variable, but biased towards Adivasi communities to 
some degree. However, the total number of households in a village was 
significantly negatively correlated with the percentage of Adivasi 
communities present: larger villages held a greater proportion of non-tribal 
communities.  
 
Table 3: Social attributes (population size, household number, household 
size, and percentage of Adivasis) of areas sampled in the Nilgiri 
Biosphere Reserve 
Social 
Attributes 
Nilgiri 
Wayanad  
Nilambur  Attapadi  Coimbatore  Nilgiri  Sigur  
Av. 
population 
size 
332.2  
±100.5 
270.3 
±99.1 
217.1 
±43.1 
106.6           
±23.2 
403.5 
±181.8 
373.1   
±62.9 
Av. 
household 
number 
80.9  
±25.5 
68     
±23.4 
40.1   
±8.8 
23.6                  
±4.1 
97.3    
±44.0 
84.9    
±15.7 
Av. 
household 
size 
4.5      
±0.2 
3.8    
±0.23 
5.5    
±0.4 
4.3                  
±0.6 
4.2      
±0.5 
4.6      
±0.4 
Av. Adivasi 
% 
60.6  
±13.2 
69.6  
±15.4 
70.1 
±18.1 
100                   
±0 
66.7    
±14.2 
82.3    
±7.5 
 
2.2.3 Land and ownership 
To obtain an overview of village/zone level economic status, a number of 
variables were investigated: village size, land holdings, irrigation, 
commercial crops, and overall crop or livestock holding (Table 4). These can 
all be considered as indicating a higher economic status. As expected, larger 
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villages tend to hold, own, farm, commercialise or irrigate more land, and 
have a greater worth of crops and/or livestock, showing a significant positive 
correlation between these variables. Since all these variables are closely 
linked, they appear to reliably indicate a measure of economic status.  
 
Table 4: Economic attributes (village land, farmland, irrigation, ownership, 
crop holdings and livestock holdings) for each area sampled in the 
Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve 
Economic 
Attributes 
Nilgiri 
Wayanad  
Nilambur  Attapadi  Coimbatore  Nilgiri  Sigur  
Av. village 
land 
214.4       
±105.0 
57.2             
±43.3 
55          
±16.1 
74.6               
±14.4 
165.3     
±88.1 
158.9 
±37.2 
Av. 
farmland 
204.7          
± 102.5 
12.7          
±5.9 
51.1       
±14.6 
30.6                
±10.2 
64.3     
±23.0 
125.3 
±29.7 
Av. 
irrigated 
farmland 
44                
±25.0 
2.9            
±2.2 
2.3          
±1.7 
6.9                
±4.6 
3.2      
±1.8 
1.6      
±1.1 
Av. owned 
land 
209.3         
±105.9 
56.1          
±43.5 
41.7        
±17.1 
17.3               
±7.6 
65.7    
±22.7 
52.2    
±17.8 
Av. 
commercial 
crop 
acreage 
144.9          
±80.3 
19.6             
±9.0 
18.2          
±10.9 
16                
±5.2 
125.1   
±81.3 
80.9    
±25.2 
Av. crop 
holding 
(lakh 
Rupees) 
8.8                
±4.9 
15.4       
±8.2 
 
8.0             
±5.6 
 
1.4                 
±0.8 
11.9  
±7.6 
 
2.5     
±0.9 
Av. 
livestock 
holding 
(lakh 
Rupees) 
10.3            
±3.1 
1.1               
±0.3 
5.7           
±2.0 
2.2                 
±0.8 
3.3      
±1.0 
19.7    
±8.3 
 
Correlated variables were removed from later data analysis, and only 
farmland was retained as a potential predictor for the statistical models. The 
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‘wealthiest’ to the ‘poorest’ zones through a combination of these attributes 
emerge as: the Nilgiri Wayanad Plateau, Nilgiri Plateau, Sigur, Nilambur 
Plain, Attapadi Plain, and Coimbatore Plain. 
Other community issues are apparent from the data. For example, the 
percentage of tribal communities is negatively correlated with village land, 
owned land, irrigated farmland, numbers of households owning land, the 
acreage of commercial crops, and the total value of the crop holding; while it 
is positively correlated with the land cover of crops palatable to wildlife. This 
would suggest that tribal communities own less land, with less ability to 
irrigate, grow less commercial crops and more palatable subsistence crops, 
with implications in terms of access to investment for irrigation and the 
growing of commercial crops. The dominance of palatable crops may also 
predispose these communities to crop-raiding by wildlife.  
2.2.4 Livelihood dependencies 
Data were gathered on the main sources of livelihoods within each village. 
These were agriculture, livestock, forest related (forest products and forest 
watchers) and employment (wage labour, other employment, and leasing of 
land). Agriculture and livestock are the livelihoods subject to the most 
intense conflicts.  
 
 
Figure 1: Livelihood dependencies (employment, forest related, livestock, 
agriculture) for villages in the regions of the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve 
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Within each zone, the villages sampled covered the range from no 
dependency on these two livelihoods to wholly dependent, and the average 
dependency per zone is shown in Figure 1. Across zones, there is a 
significant difference in reliance on these two conflict-prone livelihoods 
(ANOVA: F61,6 = 3.182, p = 0.009, n  = 62), implying that different zones may 
have different levels of vulnerability to conflict given their varying reliance on 
these livelihoods. Overall, employment makes up a just over a third of 
livelihood dependency, agriculture just over a quarter, while the remainder is 
split fairly equally between forest related and livestock. Almost all the areas 
depend on agriculture and livestock for approximately 50% of their 
livelihood, excepting Nilambur for which these livelihoods make up less than 
a quarter.  
The level of reliance on agriculture and livestock correlates with a number of 
other variables. Agricultural reliance positively correlates with the number of 
households owning land, acres of owned land, percentage reliance on 
commercial crops, percentage land cover of commercial crops, but also with 
the acreage and percentage of abandoned land. This suggests that an 
increasing reliance on agriculture is coupled with increasing land ownership 
and increasing crop commercialisation, and possibly the economic leeway to 
permit the abandonment of unsuitable lands or those prone to crop raiding. 
Reliance on livestock keeping is correlated with the percentage of 
households sharecropping, and the percentage of acreage used for 
sharecropping, suggesting that the need for subsistence agriculture or 
fodder is met in this way alongside the keeping of livestock. Increasing 
livestock reliance is also correlated with numbers of large livestock (cattle 
and/or buffalo) and the total value of the livestock holding. The combined 
reliance on agriculture and livestock also correlates with the land cover of 
crops palatable to wildlife. This implies that households relying on both 
practices for income may also need to grow more fodder for livestock and 
subsistence foods for themselves that would also be palatable to wildlife, 
and may be associated with higher levels of conflict.  
2.3 Agricultural practices and crop raiding contexts 
Crop production experienced a variety of problems according to villagers, 
and the percentage occurrence with which each problem was cited is 
displayed in Figure 2 for the entirety of the NBR region, along with the 
average ranking, and average percentage of crop reported as lost to that 
problem. The mean rank of each crop problem is significantly different for 
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each crop problem type (problem ranking Kruskal-Wallis: p < 0.001, n = 62), 
but there is no significant difference in the average percentage of crops lost 
to each problem type. This suggests that problems are perceived differently 
although the losses suffered are similar.   
 
Figure 2: Average percentage of crop lost, and average ranking where 1 = 
most serious, for each problem facing crop production across the NBR 
It is evident from the data that crop raiding is consistently ranked as the 
highest threat to crop production. By zone, the percentage contribution of 
each crop problem to loss is not quite the same, with weather causing the 
most losses, closely followed by crop raiding, then insects/pests, rodents 
and disease (Figure 3). Weather affects all zones to a major extent except 
Attapadi, although different weather problems are zone specific: only Nilgiri 
Wayanad lists climate change as a problem; heavy wind only affects 
Nilambur and Attapadi; while frost only affects Nilgiri. Drought is prevalent 
everywhere except Attapadi. Rodents and insects/pests also affect all zones 
except Nilgiri Wayanad. 
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Figure 3: Percentage contribution each cited problem (weather, rodents, 
pests, crop raiding, disease) makes to overall crop losses by region in 
the NBR 
 
A total of 1456 households in 50 villages (out of 4471 households in 62 
villages) reported suffering from crop raiding from 2007 - 2009, losing an 
average of 26% of their crops over an estimated 1778 acres, and a total of 
14,325,650 Indian Rupees (143 lakh Rupees, equivalent to £162,278) from 
2007 - 2009.  
2.3.1 Wildlife species responsible for crop raiding 
Wildlife species or groups of species that were perceived as most 
problematic across the NBR are displayed in Figure 4a, as the average 
ranking achieved (where 1 is the most serious or problematic species), and 
the average percentage of crop lost to that species. Figure 4b also shows 
the total reported area of crop lost to that species, and the total numbers of 
households affected by that species. There is a significant correlation 
between perceived rank and proportion lost, and between damaged area 
and numbers of households affected. Species perceived to be problematic 
are, in order of decreasing importance, wild pig, elephant, gaur, primates, 
deer (primarily sambar and chital but also muntjac), rodents (primarily 
porcupines), and birds. In general, species ranked as more problematic are 
responsible for greater percentages of crop loss, damaging larger areas and 
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affecting more households. However, there are a few exceptions, such as 
gaur which affect very few households but are reported as causing a great 
deal of damage, or primates who affect very many households but cause 
much less damage.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4: Wildlife species across the NBR responsible for crop raiding 
showing (a) the average percentage crop loss and average ranking as 
a problem by taxa; (b) the total damaged area and households affected 
by taxa (wild pig, elephant, gaur, primates, rodents, deer, birds) 
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When analysing crop raiding by all species, perception, loss and impact of 
crop-raiding is significantly different by zone (perception Kruskal Wallis: p < 
0.001, n = 62; proportion lost ANOVA: F1,6 = 12.870, p < 0.001, n = 62; 
damaged area ANOVA: F1,6 = 7.823, p < 0.001, n = 62), meaning that each 
zone suffers to a different extent from each species. Table 5 lists the top 
three species ranked as problems and the top three species causing the 
greatest proportion of crop losses in each region. These species are not 
always the same: elephants are perceived as problems in every zone, but 
actually cause the greatest losses in Nilambur, Coimbatore, Nilgiri and Sigur, 
but not in Nilgiri Wayanad or Attapadi. Wild pig are consistently problematic 
in all zones. Gaur are an actual problem in Nilgiri, though are perceived as 
problems also in Sigur. Other problematic species or groups include sambar, 
chital, porcupines, primates and birds.  
 
Table 5: Top three wildlife species perceived as problems to crop 
production, and top three species actually responsible for causing the 
highest average proportion of crop losses 
Zone Perceived problem 
species 
Species causing highest 
average proportion loss 
Nilgiri Wayanad Elephant, Sambar, Primates Chital, Wild Pig, Primates 
Nilambur Porcupines, Wild Pig, 
Elephant,  
Elephant, Birds, Wild Pig 
Attapadi Wild Pig, Chital, Elephant, Wild Pig, Chital, Barking Deer 
Coimbatore Elephant, Primates, Wild Pig Elephant, Primates, Wild Pig 
Nilgiri Elephant, Gaur, Wild Pig Elephant, Wild Pig, Gaur 
Sigur Gaur, Elephants, Wild Pig Wild Pig, Elephants, Porcupines 
 
2.3.2 Seasonality 
Crop raiding is strongly seasonal, with two clear peaks in numbers of 
incidents throughout the year, around May, just before the south-west 
monsoon, and in November, during the rains of the north-east monsoon 
(Figure 5), both corresponding with the main agricultural growing seasons. 
However, each peak is attributable to a different species – elephants in May 
and wild boar in November. The May incidents are most likely due to the 
lack of rain, and therefore fodder before the start of the south-west 
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monsoon, when the forests become very dry and hence elephants may be 
supplementing their food sources with growing crops (Madhusudan 2003). 
During the north-east monsoon the growing crops are primarily raided by 
wild boar. Presumably there are sufficient forest resources during these 
rains to explain the reduced crop raiding by elephants at this time.  
 
Figure 5: Seasonality in crop-raiding by wildlife species 
 
In terms of temporal changes in crop raiding, 47.2% of villages considered 
crop raiding to have increased over time, as opposed to 30.6% who thought 
it had decreased and 22.2% who believed it had not changed.  
2.3.3 Government awarded compensation for crop losses 
The primary method of conflict mitigation in India is state-awarded 
compensation. Although electric fences and / or trenches are established 
around parts of protected areas, these are subject to varying degrees of 
maintenance and effectiveness (Rangarajan et al. 2010), hence recompense 
is awarded for losses. However, many problems with the existing 
compensation scheme have been cited, such as inadequate remuneration, 
delays, and corruption (Madhusudan 2003, Ogra and Badola 2008a, 
Rangarajan et al. 2010). 
The village-level survey revealed that 262 households in 21 out of 62 
villages had previously applied for compensation for crop losses. Of those, 
57 households from 3 villages in Nilgiri Wayanad reported receiving 
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compensation, a total value of R30,000 against the claimed-for loss in those 
three villages of R340,000 (Figure 6).  
The household level survey in 18 sub-sampled villages revealed that only 18 
households in 6 villages out of the 478 households surveyed had applied for 
compensation. Thirteen households in four villages had received some 
compensation, ranging from R300 – R20,000, although in some cases it took 
up to two years for compensation to be granted. Five households never 
received anything. A total of R63,500 was granted in compensation, just 
over 10% of an estimated loss of R610,000.  
 
 
Figure 6: The number of households applying for compensation, the total 
money obtained, compared against the value applied for (where 
known), for each region in the NBR 
 
2.4 Livestock keeping practices and depredation contexts 
Livestock keeping experienced a variety of problems according to villagers, 
and the average numbers of major livestock reported as lost to each 
problem across the entire NBR from 2007 – 2009  is displayed in Figure 7 
along with the average ranking of seriousness. The mean livestock numbers 
lost were not significantly different per problem type, however, the mean 
ranking did differ by problem type (Kruskal Wallis: p < 0.041, n = 62) 
implying that depredation is considered a main threat to livestock keeping 
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despite similar losses per problem. Depredation was the main cause of loss, 
followed by disease, accidents, natural causes, fodder availability and 
drought. Perceptions of threat were slightly different, with depredation and 
disease ranked as most important, followed by fodder availability and 
accidents, drought, and finally natural causes.  
 
 
Figure 7: Average reported numbers of livestock lost to problems listed by 
villagers, and average ranking of seriousness, where 1 = most serious, 
across the NBR 
 
Livestock problems were broken down further by zone, to analyse 
perception and loss. Livestock depredation was ranked as the most serious 
problem in Nilgiri Wayanad, Nilambur, Coimbatore, Sigur, but not Attapadi or 
Nilgiri, where disease was more serious. Livestock depredation affects 
similar numbers of households to drought and fodder availability, and on 
average is responsible for the most livestock losses, closely followed by 
disease (Figure 8). There were no significant differences by zone in the 
average numbers of households affected or average numbers of livestock 
lost to wildlife, implying that actual losses are similar across the NBR.  
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Figure 8: Percentage of occurrence of particular problems in village 
generated ranked lists of livestock problems (natural causes, accident, 
fodder availability, drought, livestock depredation, disease), by region 
 
A total of 538 households in 48 villages (out of 4471 households in 62 
villages) reported suffering from livestock depredation, losing a total of 1059 
animals from 2007 - 2009, valued at 1,804,310 Indian Rupees (equivalent to 
£20,555), an estimated 3.2% of their livestock holding. During the monitoring 
period in 2010 - 2011 when losses were verifiable, a total of 308 animals 
were lost from 85 households across 18 villages, valued at 587,545 Indian 
Rupees (equivalent to £6,693), an estimated 9.3% of their livestock holding. 
2.4.1 Wildlife species responsible for depredating livestock 
Wildlife species perceived as most problematic across the NBR are 
displayed in Figure 9, as the average ranking achieved (where 1 is the most 
serious or problematic species), average number of livestock lost, and 
average value lost. Species considered problematic are, in order of 
decreasing importance, leopard, tiger and dhole, followed by small 
carnivores, including wild cat, mongoose, civet and fox.  
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Figure 9: Wildlife species across the NBR responsible for livestock 
depredation, showing the average numbers of livestock lost, and 
average ranking as a problem, and the average value lost 
 
When considering the entirety of the NBR, the following variables were 
significantly different between species: perceived ranking (Kruskal Wallis: p 
= 0.001, n = 62), numbers of livestock depredated (ANOVA: F1,2 = 3.290, p = 
0.001, n = 62), value lost (ANOVA: F1,12 = 2.788, p = 0.003, n = 62). This 
means that each species has a significantly different level of depredation, 
and thus perceived ranking. But, when analysing livestock depredation by all 
species factored by zone, there were no significant differences by zone in 
perception or loss, meaning that all zones suffer to a similar extent from 
livestock depredation.  
2.4.2 Seasonality 
Livestock depredation is also seasonal, with the greatest peak in June at the 
end of the dry season / start of the south-west monsoon, with smaller peaks 
in April, before the monsoon, and during August/Sept at the end of the 
monsoon (Figure 10). However, the peaks correspond primarily with losses 
from village land. Forest losses peak in April and September, just before the 
south-west and north-east monsoon during the dry season, when cattle 
graze further into the forests (Madhusudan 2003).  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 10: Seasonality in livestock depredation by (a) wildlife species 
(leopard, tiger, wild dog) and (b) depredation location (forest or village) 
across the NBR 
 
Of all the responses given when asked if livestock depredation had changed 
over time, a majority of 59.4% claimed that it had actually decreased, 
whereas 40.6% claimed it had increased.  
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2.4.3 Government awarded compensation for livestock 
depredation 
State managed interventions that consist of electric fences and trenches 
around parks are often broken to permit livestock to enter the park to graze. 
Thus the primary form of government mitigation is compensation for loss. 
With regards to compensation for livestock lost, the village level survey 
revealed that 88 households in 17 out of 62 villages had applied for 
compensation, and of those only three villages in Sathyamangalam and one 
village in Wayanad received any money, for a total value of R27,500 against 
the claimed-for loss in those three villages of R59,500 (Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11: The number of households applying for compensation, the total 
money obtained, compared against the value applied for (where 
known) for different regions of the NBR 
 
During the household level survey, only 9 households in three villages, out of 
a total of 478 households, reported applying for compensation. Of these, 
four households received compensation, one household receiving funds two 
years after the loss, totalling R15,460, although the losses were estimated to 
be worth at least twice as much.  
2.5 Attacks on people by wildlife  
In terms of wildlife attacks on people, minor injuries are more frequent than 
major injuries or death. Twenty-four of the sixty-two villages have reported 
some form of attack from 2007 - 2009 (Figure 12). Of concern is that 22 
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deaths and 33 major injuries have occurred in 15 of the 62 villages from 
2007 - 2009, with the bulk of these happening in Chindakki in the Attapadi 
region (12 deaths; all due to elephant) and Nedungayam in the Nilambur 
region (24 major injuries; 20 due to elephant and 4 due to sloth bear). Five 
further deaths occurred during the monitoring period from 2010 – 2011, four 
due to elephant and one due to gaur, and one case of minor injuries due to 
elephant; in three villages including Nedungayam. 
   
 
Figure 12: Wildlife attacks reported from sample villages across the NBR, 
numbers of incidents and numbers of villages reporting deaths, major 
injuries or minor injuries  
 
 
Figure 13: Wildlife attacks by species in villages across the NBR 
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Elephants are responsible for the majority of reported serious attacks, 
followed by sloth bear (Figure 13). Gaur, leopard, wild pig and primates have 
also been reported as causing injury but to a much lesser extent.  
Where information on the location of the wildlife attack was supplied, the 
majority of attacks across the NBR occurred when people were in Reserve 
Forests (13 incidents, 52%), jointly followed by Protected Forest and village 
lands (each with 6 incidents, 24%). In Wayanad, Nilambur and Sigur 
reported attack locations were exclusively in protected or reserve forests, 
while in Silent Valley, Kotagiri and Sathyamangalam the majority of reported 
locations were protected or reserve forests (Figure 14). Reasons given for 
going into the reserve forest or protected area included for NTFP’s such as 
honey, for firewood, and for grazing livestock. Some villages located in or 
close to forested lands linked attacks by wildlife to lack of electricity at night, 
and the need to return from work after dark.  
 
 
Figure 14: Location of wildlife attacks (protected forest, reserve forest, 
village land) by region in the NBR 
 
2.5.1 Property damage 
Damage to property or infrastructure was slightly more common than attacks 
on people, with 67 incidences in 19 out of 62 villages from 2007  - 2009, and 
28 incidences in 7 out of 18 villages from 2010 – 2011 valued at R102,760. 
The villages suffering from the most incidents were located in the Attapadi 
region. Villagers believed that damage was usually a result of animals 
passing through, such as to raid crops or visit water sources. Elephants 
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were responsible for the majority of incidents, with gaur, wild pig and sloth 
bear also reported but to a much lesser extent. In terms of compensation, 
110 households in 5 villages (from 1 village in Nilambur, 2 in Attapadi and 2 
in Sigur) applied for compensation. Only the two villages in Sigur received a 
total of R3000 as compensation.  
2.6 Major problems facing villages 
Villages were asked what they believed were the major problems facing their 
village. Overall, villages listed water availability (both drinking and for 
agriculture) and transport as problems more often than wildlife (Figure 15). 
Healthcare and livelihoods were listed as problems as frequently as conflicts 
with wildlife. Livelihood related problems encompassed access to seeds, 
cattle for ploughing, grazing areas for livestock, technology for agriculture, 
and drainage. Of the rest, electricity provision was the most important.  
 
 
Figure 15: Ranking of most common major problems for villages across the 
NBR 
At a zone level, wildlife was cited in a major proportion of responses in Nilgiri 
Wayanad, Coimbatore and Nilgiri (Figure 16). Villages in Nilambur and 
Attapadi did not consider wildlife to be one of the major problems at all, while 
Sigur cited it in only a small proportion of responses. Other major problems 
included lack of transport, commonly cited in all zones; access to water, 
common to all zones, the need for medical facilities mostly in Attapadi and 
Sigur, and the lack of electricity in Nilambur.  
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Figure 16: Percentage contribution of issues to village-generated lists of 
major problems by zone 
 
All of these major problems (water, transport, livelihoods, health) that relate 
directly to the ability to live and make a living were considered more 
important than issues such as lack of access to education and disputes over 
land. Land disputes mentioned included needing more land for agriculture or 
issues over ownership due to the exclusionary nature of protected areas or 
the limited rights of rural communities. These two latter problems are 
frequently associated in the literature as either being negatively affected by, 
or triggering conflicts (Dickman 2010, Nagendra et al. 2013), but were not 
cited as problems as frequently as might have been expected. This is most 
likely due to the more pressing nature of other problems, which diminish the 
importance of biodiversity conservation in the face of social injustices. There 
may therefore be the opportunity for zone level management of conflict to 
focus on addressing some of these issues as conservation linked incentives 
(Sachs et al. 2009). 
 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Region 
Water 
Wildlife 
Transport 
Medical 
facilities 
Livelihoods 
Land 
Housing 
Electricity 
Education 
- 64 - 
Chapter 3 
(Mis-)understanding conflicts: ecological and socio-
economic drivers of loss and perception at a landscape 
scale 
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3.1 Introduction 
Human-wildlife conflict continues to pose one of the greatest threats to the 
conservation of large mammals and to the sustainable development of rural 
communities, despite the ever-increasing resources committed to research 
and mitigation (Redpath et al. in press). Conflicts with and over wildlife are 
most severe in biodiversity-rich and fragmented landscapes with high human 
densities, which exemplify both problems of habitat and species loss along 
with the marginalisation of rural communities (Balmford and Whitten 2003). 
Many of these conflicts manifest as livestock depredation, crop raiding, and 
threats to human life or property, often resulting in high costs for local 
communities (Thirgood et al. 2005b) and retaliation against wildlife which 
endangers conservation efforts (Woodroffe et al. 2005b).  
The identification of both ecological and socio-economic drivers of conflict is 
an essential pre-requisite to establishing successful mitigation efforts 
(Graham et al. 2005, Dickman 2010, Linnell 2011). This is particularly 
pertinent considering that conflict mitigation efforts rarely provide long-term 
solutions, even where damage is successfully reduced (Webber et al. 2007, 
Dickman 2010). As yet, few conflict studies specifically identify common 
drivers or predicates of damage caused by wildlife, and typically often focus 
on ecological drivers (Dublin and Hoare 2004a, Treves et al. 2004, Graham 
et al. 2005, Sitati et al. 2005, Gubbi 2012).  
Conflict situations have a number of aspects, such as the presence/absence 
of conflict, the intensity of conflict, the economic value of conflict and the 
perception of conflict. Each aspect can be driven by different sets of factors. 
Often, studies and mitigation efforts do not include all of these aspects, or 
there are differences in assessments between studies, which may explain 
difficulties in effectively identifying drivers of conflict or in drawing 
conclusions across sites. It is important to consider all aspects of a conflict 
situation in order to design appropriate mitigation measures. For example, 
apparent disparities have been noted between measures of conflict such as 
intensity or value, and the perception of conflict (Woodroffe et al. 2005a, 
Dickman 2010), leading to beliefs that perceptions of conflict by local 
communities can be illogical and therefore difficult to address (Woodroffe et 
al. 2005a). Consequently, failing to understand or address drivers of 
perception can undermine mitigation attempts since negative perceptions 
are often linked to behaviours such as retaliation or persecution (Dickman 
2010).  
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One of the world’s biodiversity hotspots (Myers et al. 2000), the Western 
Ghats is a mosaic of protected areas embedded in a human-dominated 
landscape,  with high levels of biodiversity found alongside high human 
densities (Das et al. 2006). Within the Western Ghats, the Nilgiri Biosphere 
Reserve (NBR) exemplifies many of conservation management problems 
found throughout the wider area. In an area of c.7,500km2, of which c.4 500 
km2 is protected, the NBR encompasses all the topographic and climatic 
variation, all major forest types and much of the species diversity found 
across the Western Ghats. Economic activities and land ownership range 
from subsistence holdings and corporate-owned commercial plantations to 
state-owned reserves, supporting a human population with a diverse 
demographic, economic and socio-cultural history. The NBR hosts some of 
the largest wildlife populations in Asia (Karanth and Sunquist 1992, Kumar 
1999, Karanth and Sunquist 2000), including significant populations of 
elephant Elephas maximus and tiger Panthera tigris, with significant 
populations of wildlife persisting outside of protected areas (Bhagwat et al. 
2005, Bali et al. 2007).  
Given the extensive remaining populations of large mammals, human-
wildlife conflict is prevalent across India, where nearly 500,000 households 
suffer from crop damage by elephants, which also kill almost 400 people per 
year, while up to 100 elephants are killed per year due to conflict 
(Rangarajan et al. 2010). Of the several species of large carnivores, 
leopards Panthera pardus are responsible for the most attacks on humans, 
with 902 injuries and 201 deaths attributed to leopards in the state of 
Maharashtra alone between 1999 and 2005 (Athreya et al. 2011), and 45 
leopard deaths due to conflict across India reported in 2011 (WPSI 2012).  
The high densities of both humans and large mammals in the NBR and 
changing land uses within and around the network of protected areas 
inevitably leads to particularly high levels of human-wildlife conflict in this 
region (Sukumar 1994, Madhusudan and Mishra 2003). Livestock predation 
and crop-raiding cause significant economic costs to local communities, 
such as losses of 11% of annual grain production to elephants and 12% of 
livestock holdings to felines (Madhusudan 2003), leading to destructive 
reprisals such as poaching, electrocution, and poisoning of livestock 
carcasses (Karanth and Madhusudan 2002, Rahmani 2003); and an 
associated negative change in human attitudes (Madhusudan and Mishra 
2003, Ogra and Badola 2008a). These economic costs of conflict and the 
incentives for illegal exploitation mean that many local communities may not 
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view biodiversity conservation as economically viable; especially when 
investment in damage control strategies (such as husbandry, guarding, 
deterrents or barriers), can be time-consuming, expensive, and involve 
opportunity costs limiting education or other income generating activities 
(Haule et al. 2002, Osborn and Parker 2003, Sitati and Walpole 2006). In 
India, state managed mitigation efforts include electric fences and / or 
trenches around parts of protected areas, with varying degrees of 
maintenance and hence effectiveness (Rangarajan et al. 2010); and 
compensation, a potential source of further conflicts (Bulte and Rondeau 
2007), with problems such as inadequate remuneration, delays, and 
corruption (Madhusudan 2003, Ogra and Badola 2008a, Rangarajan et al. 
2010). 
With the shortcomings of existing mitigation measures (Sukumar 1993, 
Sukumar 1994, Karanth and Madhusudan 2002, Madhusudan 2003), there 
is an urgent need to identify the primary drivers of conflict in an integrated 
ecological and socio-economic context, to enable the development of 
effective conflict management strategies as part of conservation 
management and policy. Prevention and effective management of future 
conflicts depends on identifying the conditions promoting conflicts in order to 
focus outreach and interventions accordingly (Karanth and Chellam 2009, 
Dickman 2010).  
This study used an interdisciplinary approach to identify ecological, social 
and economic drivers of two common manifestations of human-wildlife 
conflict, crop raiding and livestock depredation, in a large and 
geographically, climatically, ecologically and culturally variable landscape. 
By identifying drivers common to a range of communities subject to negative 
interactions with wildlife, the purpose was to define a set of 'generic' drivers 
of loss and perception likely to be involved in human-wildlife conflict 
situations at a landscape level. Knowledge of the general factors likely to 
promote conflict, and the linkages between different aspects of conflict, can 
facilitate mitigation efforts at other conflict sites and contribute towards 
understanding the dynamics of conflict. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Study Site 
The Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve lies within the Western Ghats in south India, 
in the states of Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, between 11°36′N and 
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12°00′N latitude and 76°00′E to 77°15′E longitude. The main protected areas 
are Wayanad Wildlife Sanctuary, Nagarhole National Park, Bandipur 
National Park, Mudumalai Wildlife Sanctuary, Silent Valley National Park, 
Mukurthi National Park, BRT Wildlife Sanctuary, and Sathyamangalam 
Wildlife Sanctuary. Several other areas are designated as reserve forests 
under lesser protection. Climate and habitats range from tropical moist semi-
evergreen and deciduous forests on the western slopes of the Ghats, and 
montane forests and grasslands at higher altitudes, receiving up to 7000mm 
of rainfall per year; to dry deciduous and thorn or scrub forests on the 
eastern slopes receiving only 500mm of rainfall. The climate follows the 
tropical monsoon, with the south-west monsoon heavy rains from July to 
September, and the north-east monsoon light rains from October to 
November. Several major rivers thread through the NBR. Anthropogenic 
activities include forestry for teak Tectona grandis and timber, shade and 
open coffee, tea, rice paddies, subsistence farmers, pastoralists keeping 
cattle, buffalo, goats and sheep, and indigenous people reliant on non-timber 
forest products such as honey. Approximately 705,000 people live in the 
NBR (Das et al. 2006).  
3.2.2 Methodology 
Sixty-two villages were surveyed across the NBR, sampling across a range 
of ecological and socio-economic gradients. Surveys were conducted 
between May 2009 to August 2009, and followed a standardised semi-
structured questionnaire posed to a group comprising members of the 
village. At each village, preliminary visits invited representatives to attend a 
meeting to obtain this data on behalf of all village occupants. Demographic 
data were taken for those who attended and contributed to the village level 
meeting, which typically lasted for a couple of hours. Questionnaires 
(appendix B) were undertaken by a small group which included a local 
language speaker, after a period of training in survey implementation and 
pilot surveys to minimise inter-observer bias and problems such as leading 
questions.    
Detailed data were collected on a number of socio-economic 
village/household attributes, livelihoods, and on the ecological attributes of 
the surrounding landscape (summarised in Table 6). Reported losses due to 
conflicts with wildlife from 2007 - 2009 were recorded in terms of extent, 
value and perception of crop or livestock loss (Table 7). Perception of 
conflict was quantified in this study as the threat to life or livelihood. To 
assess perceptions, groups were asked to generate and self-rank a list of 
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threats facing crop production, livestock production, and their village. Their 
identification and ranking of wildlife as a problem was then used as a 
contextual representation of perception of conflict.  
Several ecological variables were obtained through remote sensing and 
compilation of existing data. Mean NDVI (Normalised Difference Vegetation 
Index) for a 5km zone around each surveyed village was used as a proxy for 
productivity, derived from MODIS Terra 16day 250m NDVI remote sensed 
images of the region. Changes in productivity were calculated using change 
in mean NDVI from images over a four year period before surveys were 
undertaken. Monthly precipitation logs3
Hijmans et al. 2005
 for the states of Kerala, Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu ( ) corresponding to the date of the 
images were analysed to identify images from the same month with similar 
rainfall patterns four years apart. This minimised effects due to vegetation 
changes that may have occurred under within-year climate variation. Nov 
2004 and Nov 2008 were chosen as the comparable years, giving a 2008 
proxy value for productivity, and a differential representing changes in 
productivity, i.e. negative changes indicated relative levels of degradation. 
MODIS assessments of the accuracy of each satellite image were also 
studied to ensure that there was minimal pixel unreliability (e.g. due to cloud 
cover) for the regions of interest. Altitude and precipitation records were 
taken from the online Data Pool at the NASA Land Processes Distributed 
Active Archive Center (LPDAAC 2012)4
Prabhakar and Pascal 1996
. The major habitat type in the 
surrounding landscape for each village was classified using a combination of 
ground observations and classifications from standardised vegetation maps 
of the region ( ), as evergreen forest, semi-
evergreen forest, shola (high-altitude) forest, moist deciduous forest, dry 
deciduous forest, scrub/thorn forest, and non-native plantations, as per the 
dominant vegetation categories in the Western Ghats (CEPF 2004). 
Proximity to the protected area was recorded as the distance from the village 
location to a digitised GIS layer of the protected area boundary.  
Population estimates at the landscape scale for the mammal species 
involved in conflicts were obtained using data from occupancy models 
developed for large mammals in the Western Ghats region (Pillay et al. 
                                            
3 http://www.worldclim.org/ accessed Jan 2012 
4 https://lpdaac.usgs.gov/get_data accessed Jan 2012. ASTER GDEM is a 
product of METI and NASA 
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2011). Their data collection gave an index of reported encounter rates for 
each species in each forest range in the NBR, which was categorised for this 
study as proxies of low, medium and high density for herbivores, carnivores 
and carnivore prey species, and assigned to villages for their respective 
forest range.  
Table 6: Ecological, social, and economic explanatory variables used in 
baseline candidate models for (1) presence of loss; (2) intensity of loss; 
(3) value of loss; (4) perception of loss 
Ecological Social Economic 
General 
Altitude 
Precipitation 
Degradation 
Productivity 
Protected area 
distance 
Forest refuge 
distance 
Wildlife densities 
Abandoned land 
Encroached land 
 
 
General 
Number of 
households 
Family size 
Community 
composition 
General 
Primary livelihood dependency 
 
Crop specific 
Farmland 
Households practicing agriculture 
Land ownership (owned, leased, 
shared) 
Irrigation 
Commercial/subsistence crops 
(acreage and percentage) 
Crop types 
Crop monetary values in Rupees 
Crop holding extent 
 
Livestock specific 
Households keeping livestock 
Livestock types  
Livestock monetary values in Rupees 
Livestock holding extent  
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Table 7: Response variables measured for each model type 
Conflict Aspect Crops Livestock 
Presence of loss Presence / absence of 
raiding 
Presence / absence of 
depredation 
Intensity of loss Reported area damaged 
due to crop raiding in last 2 
years 
Numbers of livestock reported 
lost to depredation in last 2 
years 
Value lost Estimated value of crops 
lost (market value & 
investment) 
Estimated value of livestock 
lost (market value) 
Perception of 
conflict 
Ranked perception of crop 
raiding as a threat  
Ranked perception of 
livestock depredation as a 
threat 
 
Models were generated for (1) the presence or absence of conflict; (2) the 
intensity of conflict (measured in terms of crop area or livestock number lost 
from those villages suffering from conflict); (3) the value of loss (in Rupees, 
for those villages suffering from conflict); (4) the perception of wildlife as a 
problem for crop or livestock production (for all villages sampled, regardless 
of whether actual loss was present). 
For each response variable, a best fit explanatory model was selected 
(details provided in Table 8). Independent variables were tested for 
collinearity to refine and reduce the number of variables used in candidate 
model generation. This was combined with a priori selection of variables 
based on knowledge of likely variables associated with conflict. Generalised 
Linear Models were used to test for explanatory variables, choosing 
appropriate distributions for each response variable (presence/absence, 
intensity, value). Ordered Logit Models were used for the ranked perception 
data. All response variables were tested for outliers which were removed 
where necessary; and for over-dispersion which affected the choice of 
distribution. Mantel tests indicated that no spatial autocorrelation was 
present. All analyses were carried out using the R programming environment 
(R 2010). 
Non-significant individual explanatory variables were dropped using 
backwards step-wise selection, and model selection criteria based on AIC 
was used to decide on the optimal model for each response variable 
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explored. Models for each response variable were validated by testing the 
homogeneity of the residuals, normality of the residuals, residuals against 
variables, and testing for the presence of influential observations.  
3.3 Results 
Table 8 presents the significant explanatory variables associated with each 
aspect of conflict, and full details of the fitted models. Increased levels of 
habitat degradation, closer proximity to forest patches, and greater extents 
of farmland increased the probability that a village would suffer from crop 
raiding. Where crop raiding was present, the intensity of crop raiding 
(measured in acres lost to wildlife) was correlated with increasing acreage of 
abandoned land within a village, increasing acreage of encroached land 
within the adjacent protected area, and increasing extent of farmland.  
Livestock depredation followed a similar pattern. Presence of livestock 
depredation is predicted by proximity to forest patches and the numbers of 
households keeping livestock. Intensity of depredation (numbers of livestock 
lost) is linked to proximity to forest patches, the total numbers of livestock 
held by the village, and increasing densities of carnivores.  
The influence of protection or mitigation measures at a landscape level could 
not be ascertained, given that villages tended to employ a multitude of 
measures, hence it was impossible to include it as an explanatory variable in 
any of the models.  
The economic costs of conflict are solely driven by socio-economic 
variables. The value of crop losses are determined by the extent of 
commercial crops, the level of ownership present in a village (as opposed to 
leasing or sharecropping), and the availability of water through investment in 
irrigation. Likewise, for livestock the economic value is simply determined by 
the types and numbers of livestock lost. No ecological variables were linked 
to value lost to conflict.  
Finally, in terms of perceptions, the data suggests that this is predominantly 
driven by proportional loss (loss as a percentage of the overall extent of crop 
or livestock holding), for both types of conflict. Villages that experience larger 
proportional losses to wildlife hold a correspondingly increased perception of 
the threat posed by wildlife. For crop raiding, this is moderated by the level 
of commercialisation of a village: the higher the percentage of commercial 
crops grown in a village, the greater the perception of threat posed by 
wildlife.  
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Table 8: Significant ecological and socio-economic drivers of conflict: 
presence/absence of conflict damage, intensity of damage, economic 
value lost, and perception of conflict as a threat to livelihood production. 
Type of 
conflict 
Presence of 
Loss 
Intensity of Loss Value Lost Perception of 
Conflict 
Crop 
raiding 
(1) 
- Degradation* 
- Forest 
distance* 
+ Farmland* 
(2) 
+ Abandoned*** 
+ Farmland*** 
+ Encroached*** 
(3) 
+ Commercial crop 
%** 
+ Farmland 
ownership** 
Irrigation level (high)*  
(4) 
+ Proportion*** 
+ Commercial  
crop %*** 
 
Livestock 
depredation 
(5) 
- Forest 
distance* 
+ Numbers of 
households 
keeping 
livestock ** 
(6) 
- Forest 
distance*** 
+ Total livestock 
kept*** 
Carnivore density 
(medium)* 
(7) 
+ Total livestock 
lost*** 
Livestock type kept 
(large)* 
(8) 
+ Proportion** 
(1) Generalised Linear Model (GLM) fitted with a binomial distribution; model 
terms: degradation p = 0.013, farmland p = 0.027, forest distance = 0.029,  
percentage irrigation 0.187, df = 58, n = 62; 
(2) GLM fitted with a gamma distribution; model terms: abandoned p < 0.001, 
encroached p < 0.001, farmland p < 0.001, df = 44, n = 48; 
(3) GLM fitted with a quasipoisson distribution; model terms: commercialisation 
p = 0.048, irrigation high p = 0.008, df = 44, n = 48; 
(4) Ordered Logit Model; model terms: proportion crop lost p < 0.001, 
commercialisation p < 0.001, n = 62;  
(5) GLM fitted with a binomial distribution; model terms: forest distance p = 
0.045, numbers of households keeping livestock p = 0.002, df = 59, n = 62;  
(6) GLM fitted with a quasipoisson distribution; model terms: forest distance p < 
0.001, carnivore density medium p < 0.033, total livestock p < 0.001, 
encroached land p = 0.071, df = 42, n = 45; 
(7) GLM fitted with a quasipoisson distribution; model terms: total livestock lost 
p < 0.001, livestock type kept (large) p = 0.019, df = 42, n = 45; 
(8) Ordered Logit Model; model terms: proportion livestock lost p = 0.005, n = 
62;  
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3.4 Discussion 
Several key socio-ecological factors emerged as significant explanatory 
variables for different measures of conflict. The data showed that as 
measures of conflict move from absolute (presence/absence and the 
intensity of damage) to human interpretations of loss (economic value and 
perception), it is quite clear that ecological drivers give way to socio-
economic factors.  
The greater the level of habitat degradation in the vicinity of a village, the 
closer it is to forest patches, and the more cropland it has to attract wildlife, 
the more likely it is that crop raiding will be present. Although degradation in 
habitat quality is often cited as a possible driver for conflict, there are few 
other studies statistically linking measures of degraded habitat with 
increased conflict (Chartier et al. 2011). Proximity is however a strong 
predictor of crop loss in other conflict studies (Rao et al. 2002, Sitati et al. 
2003, Naughton-Treves and Treves 2005, Woodroffe et al. 2005a). Intensity 
of crop raiding increased with increasing levels of farmland, abandoned land 
(land no longer used by the village), and illegally encroached land (land that 
villagers do not own but that they cultivate from nearby forests). The 
significance of farmland extent in both predicting presence and intensity of 
conflict indicates that a greater crop area is an attractant to wildlife, 
especially as cropland extent has also been strongly linked to levels of crop 
loss in other conflict studies (Woodroffe et al. 2005a). The presence of 
abandoned land in a village is likely to act as a local refuge for wildlife, 
resulting in increased numbers or lengths of crop raiding visits. Encroached 
lands that are illegally cultivated within the forest also indicate increased 
levels of forest disturbance as well as cropland that is likely to be more 
vulnerable to crop raiding as it is usually located within or adjacent to forest 
refuges. Although not significant in the final model, it is worth noting that 
moderate (not high) densities of herbivores were associated with increased 
levels of crop-raiding. This may suggest that conflict is not simply a function 
of the population density of the problem species, as higher densities would 
have been expected to correlate with more crop-raiding. Instead, medium 
densities may be linked to more conflicts due to the reasons behind the 
lowered population size, such as habitat disturbance and an associated 
decrease in habitat quality. However, the data were limited to categories of 
low, medium and high densities and so more detailed analyses of densities 
would permit this effect to be explored.  
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For livestock depredation, the data also indicated that the closer a village 
was to a forest, the more likely depredation was to occur. Proximity is 
particularly important in this case as many villages send their livestock each 
day to graze within forest lands where livestock is vulnerable to large 
carnivores, due to a lack of grazing lands in the village. However, some 
incidents also occur within villages and in these cases proximity is also 
important. Intensity was further predicted by the number of households 
keeping livestock, rather than the total number of livestock. This is likely to 
indicate an underlying combination of the total number of livestock in the 
village and the size of the grazing herd taken to forest areas, as small 
numbers of households may supervise their livestock independently, 
whereas large numbers of households often send all livestock to graze 
under the supervision of a couple of villagers. This is an important 
distinction, as a larger grouping of livestock is more likely to attract 
predators.  
The model also indicated that increasing densities of carnivores are linked to 
increased levels of depredation, although there was no correlation with prey 
densities. These explanatory variables are similar to the findings of previous 
conflict studies which associated proximity, livestock density, predator and 
prey density with depredation intensity (Treves et al. 2004, Woodroffe et al. 
2005a).  
For both crop raiding and livestock depredation, presence or intensity was 
only linked with proximity to forest patches, with no link to proximity to a 
protected area. Sampled villages were surveyed along a spatial gradient that 
ranged from directly within, to 35km away, from a protected area. Given that 
this had no effect on measures of loss, the implication is that large mammals 
are utilising forest patches outside of protected areas and can be found 
throughout the entire landscape, hence risk from conflict in this area is 
strongly linked to proximity to a forest refuge.  
The economic value of losses to conflict as manifested by crop raiding or 
livestock depredation can be seen to have a solely socio-economic context – 
the value of loss (measured in Rupees) is dictated by what people can afford 
to invest in their livelihood production system, and not by the foraging 
preferences of wildlife or ecology of the landscape. There is no statistically 
significant preference by problem wildlife species for more or less expensive 
crop or livestock types. Instead, the value of loss is linked to economic 
investment drivers: the percentage of commercial crops, farmland 
ownership, and levels of irrigation for crop raiding; and livestock types kept 
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and numbers lost for livestock depredation. This indicates that the economic 
value of damage alone, although often used as a typical measure of conflict 
particularly when comparing across sites, is not appropriate when the 
underlying ecological and social drivers need to be understood and 
integrated into mitigation measures. It is also evidently not a suitable means 
for prioritising conflict interventions or assessing losses unless comparisons 
are made between similar holdings, as otherwise richer landholders will 
always be considered as suffering from a greater degree of loss than poorer 
landholders. For example, an acre of commercial crops lost to wildlife would 
be valued higher than an acre of subsistence crops lost, although the 
intensity of the crop raiding conflict remains the same.  
Finally, perception of the threats wildlife pose is also driven by the socio-
economic context of loss. That is, loss in the context of people’s existing 
holdings - the proportional loss suffered. This bears no immediate relation to 
the intensity of conflict as measured in terms of absolute loss, such as acres 
of crops damaged or numbers of livestock lost, and can explain why 
perceptions often seem to be disconnected from absolute loss and from 
economic loss. Hence, if the socio-economic context of loss is not accounted 
for in conflict studies or mitigation, perception can seem to be arbitrary and 
mitigation measures will often fail to change it. In particular, schemes such 
as compensation that currently exist in India, which address only absolute 
economic loss often do not change perceptions of conflict. Furthermore, for 
crop raiding conflicts, perception is moderated by the degree of 
commercialisation of a village – the more the village economy is based on 
money rather than subsistence, the higher the perception of threat posed by 
wildlife for the same level of proportional loss. This implies a consistent 
increase in conflict as communities become more dependent on crops for 
income rather than subsistence.  
 
Table 9: Generic factors driving crop raiding and livestock depredation 
conflicts 
Likelihood of conflict & 
 intensity of occurrence 
Value lost to conflict Perception of Conflict 
- Habitat quality 
- Habitat proximity 
- Holding extent 
- Economic investment 
 
- Proportional loss 
- Economic investment 
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At a general level, these results (Table 9) indicate over-arching generic 
variables likely to play a part in any given conflict situation. For crop raiding, 
variables driving presence and intensity of conflict broadly represent 
ecological measures of habitat quality (degradation, abandoned land, 
encroached land), and proximity to a wildlife refuge, combined with the 
socio-economic variable of holding extent (farmland). Similarly, for livestock 
depredation, variables driving presence and intensity of conflict broadly 
represent ecological measures of habitat quality (wildlife densities), and 
proximity to a wildlife refuge, combined with the socio-economic variable of 
holding extent (livestock density). Economic losses for both crop raiding and 
livestock depredation are determined solely by economic investment 
(commercialisation, farmland ownership and irrigation for crops; livestock 
types kept and numbers lost for livestock depredation). Finally, perception is 
driven by the socio-economic context of proportional loss, which is 
exacerbated by increasing economic investment in the case of crop raiding. 
Hence, while the loss that people suffer may be driven by a combination of 
ecological variables and the human context, economic valuation of loss is a 
solely anthropogenic construct, with very little ecological basis. Most 
importantly, it is apparent that perceptions have no correlation with either 
loss or the ecological context of conflict; instead they are influenced by the 
impact of that loss, measured as proportion of holding lost to wildlife. 
3.5 Conclusions 
It is clear that conflict is a product of a complex inter-weaving of both 
ecological and socio-economic drivers, which play different parts depending 
on which aspect of conflict is being assessed. Versions of these generic 
variables may be drivers in any conflict situation, therefore studies of conflict 
should attempt to assess each of these aspects to understand the dynamics 
of a given situation, where best to target mitigation efforts, and how to 
prioritise vulnerable areas. Mitigation measures should also be clear about 
which aspect of conflict they intend to address, whether it is by reducing the 
probability of conflict occurring, reducing intensity when it does occur, 
reducing the value of loss, or by changing people’s perceptions, as different 
factors drive each of these aspects. This is a fundamental consideration, as 
it explains why schemes such as monetary compensation which only 
address the economic value of loss, without any effect on reducing actual 
losses, cannot influence perception as it does not address the impact of high 
proportional loss. The data also suggests that increasing economic 
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development is likely to result in a decreased tolerance of conflict; hence the 
problems of human-wildlife conflict are only likely to become more intense. 
Mitigation efforts should therefore take steps to reduce or compensate for 
loss more effectively, accounting for high impact losses in order to address 
negative perceptions, as well as including measures to improve tolerance in 
more commercialised communities.  
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Chapter 4 
A question of protection: how householders choose and use 
livelihood protection strategies to mitigate human-wildlife 
conflicts 
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4.1 Introduction 
In landscapes shared between people and wildlife, conflicts can manifest as 
negative interactions with wildlife or between different groups of people over 
wildlife management. At a landscape level conflict that results in losses to 
people (livestock depredation and crop raiding) can have multiple ecological 
and socio-economic drivers, depending on the aspect of conflict being 
measured (chapter 3). However, conflicts can also be intensely localised 
throughout a landscape (Treves et al. 2004, Woodroffe et al. 2005a, 
Guerbois et al. 2012). Understanding the process and outcomes of local 
decision-making over conflict mitigation is fundamental (Young et al. 2010), 
as landscape-level management may not recognise local individuality or 
intensity, while local schemes may not be effective or able to sufficiently 
contextualise conflicts for stakeholder acceptance.  
Furthermore, while several ecological drivers of conflict may be considered 
to operate at regional scales, at smaller scales the socio-economic context 
of individual behaviours becomes of integral importance in understanding 
conflicts and how they can be managed (Manfredo and Dayer 2004a, Young 
et al. 2010). For example, there are significant differences between 
individuals in their actions in response to conflict, such as the decision-
making underlying interventions chosen to protect livelihoods or 
consequential behaviours such as retaliation (Manfredo and Dayer 2004a); 
and in the attitudes towards conflict, wildlife, and other stakeholder groups 
responsible for managing wildlife (Dickman 2010). These socio-economic 
nuances behind the trade-offs of coexisting with wildlife can only be 
adequately explored at the household level, but often have major impacts on 
tolerance for wildlife conservation which can have landscape scale 
consequences, and for the effectiveness and uptake of existing and new 
mitigation measures (Dickman 2010).  
It is vital to be able to assess not only the efficacy but also the reasoning 
behind choices of existing intervention measures to recognise which are 
sufficiently effective at reducing losses and which are likely to be most 
accepted by stakeholders given the context of conflicts. Measures that meet 
both these criteria have improved chances of long-term sustainability, 
reducing conflict and promoting both wildlife conservation and permitting 
economic development (Messmer 2000). Measures that meet only one 
criterion are much more likely to fail: effective measures may not be utilised 
or maintained if they are not acceptable to communities, while ineffective but 
widely used measures will do little to reduce conflicts. Hence, community 
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participation in management decisions is integral to human-wildlife conflict 
resolution (Western 1994, Redpath et al. 2004, Redpath and Thirgood 
2009), particularly in the context of exclusionary protected areas (Horwich 
and Lyon 2007).  
Many intervention measures are utilised globally to protect crops and 
livestock from loss to wildlife, broadly classified into early-warning systems, 
barriers, deterrents, guarding, husbandry, problem animal control, and 
financial recompense, but studies on the effectiveness of these systems 
have so far been limited (Osborn and Parker 2003, Graham and Ochieng 
2008, Ogra and Badola 2008b, Inskip and Zimmermann 2009a). Some 
interventions such as compensation have been cited as exacerbating 
conflicts (Bulte and Rondeau 2005), and as yet few studies have attempted 
to quantify and include stakeholder decision-making (Redpath et al. 2004) in 
intervention choices.  
This study builds on an interdisciplinary survey methodology (described in 
chapter 3) to investigate the effectiveness of different mitigation measures 
currently employed at the local level in a subset of villages across the Nilgiri 
Biosphere Reserve, India, and to understand at a preliminary level how 
householders consider and choose mitigation schemes, which potential 
schemes might be most favoured, and which institutions should be 
responsible for implementation. These are key mechanisms that must be 
understood in any landscape prior to the establishment of any conflict 
mitigation scheme to improve the potential for uptake and success.  
4.2 Methods 
Socio-ecological variables associated with losses to wildlife and perception 
of threat from wildlife were investigated at a household level within the Nilgiri 
Biosphere Reserve. Full details of the study sites and villages are given in 
Chapters 2 and 3. A sub-sample of 18 villages out of the original 62 villages 
surveyed were chosen to represent the range of conflicts experienced 
across different geo-climatic regions of the NBR, based on livelihood 
vulnerability to conflict, perceptions and loss, and with a focus on conflicts 
caused by large mammals of conservation concern.  
At the local household scale, 478 household interviews (in a sub-sample of 
18 villages taken from the 62 villages surveyed in Chapter 3), were 
conducted from May 2009 to January 2011. Surveys followed a standardised 
semi-structured questionnaire posed to adults in each household. 
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Questionnaires were undertaken by a single local language speaker, and 
several villages were covered by one interviewer, after a period of training in 
survey implementation and pilot surveys to minimise inter-observer bias and 
problems such as leading questions. This socio-economic dataset was 
coupled with a conflict monitoring scheme managed by each interviewer, 
that recorded actual losses to wildlife for all sampled households in the 18 
survey villages from January 2010 to December 2011 using standardised 
questionnaires.   
Detailed data were collected on a number of socio-economic household 
attributes, following the survey methodology described in Chapter 3 but 
applied at a household level. Additional data specific to the household 
interviews were collected as follows. Economic status was assessed as an 
index represented by a combination of income group, presence of children in 
education, cable television, a vehicle, a phone, and a tiled roof, given that 
typical measures of income are inappropriate for many subsistence based 
livelihoods. Past losses to wildlife and details of existing protection 
measures, livestock and crop holdings, compensation, actions taken in 
response to loss, and losses to other causes were also recorded. Household 
decision-making was assessed through self-ranked listings for several key 
decisions (Table 10). The lists of criteria for each decision were generated 
through pilot discussions and surveys with householders that elicited sets of 
relevant options. Further, to restrict choices to familiar measures, the options 
presented as potential intervention measures were based on those used in 
South India by communities and governments. Households were asked to 
rank criteria in an ideal mitigation scheme, rank potential mitigation 
measures for crop protection and livestock protection, and to rank 
stakeholder groups in order of responsibility for managing conflicts.   
The conflict monitoring scheme collected information from households 
reporting conflict incidents, which was verified by the interviewer; and 
included the date, the GPS location and the household which was affected. 
For crops, details were collected on irrigation, fence type, deterrents used, 
distance from nearest forest refuge, crop type, area cultivated, area 
damaged, and wildlife species suspected of causing the damage. 
Interventions were classed as follows: no fence; natural fences made of 
brush or natural vegetation; wire fences made of several strands of plain or 
barbed wire; solar-powered electric fences; guarding/patrolling crops at 
night; noise generated by firecrackers, drums, or shouting; fires lit to protect 
crops or use of fire torches; the presence of dogs guarding crops; and lights 
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from torches. For livestock, details included the location of the loss, guarding 
measures present, distance from nearest forest refuge, livestock type, 
number owned, number lost, age/sex of livestock lost, and predator 
suspected. Interventions were classed as no protection; guarding; the use of 
sheds / corrals at night.  
 
Table 10: Key questions and criteria choices posed to householders in the 
NBR regarding mitigation scheme decision-making 
Key question Criteria 
Rank the factors most 
important in your ideal 
mitigation scheme 
Proven effectiveness; low start-up costs; low 
maintenance costs; low labour effort; household 
control of scheme; potential for negative effects 
on wildlife; high level of community acceptability; 
fair compensation; 
Rank these mitigation 
measures in your order of 
preference for crop 
protection 
Insurance; compensation; natural fencing; wire 
fencing; electric fencing around fields; electric 
fencing around parks; trenches around fields; 
trenches around parks; deterrents; stop livestock 
grazing in the protected area; improved habitats 
within the protected area; 
Rank these mitigation 
measures in your order of 
preference for livestock 
protection 
Guarding; fencing; compensation; insurance; 
government control of problem animals; stopping 
livestock grazing in the park; stopping illegal 
hunting; improved habitats within the protected 
area; 
Rank the stakeholder groups 
in the order in which they 
should assume responsibility 
for managing conflict  
Communities; NGOs; Forest Department; other 
government institution; tourists; resorts; urban 
citizens; 
 
A best-fit Generalised Linear Mixed Model fit by the Laplace approximation 
was constructed to predict the intensity of conflict (measured in terms of 
number of incidents from those households suffering from crop raiding or 
from livestock depredation in a particular locality). Variables included in the 
initial candidate model are listed in Table 11, without interaction terms. 
Independent variables were tested for collinearity, and the response 
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variables were tested for outliers, removed where necessary, and for over-
dispersion. All analyses were carried out using the R programming 
environment (R 2010). Village was included as a random effect to account 
for spatial variation in the location and intensity of conflict incidents. Non-
significant individual explanatory variables were dropped using backwards 
step-wise selection, coupled with model selection criteria based on AIC to 
decide the minimal adequate model. Models were checked for homogeneity 
and normality of the residuals and the presence of influential observations.  
Table 11: Response and independent variables included in the baseline 
generalised linear mixed models of the number of conflict incidents 
Variable type Variable name 
Response variable Number of incidents of crop raiding per household per field 
Number of incidents of livestock depredation per household 
per locality (village vs. forest) 
Independent 
variables (socio-
economic) 
Community, primary livelihood, economic status, forest 
resource use measured as level of firewood harvested; 
Independent 
variables (crop 
raiding) 
Type of protection: no fence, natural fence, wire fence, 
electric fence, guarding, noise, fire, dogs, and lights; 
Distance from nearest forest refuge, distance from protected 
area, cultivated land, presence of irrigation, crop type 
(paddy, fruit trees, cash crops, vegetables, non-timber forest 
products, sugar cane, livestock fodder crops;  
Independent 
variables (livestock 
depredation) 
Type of protection: none, guarding, shed / corral;  
Distance from nearest forest refuge, distance from protected 
area, total number of livestock of that type kept, livestock 
type; 
 
4.3 Results 
Between Jan 2010 and Dec 2011 there were 1753 incidents of crop-raiding 
reported by 376 households in 696 separate field locations, and 258 
incidents of livestock depredation reported by 85 households, across the 18 
survey villages.  
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4.3.1 Crop protection strategies 
A total of 1721 incidents were attributable to larger mammals, while a further 
32 incidents were ascribed to smaller mammals and birds, and excluded 
from the model analysis. Crop protection strategies fell into two main 
categories, barrier methods and deterrents. The majority of incidents were 
associated with no fence (35.5%) or with a natural fence (35.8%), followed 
by wire fencing (22.5%), and finally solar-powered electric fencing (6.3%). 
Deterrents were used in 65.6% of incidents, as one or more of the following: 
noise (48.2%), guarding (11.3%), fire (5.2%), dogs (0.7%), and lights (0.2%). 
The crops that were damaged were predominantly paddy fields (27.2%) and 
fruit trees such as banana or jackfruit (27%), followed by cash crops such as 
coffee, tea and spices (21.2%) and vegetables (21.3%). Cultivated non-
timber forest products (2.2%), sugar cane (0.7%) and livestock fodder crops 
(0.5%) made up the remainder. Elephants Elephas maximus were 
responsible for the majority of incidents (44.2%), closely followed by wild 
boar Sus scrofa (34.8%). The minority of incidents were attributed to deer 
(sambar Rusa unicolor, chital Axis axis and muntjac Muntiacus muntjak; 
9.6%), gaur Bos gaurus (0.6%), sloth bear Melursus ursinus (0.2%); with 
small mammals (porcupines Hystrix indica, black naped hare; 5.5%), 
primates (primarily Macaca radiata; 3.1%), birds and rats (0.9%) making up 
the remainder of incidents which were excluded from the model analysis.  
The number of incidents experienced per field per household gave a 
measure of frequency of incursion to that particular locality. The best fitting 
generalised linear mixed model included distance from the nearest forest 
refuge (p = 0.0393) and fencing type as the significant explanatory variables 
influencing the number of incidents occurring (against no fencing: natural p < 
0.001, wire p < 0.001, electric p = 0.0162), with village as a random effect 
(Table 12). The number of incidents decreased with distance from forest 
refuges. In terms of fencing type, electric fencing was associated with the 
least number of incidents, followed by wire, natural and no fencing. Notably, 
the presence or absence of deterrents did not have any significant effect on 
the number of incidents occurring, and neither did crop type.  
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Table 12: Generalised Linear Mixed Model details for incidents of crop 
raiding and livestock depredation across the NBR 
Model variables Estimate Standard 
Error 
Z  Probability 
Crop raiding incidents ~ distance from forest + fence type + (1|village), n = 696 
Intercept1 1.038 0.126 8.206 < 0.001 
Distance from forest -0.077 0.037 -2.061 0.039 
Natural fence -0.312 0.067 -4.641 < 0.001 
Wire fence -0.424 0.072 -5.913 < 0.001 
Electric fence -0.350 0.146 -2.404 0.016 
Livestock depredation incidents ~ number of livestock kept + protection type + 
(1|village), n = 143 
Intercept2 0.934 0.110 8.499 < 0.001 
Number of livestock 
kept 
0.011 0.001 10.920 < 0.001 
Shed / corral -0.583 0.256 -2.279 0.023 
Guarding -0.572 0.184 -3.199 0.002 
1 Corresponds to the factor of no fence type; 
2 Corresponds to the factor of no protection; 
 
Figure 17 shows the actual number of incidents plotted against distance to 
the forest refuge, with predicted line values for each fence type as generated 
by a version of the model without village as a random effect. There is a lot of 
variability in incident number at close proximity to the forest refuge, and this 
is likely to be a consequence of factors that drive conflict at a larger spatial 
scale, such as those identified in Chapter 3 (degradation, farmland, 
abandoned and encroached land), variation which is accounted for to some 
extent in the final model by including village as a random variable.   
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Figure 17: Number of crop raiding incidents as a function of distance from 
nearest forest refuge. Lines represent predicted values for each fence 
type, from a generalised linear model of incident as a function of fence 
type and distance 
 
4.3.2 Livestock protection strategies  
A total of 184 incidents of livestock depredation attributed to large mammals 
were recorded across all study villages. A further 120 incidents of losses of 
poultry to small carnivores (such as jungle cat Felis chaus, small Indian civet 
Viverricula indica, mongoose Herpestes spp.) and raptors within village 
property were also recorded but not included in the analysis. Incidents were 
classified based on household, locality of loss and livestock type. Leopard 
Panthera pardus were primarily responsible for depredation incidents 
(46.4%), followed by tiger Panthera tigris (8.2%) and wild dog Cuon alpinus 
(5.9%).  
Livestock protection strategies in the study region were limited to no 
protection, where stock were left to forage unattended, and to personal 
guarding where a herder was present with the stock. Both protection 
methods were used for grazing livestock within village lands and within 
nearby forested areas. Within village lands livestock were also sometimes 
protected by being kept in a corral or shed. Incidents occurred both within 
village lands (48%) and within the forest (52%). The majority of incidents 
were associated with no protection (58.2%), followed by guarding (30.9%) 
and lastly by the use of sheds or corrals (10.9%). Cattle were most 
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commonly depredated (38.3%), followed by goats (31.4%), dogs (12.6%), 
chickens (8.6%), buffalo (8%) and sheep (1.1%). Although not technically 
livestock, the taking of dogs by leopards was included as a loss.  
The best fitting generalised linear mixed model included number of livestock 
of that type kept (p < 0.001) and protection type as the significant 
explanatory variables influencing the number of incidents occurring (against 
no protection: shed/corral p = 0.023, guarding p = 0.002), with village as a 
random effect. The number of other livestock of that type kept was the main 
predictor of the number of incidents, while guarding or using sheds or corrals 
was associated with reduced numbers of depredation incidents. Notably, 
location (whether taken from the village or from in the forest), distance from 
nearest forest refuge, and livestock type were not retained as significant 
predictors in the final model.  
Figure 18 shows the number of incidents plotted against the number of 
livestock kept, with predicted line values for each protection type as 
generated by a version of the model without village as a random effect. 
Once again there is some variability which is accounted for to some extent in 
the final model by including village as a random variable.   
 
 
Figure 18: Number of livestock depredation incidents as a function of 
number of livestock kept. Lines represent predicted values for each 
protection type, from a generalised linear model of incident as a 
function of protection type and number of livestock 
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4.3.3 Household decision-making 
When asked which factors were most important in an ideal mitigation 
scheme, householders expressed clear preferences for certain criteria, with 
a significant difference in mean preferences overall (Independent-samples 
Kruskal-Wallis test, p < 0.001, n = 478; Figure 19a). Four key criteria relating 
to costs and benefits were most preferred: low startup costs, low 
maintenance costs, low labour effort, and proven effectiveness. The three 
criteria relating to costs were considered as important as the effectiveness of 
the scheme, with no significant difference between them in mean rankings. A 
high level of household control of the scheme, minimal negative effects on 
wildlife, community acceptability and fair compensation were ranked as 
much less important, with a significant difference in the order of preference 
between proven effectiveness and household control (Mann-Whitney U test, 
Z = -13.741, p < 0.001, n = 478), between household control and negative 
effects on wildlife (Z = -4.990, p < 0.001, n = 478), between negative effects 
and community acceptability (Z = -10.686, p < 0.001, n = 478), and between 
community acceptability and fair compensation (Z = -12.167, p < 0.001, n = 
478).  
Regarding preferred mitigation schemes to protect against crop-raiding, 
householders again expressed a strong preference for certain options 
(Independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test, p < 0.001, n = 478; Figure 19bi). 
The most preferred option was electric fencing surrounding fields, with a 
mean ranking significantly higher than the second option of trenches around 
fields (Mann-Whitney U test, Z = -12.589, p < 0.001, n = 478). The choice of 
trenches around fields was significantly different from the third most popular 
option of electric fences around the park (Z = -3.983, p < 0.001, n = 478), 
which differed from the fourth most popular set of options (Z = -19.103, p < 
0.001, n = 478). This set of options, which included better compensation, 
trenches around parks, more deterrents, wire fences around fields, and 
insurance, showed no significant difference in their mean preference 
ranking. These were all considered significantly better than natural fences 
around fields (Z = -2.953, p = 0.003, n = 478), followed by improving habitat 
within the park (Z = -5.427, p < 0.001, n = 478), and government control of 
problem animals, and finally the least preferred option was to stop grazing 
livestock in the park (Z = -2.970, p = 0.003, n = 478). 
For preferred mitigation schemes to protect against livestock depredation, 
householders again expressed significant differences in preferences 
between options (Independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test, p < 0.001, n = 
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478; Figure 19bii). Guarding was consistently ranked as the most preferred 
mitigation measure, followed by fencing of livestock corrals (Mann-Whitney 
U test, Z = -3.752, p < 0.001, n = 478). This was significantly preferred over 
the third option of compensation (Z = -6.292, p < 0.001, n = 478), which was 
preferred over insurance (Z = -3.669, p < 0.001, n = 478). Four criteria 
ranked last in preference (Z = -5.771, p < 0.001, n = 478), but with no 
difference between them: government control of problem animals, stopping 
livestock grazing in the park, stopping illegal hunting, and improving habitat 
in the park.  
There was an obvious difference in preferred rankings for those most 
responsible for conflict (Independent-samples Kruskal-Wallis test, p < 0.001, 
n = 478; Figure 19c). Householders considered conflict management to be 
primarily the responsibility of the Forest Department, followed by other 
government institutions (Mann-Whitney U test, Z = -19.649, p < 0.001, n = 
478), local communities (Z = -11.722, p < 0.001, n = 478), and independent 
conservation and development NGOs (Z = -5.114, p < 0.001, n = 478). 
Finally, tourists (Z = -20.150, p < 0.001, n = 478), tourist resorts (Z = -
18.051, p < 0.001, n = 478), and urban citizens (Z = -19.308, p < 0.001, n = 
478) were consistently ranked as being least responsible for managing or 
helping solve problems with conflict.  
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(a) 
 
(b) (i) 
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(b) (ii) 
 
(c) 
Figure 19: Mean ranking with 95% confidence interval bars for (a) preferred 
criteria in a householder’s ideal mitigation scheme; (b) preferred 
mitigation schemes for (i) crop raiding and (ii) livestock depredation; (c) 
stakeholder groups considered to be most responsible for managing 
conflict (where 1 = most preferred/responsible) 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Livelihood protection strategies 
The type of barrier and proximity to a forest refuge were the primary 
predictors for the number of crop raiding incidents. The closer fields were 
located to forest refuges, the higher the number of incidents, regardless of 
fence type. However, the most effective intervention associated with the 
lowest numbers of incidents was found to be electric fences, followed by 
wire fences, natural fences, and lack of fencing. This is in accordance with 
previous studies which consider electric fences best able to reduce both the 
likelihood of crop-raiding and loss (Davies et al. 2011), and which found 
proximity to forest to influence the extent of crop-raiding (Linkie et al. 2007). 
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However, in this study there was no indication that the use of particular 
deterrents in combination with fencing affected the number of incidents, 
although other studies have reported the use of spotlights and fire to 
effectively reduce damage while noise increases damage (Sitati and 
Walpole 2006, Davies et al. 2011).  
Livestock loss was most associated with the numbers of livestock kept, most 
likely because this can be an attractant for predators, both when out grazing 
and when kept at night. Previous studies have similarly cited livestock 
density as a key predictor of depredation intensity (Treves et al. 2004, 
Woodroffe et al. 2005a). However, loss to predation was moderated by 
protection type: no protection was associated with a much higher frequency 
of predation than the use of guardians or sheds / corrals to house livestock 
at night. Other studies have also found the use of guarding and husbandry to 
effectively decrease depredation by large carnivores (Ogada et al. 2003, 
Marker and Dickman 2004, Woodroffe et al. 2007, Inskip and Zimmermann 
2009a). However, there was a very low diversity of protection strategies 
employed to protect livestock from depredation in this particular study area, 
when compared to other carnivore conflict studies (Inskip and Zimmermann 
2009a). Unexpectedly, for livestock there was no clear association with 
depredation and location. Grazing livestock in forest areas has previously 
been considered to be one of the main reasons for livestock losses to wildlife 
in the region (Madhusudan 2005) ; although results from the two years of 
monitoring in this study indicated no significant difference in the number of 
depredation incidents on village lands or within forests. 
4.4.2 Household decision making 
Rankings of the different criteria for each key question relating to conflict 
mitigation schemes were quite clear and consistently ordered across the 478 
households sampled in the region. Although these questions were very 
broad and quite simplistic, this indicates that a majority of rural households 
have consistent views concerning livelihood protection from wildlife loss at 
this broad level, despite differences in livelihoods, economic status, 
community, and other socio-economic attributes. The revealed homogeneity 
of this particular stakeholder group of rural communities indicates some 
consistent preferences for important criteria that could realistically be 
incorporated into management plans implemented by government or other 
stakeholder groups.  
The primary criteria used by householders in deciding on a protection 
strategy related to the direct costs and benefits of that measure: low startup 
- 94 - 
costs, low maintenance costs, low labour effort, coupled with proven 
effectiveness. This explains the use of less effective barrier methods such as 
natural and wire fencing, the use of deterrents, and why there are still a 
majority of householders that continue to use no protection methods at all for 
either crops or livestock.  
Given the choice however, householders considered electric fencing 
surrounding fields to be the best mitigation strategy out of those currently 
available to protect crops, followed by trenches surrounding fields. The focus 
on field-based protection is in contrast to the currently commonly practiced 
Indian method of placing trenches and fences around parks. For livestock, 
guarding was recognised as the most preferred mitigation measure, followed 
by fencing of livestock corrals. This indicates that the effectiveness of these 
measures is clearly recognised by householders, considering that they were 
associated with significantly reduced incidents, but that there are underlying 
factors that must inhibit their more widespread use. For electric fences, 
these are likely to be the costs of start-up and maintenance, and for livestock 
guarding to be the high labour effort involved.  
Government awarded compensation is the most prevalent form of mitigation 
in India for all types of conflicts, with many associated problems and 
complaints (Bulte and Rondeau 2005, Nyhus et al. 2005b, Ogra and Badola 
2008b, Rangarajan et al. 2010). Despite this, fair compensation was 
considered the least important criteria when it came to choosing a mitigation 
scheme. Better compensation was also only ranked as a middle option from 
the list of potential measures to protect against crop raiding, although it was 
ranked third for livestock, indicating that it is considered more acceptable for 
addressing livestock losses than for crop losses. This is most likely because 
it is easier to assess and claim the market value for an animal than for a 
certain area of crop damage. Insurance was not considered as a particularly 
important option for crop-raiding or livestock-depredation. Mitigation 
measures that concentrated on the protected area for both crop-raiding and 
livestock-depredation were least popular, including improving habitat or 
reducing hunting, control of problem animals, or restricting livestock access 
to grazing.   
4.4.3 Responsibility for managing conflicts 
There was a strong belief that the Forest Department should be responsible 
for conflict mitigation, followed by other government institutions. Local 
communities viewed themselves as being less responsible for these 
problems than the government, though more responsible than NGOs. This is 
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in opposition to some of the preferred scheme criteria which showed that 
households clearly prefer mitigation measures to be field rather than park 
based, and understand the problems of existing measures such as park 
fences, trenches and compensation, which should reflect a greater 
acceptance of responsibility. However, they still strongly believe 
responsibility lies with the government, despite ongoing mitigation failures. 
This is reflected in householders’ responses to being asked if they were 
prepared to take personal or collective responsibilities for managing conflict, 
where 31.8% were not prepared, 21.9% were prepared, and 53.7% were 
non-committal. Community reluctance to collaborate in mitigation efforts has 
been highlighted as a major factor in conflict mitigation failures (Ogra 2009, 
Rangarajan et al. 2010). Thus, empowering local communities to take 
responsibility for conflict may be the only sustainable solution (Osborn and 
Parker 2003), and hence any initiatives should attempt to reduce conflicts 
between the local communities and the Forest Department to drive a mutual 
sense of responsibility in parallel with establishing protection measures. 
Tourists, tourist resorts and urban citizens were considered to be those least 
responsible for dealing with conflicts. This suggests that schemes that 
attempt to link tourism incomes to conflict mitigation may need to be 
undertaken with care to ensure that local communities are accepting of the 
assistance provided by outsiders without assuming that this will be the case.  
4.5 Conclusions 
It is clear that the closer fields are to forest refuges, the higher the number of 
incidents of crop-raiding. Raiding can be reduced with more effective 
barriers, with the greatest reductions achieved by the use of electric fences. 
Deterrents do not appear to have any significant effect on incident reduction. 
Elephants and wild boar are responsible for the majority of crop raiding 
incidents, while leopard are primarily responsible for livestock depredation. 
Livestock depredation appears to be associated primarily with livestock 
density, and incidents are significantly reduced with guarding or with sheds / 
corrals. Given the low diversity of livestock protection methods employed, it 
may be that trials of other methods or further investigation into effective 
ways of improving guarding and husbandry may result in decreased 
depredation incidents (Inskip and Zimmermann 2009a).   
However, it is not sufficient to implement or promote intervention measures 
solely on effectiveness if the mechanisms by which people choose to protect 
their livelihoods are not understood. Electric fences are shown in these 
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circumstances to be the most effective at reducing crop-raiding incidents, but 
only if maintained, and a common criticism of electric fences in India is poor 
maintenance by the Forest Department leading to failures (Ogra and Badola 
2008b, Rangarajan et al. 2010). This is a problem of institutional 
implementation, which has been recognised in a recent governmental inquiry 
that recommended a moratorium on further trenches and fences around 
Indian protected areas until universal performance standards are established 
(Rangarajan et al. 2010). These institutional problems however, may be 
avoided if decision-making by communities can be understood and tied to 
the establishment and use of effective measures. When given the choice 
communities would prefer to utilise electric fences surrounding fields, or 
improve their guarding practices, but are obviously hampered by their main 
criteria for implementing such strategies, which are issues of start-up and 
maintenance costs and labour effort. Results also indicate that many 
households continue to use no or extremely ineffective protection strategies, 
due to the associated costs or effort, which will inevitably perpetuate 
conflicts and undermine any conservation initiatives.   
Given that the choice rankings revealed a large and diverse stakeholder 
group to have clear and consistent preferences, this indicates scope for 
more in-depth analyses of decision-making, which can be undertaken using 
economic valuation techniques such as conjoint analysis (Alriksson and 
Öberg 2008) and multi-criteria decision making (Kiker et al. 2005). This 
would yield further understanding of household preferences, particularly 
relating to the continued absence of protection strategies as well as 
identifying barriers to the adoption of more effective strategies.  
The problem of conflict is also overwhelmingly attributed to the Forest 
Department and the government, despite government-managed mitigation 
schemes being less favoured. Creating a sense of responsibility and 
empowerment at a community level may be a mechanism by which more 
community based schemes can be implemented (Kellert et al. 2000, Berkes 
2004, Ogra 2009), to overcome the challenges of cost and effort associated 
with more effective measures.  
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Chapter 5 
“No man is an island5
 
”: challenges and opportunities for co-
operative human-wildlife conflict mitigation 
 
 
 
  
                                            
5 John Donne (1624) Meditation 17: Devotions upon Emergent Occasions 
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5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Human wildlife conflict and mitigation needs 
Human-wildlife conflict undermines the conservation of large mammals and 
inhibits the sustainable development of rural communities in shared 
landscapes. Livestock depredation, crop raiding, and threats to human life or 
property are major causes of conflicts adjacent to protected areas, often 
resulting in retaliation against already threatened wildlife populations 
(Thirgood et al. 2005b). In biodiversity-rich landscapes with high human 
densities, conflicts can be most severe, impacting on impoverished local 
communities who bear a high cost for conservation (Balmford and Whitten 
2003).  
Crop raiding in particular can be a source of debilitating loss, e.g., in 
southern India village households lost 11% of annual grain production to 
elephants (Madhusudan 2003), with a total of 0.8 – 1million ha of crops lost 
across India (Bist 2006), while investment in damage control strategies can 
even exceed the cost of damage (Osborn 2005, Thirgood et al. 2005b). 
Compensation is often hampered by implementation problems which can be 
a source of further conflicts (Bulte and Rondeau 2005, Nyhus et al. 2005b) 
and does nothing to reduce the risks of future crop loss. Out of the growing 
body of mitigation techniques, improved crop protection strategies may be 
most cost-effective (Thouless and Sakwa 1995, Sitati and Walpole 2006). 
Methods include manual guarding; deterrents such as noise, fire and chilli; 
and barriers such as natural or wire fences, electric fences, and trenches 
(Osborn and Parker 2003). Guarding varies in effectiveness and often 
involves opportunity costs such as restricted participation in other income 
generating activities or education (Haule et al. 2002, Osborn and Parker 
2003). Deterrents and non-electrified fences are usually of low efficacy 
(Osborn and Parker 2003, Sitati and Walpole 2006), while the most effective 
methods are electric fences and trenches which are the most expensive to 
install and maintain (Hayward and Kerley 2009), as reported in Chapter 4. 
These latter methods must rely on economies of scale, therefore are often 
implemented by external agencies or at a community level (Osborn and 
Parker 2003, Hayward and Kerley 2009).  
Community-based conservation, development and natural resource 
management is an increasingly common practice, based on the involvement 
of community members and local institutions in the control of natural 
resources, devolving power from government, and linking development with 
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conservation (Kellert et al. 2000, Berkes 2004). However, many co-operative 
projects have reported failures for a variety of reasons, whether initiated 
internally or by external agencies providing financial assistance, which often 
relate to intrinsic community heterogeneity. These include a lack of interest 
(Barrett and Arcese 1995, Songorwa 1999); failing to recognise different 
stakeholder motives and required incentives (or penalties), particularly over 
illegal hunting (Keane et al. 2008) and fisheries (Byers and Noonburg 2007); 
or failings in conceptualising and implementing community participation 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Berkes 2004). One Indian study recommended 
community level electric fencing combined with a co-operative conflict 
management institution as a potential approach for mitigation, yet found that 
only 27.4% of respondents would actively support this institution due to the 
opinion that conflict resolution is solely a government responsibility (Ogra 
2009). However, given consistent failures and criticisms of government-
managed conflict mitigation schemes, from inadequate compensation 
measures (Nyhus et al. 2005b, Ogra and Badola 2008a) to failures to 
maintain electric fences or trenches (Rangarajan et al. 2010), conflict can 
seriously challenge agricultural livelihoods particularly in developing world 
contexts. Thus, there is a real need to understand how to increase the 
success of community-based conservation and development projects using 
interdisciplinary analyses of coupled socio-ecological systems (Berkes 2004, 
Ostrom 2009, Poteete et al. 2010), particularly regarding conflict mitigation.  
5.1.2 Integrated ecological economic modeling and game theory 
The use of integrated ecological-economic models for biodiversity 
conservation and environmental management is growing (Watzold et al. 
2006, Drechsler et al. 2007, Cooke et al. 2009). Agent-based modeling 
explores individual decision-making in many social and policy contexts 
(Poteete et al. 2010), including conservation management settings such as 
land use (Parker et al. 2003) or ecosystem management (Bousquet and Le 
Page 2004), deer management (Touza et al. in press), bushmeat hunting 
(Bousquet et al. 2001), and in market-based conservation actions (Hartig 
and Drechsler 2009).  
One mechanism for understanding conflict and co-operation in individual 
decision-making is evolutionary game theory (Myerson 1991). Game theory 
has been used to integrate biological and economic processes in 
environmental decision-making; e.g. in deforestation (Rodrigues et al. 2009), 
in transboundary protected areas (Busch 2008), protected area cost-benefit 
analysis (Albers and Robinson 2007), and in group decision-making over 
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biodiversity conservation (Frank and Sarkar 2010), and can be a potential 
tool for adaptive management in conservation settings (Colyvan et al. 2011).   
5.1.3 The stag hunt 
The stag hunt (also known as the assurance game) is one game that 
illustrates the problems inherent in social co-operation (Skyrms 2004). In its 
basic form, two individuals go hunting, and each has a choice of stag or 
hare, without knowing the other’s choice. If one chooses stag, the other must 
co-operate in order to succeed, while hare can be hunted alone. However, 
hare is worth less than a stag. There are two stable states, termed Nash 
equilibria: both players co-operate (payoff dominant) or both defect (risk 
averse but sub-optimal as the payoff is less). Co-operation results in the 
maximum payoff, while defection results in some payoff to the defector and 
nothing to the co-operator (Figure 20), so if one party defects the other is 
better off defecting as well. Hare-hare can therefore be considered the 
status quo as the safest strategy is to defect and not rely on others to co-
operate, while stag-stag is the social contract. Choosing to establish a social 
contract always carries the risk of defection. This game can be applied at 
larger scales using an n-person stag hunt, where co-operation benefits can 
scale with increasing numbers of co-operators (Pacheco et al. 2009). The 
stag hunt may be more suited to describe problems of co-operation over 
natural resources than the oft-cited prisoner’s dilemma which differs in that 
the best payoff comes from defecting against a co-operator (Myerson 1991). 
Stag hunt appropriate examples include any situation where success 
requires a minimum level of co-operation for socially and individually 
beneficial outcomes to be realised, such as in land-use management 
(Skyrms 2004, Colyvan et al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure 20: The stag hunt payoff matrix, where payoffs follow A > B ≥ D > C, 
as illustrated in the example payoffs 
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The n-person stag hunt game can therefore be effectively applied in a 
conflict mitigation context. Here, people can choose whether to establish a 
co-operatively based crop protection scheme, such as a community electric 
fence or trench surrounding a group of landholdings. This technology is 
typically more expensive to install and maintain than currently practiced 
individual strategies, such as guarding or non-electrified fences, but is 
significantly more effective in reducing crop losses when maintained 
(Hayward and Kerley 2009), as reported in Chapter 4. Successful co-
operation results in a better payoff to co-operators in terms of crop 
protection, which increases as more co-operators reduce the costs of 
participating. However, acting individually is the status quo, as it is a known 
cost investment, and to some extent a predictable although lower level of 
risk reduction. Investing in a higher cost co-operative scheme is risky if other 
people defect and the scheme fails – the co-operator has paid the costs but 
has no risk reduction in place. Establishing the social contract requires 
moving from a known lower risk individual equilibrium to a more rewarding 
but risky co-operative equilibrium. Typically, game theory is pessimistic 
about the transition to social co-operation, claiming that social norms evolve 
slowly and often regress to the status quo (Skyrms 2004). Despite this, 
many well-intentioned community-based schemes have optimistically 
assumed that co-operation will always be beneficial and that people will 
participate if offered the opportunity (Barrett and Arcese 1995, Songorwa 
1999, Kellert et al. 2000, Berkes 2004).  
This study used a game theoretic approach in an agent-based simulation 
model of a virtual human-wildlife conflict situation centred on crop raiding, 
combining a spatially explicit landscape ecological model with a household 
based economic model, to explore factors that may influence crop protection 
decision-making. Here, conflict was considered in terms of the economic 
value of crop loss. Parameters influencing conflict risk (proximity and 
stochasticity) and economic productivity (landholding size and crop value) 
were chosen to represent key drivers identified from the literature. The 
model assumes that landowners cannot calculate their optimal decision 
given incomplete knowledge of mitigation effectiveness, but instead base 
their decisions on the outcomes of neighbouring landowners’ decisions, 
choosing to follow the strategy of the neighbour with the highest payoff. The 
purpose of this study was to understand some of the underlying mechanisms 
for the observed difficulty in achieving sufficient investment in community-
based conflict mitigation schemes, and to use this insight to suggest 
- 102 - 
alternative designs to enhance participation and reduce problems generated 
by conflict.  
5.2 Methods 
The model consisted of two sub-models: a spatially explicit ecological model 
that determined the risk from conflict and impact on productivity based on 
the attributes of individual landholdings; and an economic model determining 
whether each landholder will pursue an individual or co-operative strategy of 
crop protection based on payoff calculations formulated as a ’stag hunt’ 
game (Skyrms 2004) (full details of model variables are given in Table 13 & 
Table 14). The model was set in an agricultural landscape on the border of a 
protected area, where risk from conflict is a function of proximity to the 
protected area and stochasticity. Landholding productivity is a function of 
crop value and landholding size, and this productivity can be diminished by 
the risk of conflict. The factors parameterised in the model are 
conceptualised in Figure 21, illustrating the interaction between community-
level, landholder-level and strategy choice attributes. Each landholder seeks 
to maximise utility by choosing one of the mitigation options based on 
incomplete information. The drivers for the configuration of strategies in the 
landscape at equilibrium are the economic costs and benefits of each choice 
given a variable degree of risk from conflict, combined with the ability to 
learn from the success of neighbouring landholders.  
 
Figure 21. Conceptual framework for ecological and socio-economic 
parameters at community, landholding and strategy level that influence 
the landholder decision-making process. 
 
Diffusion of each strategy throughout the landscape is mediated further by 
community-level demographics. The model was constructed in Netlogo 
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(Wilensky 1999), presented following model protocols (Grimm et al. 2010), 
and data outputs were generated in R (R 2010).  
5.2.1 State variables and scales 
The model is a 20 x 21 grid, with periodic boundaries creating a vertical 
cylindrical shape. A single row along one horizontal edge of the model 
represents the border of the protected area (PA). Each of the remaining n = 
202 grid cells represent a landholding managed by a landholder (n = 400), 
each with variable ecological and economic attributes. The model can be 
applied to any spatial or temporal scale, but in this case the modeled grid is 
of sufficient size to represent a large grouping of landholders along a 
gradient of PA proximity. As each landholder may have a differently sized 
property, each grid cell is a representative landholding rather than real 
geographical extent. Each time step represents progress towards equilibrium 
rather than a measure of real time, as the percentage of co-operators at 
equilibrium is the simulation outcome. The landholder strategy xi exists in 
one of two states: for grid cells where landholders pursue a co-operative 
strategy xi = sco-op; where landholders pursue an individual strategy xi = sind. 
The variables of the two sub-models are presented in Table 13.  
5.2.2 Ecological / spatial model 
The ecological model sets the attributes of the spatial landscape (Table 13). 
Crop value, vci, is assigned to each landholding, representing a scale from 
low value subsistence crops to high value commercial crops as an index of 1 
≤ vci ≤ 10; and landholding size ai, representing a scale from smaller 
landholdings up to larger landholdings as an index of 1 ≤ ai ≤ 10. Each of 
these values are drawn from scenario-specified distributions. The total value 
of each landholding vfi is thus assigned as a function of the crop value and 
the size: 
(1) vfi  = vci * ai 
This represents an index of landholding productivity where 1 ≤ vfi  ≤ 100, 
which can be diminished according to the extent from which a particular 
landholding suffers from crop-raiding conflict.  
In order to model the different effects that crop-raiding conflict (measured as 
percentage loss in productivity) has on each landholding, the risk ri of crop 
loss posed to each landholding from conflict was modeled as a function of 
proximity to the PA boundary pi and a stochastic risk element sei: 
(2) ri = pi * sei   
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To obtain this, the model describes the proximity of each landholding from 
the PA boundary, standardised to a continuous 0 < pi < 1 index, where 1 is 
closest to the boundary. Many studies show that one of the primary drivers 
for conflict is that wildlife are attracted to cultivated areas closer to protected 
area boundaries or refuge areas (Sitati et al. 2003, Naughton-Treves and 
Treves 2005, Woodroffe et al. 2005a). Stochasticity was set as a randomly 
drawn index of 0.5 ≤ sei ≤ 1.5, drawn from the specified part of a normal 
distribution with a mean of 1. Risk is often locally spatially variable between 
landholdings for different (and not always identified) site-specific reasons 
(Sitati et al. 2003, Woodroffe et al. 2005a) sometimes producing severe 
idiosyncratic events (Dickman et al. 2011). This simple measure combines 
proximity with inherent stochasticity that can increase or decrease overall 
risk. The resulting risk measure is used to calculate the value of losses to 
conflict for each landholding, as a proportion of the overall productivity of the 
holding. This risk measure is reduced by different extents according to each 
landholder’s strategy choice.  
These indices reflect a small selection of key conflict drivers from the 
literature (Sitati et al. 2003, Naughton-Treves and Treves 2005, Woodroffe 
et al. 2005a), centering on risk as a function of proximity and stochasticity, 
and on economic losses as a function of the variation in productive capacity 
of landholdings as a result of crop value and landholding size.  
5.2.3 Economic / decision-making model 
The economic model determines the decision-making process of the 
landholders (autonomous agents) who reside on each landholding. Each 
landholder decides whether to pursue the co-operative crop protection 
strategy, or the individual strategy, following a ‘stag hunt’ definition of 
payoffs. Fixed model parameters are listed in Table 13 and manipulated 
scenario parameters in Table 14.  
Firstly, a given percentage of initial co-operators is randomly distributed 
throughout the landscape, in order to initiate the learning and evolution 
process. Co-operation cannot arise in a solely individual-based landscape 
unless some participants change their strategy, so it was projected that a 
certain number of landholders decide from the outset that they would co-
operate. Then, at each subsequent time step, landholders change strategy 
through imitating the strategy of their immediate neighbour with the best 
payoff.  
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Table 13: Ecological and economic model variables parameterized in the 
agent-based model of decision-making in a conflict situation 
Symbol Connotation Model 
Range 
Ecological (spatial) model variables: 
pi Proximity: the standardised inverse position of the ith 
landholding from the PA boundary                                                                            
= (max distance + 1 – distance) / (max distance + 1) 
0 – 1  
sei Stochastic element of risk to the ith landholding as a 
randomly drawn value from part of a normal distribution 
with µ = 1  
0.5 – 1.5 
ri Risk to the ith landholding from conflict i.e. proportion of 
productivity that will be lost as a function of proximity 
and stochasticity                   = pi * sei 
0 – 1.5  
ai Size of the ith landholding                        1 – 10  
vci Value of crops grown on the ith landholding 1 – 10 
vfi Productivity of the ith landholding = vci * ai 1 – 100 
cc Community composition as a percentage of community 
A over community B 
0 – 100 
Economic (decision-making) model variables:  
si Strategy of the landholder of the ith landholding                     Co-operative 
or Individual 
ss Percentage of landholders who choose to co-operate at 
the outset  
0 – 100 
cco-op Co-operative strategy cost per size unit ai 1 – 10 
ni Number of co-operating neighbours surrounding the ith 
landholding  
0 – 8  
cni Proportion reduction in cco-op due to co-operating 
neighbours  
= 1 – (ni  / 10) 
0.2 – 0.9 
cind Individual strategy cost per size unit ai 2   
mco-op Co-operative strategy risk reduction 0 – 1 
mind Individual strategy risk reduction 0.25  
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To obtain payoffs for each landholder (equation 3), the chosen strategy cost 
is subtracted from the productivity of the landholding vfi (equation 1), where 
the cost of their chosen strategy cstrategy is calculated as a scenario-defined 
cost per size unit ai. This cost is further reduced in the co-operative strategy 
by a certain proportion depending on the number of co-operating neighbours 
cni in the immediate vicinity (where 1 neighbour = 10% decrease and a cni 
value of 0.9; 2 = 20% and 0.8 etc). Finally, the loss due to conflict is also 
subtracted, derived from the risk to a landholding ri, (equation 2) multiplied 
by the chosen strategy mstrategy risk reduction, producing a proportional loss 
of landholding productivity to conflict. This final value is the economic payoff 
as a result of each landholders chosen strategy. If a landholder chooses a 
co-operative strategy but is surrounded by non-co-operators (defectors), he 
receives no co-operative reduction in the cost of the co-operating strategy, 
and no risk reduction at all, hence receives the poorest payoff.   
The economic payoff for each landholder is thus calculated based on the 
following variables: (1) the productivity of the landholding, (2) the cost of 
their chosen strategy per size unit, and (3) the risk and losses to conflict as 
reduced by their chosen strategy, as follows:  
(3)  Payoff for individual strategy =   
[ vfi  ] – [ ai * cind ] – [vfi * (ri * (1 – mind))]   
Payoff for co-operative strategy with neighbouring co-operators = 
[ vfi  ] – [ ai * (cco-op * cni)] – [vfi * (ri * (1 – mco-op))]  
Payoff for co-operative strategy with no neighbouring co-operators =                                                
[ vfi  ] – [ ai * cco-op ] – [vfi * ri]  
The influence of heterogenous communities was also considered, where 
different segments within a community landscape would prefer to interact 
with neighbours of the same community, or choose not to co-operate with 
members of a different community. Community composition cc sets the 
percentage of community A over community B, and trust t is set as a 
community-level probability that landholders of different communities choose 
to learn from and co-operate with neighbours of different communities.  
5.2.4 Parameterisation and analysis  
The model can therefore be divided into parameterisations of attributes at 
the community, landholdings, and landholder mitigation strategies level 
(Figure 21), varied according to a number of different scenarios. For all 
scenarios, the outcome was measured as the percentage of co-operators 
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established once the model reached equilibrium (i.e. once landholder 
strategy choice settled to an unchanging state, or time steps reached 100 to 
account for any continuous small scale changes).   
 
Table 14: Ranges for parameters varied by landholder and community level 
scenarios in the agent-based model  
Variable Scenario values 
  Landholder-level & co-operative 
attributes scenarios 
Community level  
Scenarios 
Landholding size 
ai 
Small, medium & large farms;                          
Normal dist: σ = 2.5, µ = 1, 5, 10,                 
bounds 0.1 – 10. 
5
Landholding crop 
values vci 
Low (subsistence), moderate (mixed), 
high (commercial) value crops;                                  
Nomal dist: σ = 2.5, µ = 1, 5, 10, 
bounds 0.1 – 10. 
5 
Community 
Composition (% 
community A) cc  
NA 50 – 100 
Initial co-
operators ss 
25% or 100 landowners 0 – 100 
Co-operative 
costs cco-op 
1 – 10 5 
Co-operative risk 
reduction mco-op 
0 – 1 0.75 
 
Co-operative cost-benefit tradeoffs under different landholder economies 
Nine scenarios were generated representing example patterns of 
landholdings subject to conflict, based on combinations of landholding size ai 
and crop value vci  (value ranges are given in Table 14). Landscapes were 
defined as predominantly small, medium, or large landholdings, landholding 
size being randomly drawn from part of a normal distribution where 1 ≤ ai ≤ 
10, with the distribution mean size varying across scenarios. A distribution 
mean size of 1 represented predominantly small scale landholdings, 5 - 
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medium landholdings, and 10 - large landholdings. Crop value was defined 
as predominantly crops of low economic value (e.g. subsistence crops), 
moderate value, and high value (e.g. commercial crops) per size unit ai. 
Value was randomly drawn from part of a normal distribution where 1 ≤ vci ≤ 
10, with a distribution mean set to represent the primary crop value type (1 
representing low, 5 - moderate, 10 - high value).  
These scenario parameters hence influence the total productivity vfi of each 
landholding; and so also the potential percentage losses occurring due to 
conflict. Note that ’large’ sized landholdings and ’high’ value crops in these 
scenarios represent the upper bound of richer landholders who still cannot 
afford expensive protection strategies at the individual level.  
In these size-value scenarios other parameters were kept constant (listed in 
Table 14). An initial 25% ss of randomly distributed landholders were set as 
choosing to co-operate. Individual strategy costs cind were set at 2 and 
individual risk reduction mind set at 0.25, since individual crop protection 
strategies tend to be of lower cost with a lower level of risk reduction, also in 
keeping with the definition of the ‘stag hunt’ payoff.  
Then, for each landholding size/value combination scenario the ‘costs’ of co-
operation cco-op were varied along an index of 1 to 10, representing low to 
high cost; along with the proportional risk reduction produced by co-
operative strategies mco-op, from a scale of 0 to 1, representing zero to full 
protection effectiveness. Varying the costs and benefits of the co-operative 
strategy against a fixed individual cost/benefit explored the importance of the 
relative differential between the strategies given other variations in 
parameters, and shows the same results as varying the individual 
parameters against fixed co-operative parameters. The model was run 
108,900 times (12,100 runs per scenario, 100 runs per permutation).  
Variations in community-level and external factors 
In order to explore some of the community-level factors, the landholder-level 
and co-operative strategy attributes were kept constant. These were set at 
medium sized landholders, moderate crop values, moderate co-operative 
strategy costs and moderate co-operative risk reduction benefits (listed in 
Table 14). The community-level factors could be considered as being set by 
government or NGOs assisting in implementation of such a community-
based scheme, or by inherent aspects of the community itself.  
The model was run with variations in the initial percentage of co-operators 
(from 0 – 100%; 10,100 model runs, 100 runs per permutation). Different 
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world sizes were used to vary the total number of landowners (over 1,500 
model runs, 250 per permutation), but using the same initial number of co-
operators (100); and explored variation in the numbers of neighbouring co-
operators needed (from 1 – 4; 1,000 model runs, 250 runs per permutation).  
Finally, the possible influence of community heterogeneity was considered. 
Heterogeneity could potentially influence either the diffusion of the co-
operative strategy through learning, or through an increased likelihood of 
defection against a different community member, and the effect of the former 
was investigated. Each landholder was randomly assigned to one of two 
different communities, varying the percentage of one community in the 
population (from 50-100%). As before, landholders choose their strategy 
based on the best strategy of their neighbours, but followed a rule of 
preference for following the successful strategy of a neighbour of your own 
community, rather than a neighbour from a different community. 
The assumption is that they trust and have insight into the decision making 
of their community over and above decisions made by those outside. If they 
were surrounded by members of both communities, they chose to follow the 
neighbour of their own community with the maximum payoff. If they were 
surrounded by only members of the opposite community, they would then 
choose to follow a neighbour of the opposing community with the maximum 
payoff. The model was run 6,050 times (250 times per permutation).  
Strategy payoffs at the community and individual level 
An ‘average’ model scenario (with fixed parameters of moderate landholding 
size and value, co-operative costs of 5 and benefits of 0.75, and initial co-
operators set at 25%, for 500 runs), was used to investigate the total and per 
capita payoffs at both a community and individual level for the two strategies 
at equilibrium. 
5.3 Results 
Varying degrees of co-operation emerged, dependent on the economic 
parameters of each landholder strategy, landholding-level attributes, and 
community-level attributes. The coupled model identified key determinants of 
the emergence of co-operative outcomes by comparing a number of different 
conceptual scenarios. Maximising the percentage of co-operators at 
equilibrium was considered to be the optimal outcome for conflict mitigation.  
Two sets of scenarios were explored: one set investigated how variations in 
the attributes of the co-operative strategy (the cost-benefit trade-off) might 
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impact on the evolution of co-operation, given certain typical combinations of 
landholder demographics. These scenarios permitted the evaluation of the 
core criteria of the co-operative strategy and whether these might change if 
a community is economically better or worse off. The other set of scenarios 
investigated how variations in external factors dictated by the community or 
scheme implementer could impact the evolution of co-operation, as this can 
enable suggestions for potentially beneficial changes in implementation 
procedures. 
The strategy landscape (co-operative vs individual crop protection) that 
emerged for all scenarios displayed clusterings of co-operators, with a 
tendency for co-operation to increase with proximity to the PA, 
corresponding to a general increase in the risk of loss. This validated the 
model settings, in that co-operative mitigation schemes rely on spatial 
proximity of landholdings, and that the co-operative payoff increases as risk 
from conflict increases, as does the cost from risk of defection.  
5.3.1 Co-operative cost-benefit tradeoffs under different 
landholder economies 
The first set of scenarios investigated how variations in the cost and benefit 
(risk reduction) attributes of the co-operative strategy might impact on the 
evolution of co-operation, given certain typical combinations of landholding 
demographics, where landholding varied by size and by value (Table 14). 
The model showed that within the co-operative strategy, cost is the main 
constraint to the evolution of co-operation, rather than the level of risk 
reduction (Figure 22). Changes in cost produced sharper and greater 
changes in percentage of co-operators than changes in the level of risk 
reduction, for all landholder demographics. Concurrently, landholding crop 
value had a greater influence on the evolution of co-operation than 
landholding size (Figure 22). Increasing crop value for a given size supports 
a greater cost of co-operating, while there was little variation in the evolution 
of co-operation across size, for a given crop value. Increasing crop value 
and size was also associated with the increased importance of risk 
reduction. 
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Figure 22. The percentage of co-operators at equilibrium, as a function of 
variations in co-operative strategy cost and benefits, across nine 
landholding scenarios varying in landholding size and crop value, for a 
fixed individual strategy cost and benefit. 
 
5.3.2 Community-level contexts 
The second set of scenarios investigated how variations in external factors 
dictated by the community or scheme implementer could impact the 
evolution of co-operation (Table 14). Variations of the following were tested: 
the initial percentage of co-operators, the total number of landowners, the 
number of neighbouring co-operators required for scheme implementation, 
and the influence of community heterogeneity.  
When initial numbers of co-operators are varied (Figure 23), a threshold of 
approximately 20% needs to be exceeded for there to be a strong likelihood 
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of co-operation developing, as below this the chances of completely 
reverting to the status quo of individuality are very high due to the pull 
towards this equilibrium. Points above the xy line indicate the uptake of co-
operation, while those below indicate the reduction of co-operation from the 
initial numbers of co-operators. This is also because the randomly 
distributed initial co-operators are more likely to be clustered at higher levels, 
which enhances the retaining and diffusion of the co-operative strategy. 
Once initial interest increases past this threshold the likelihood of co-
operation also increases, and past initial levels of approximately 60% the 
equilibrium is pulled towards full co-operation.  
 
 
 Figure 23. The percentage of co-operators at equilibrium, as a function of A. 
percentage of initial co-operators; B. number of landowners; C. number 
of neighbours needed; D. community heterogeneity as a percentage 
composition of two community types. 
 
When there are more landholders in a community but a fixed number of 
initial co-operators, there is a corresponding decrease in the percentage of 
co-operators evolving (Figure 23). Increasing the numbers of participants 
makes co-operation more difficult to achieve and lower levels of co-operation 
becomes a more predictable outcome.  
Establishing initial constraints on co-operation, in that it can only be 
successful with a certain number of neighbours, results in a dramatic 
decrease in the degree of co-operation (Figure 23). The need for 2 
neighbours results in a reduction in the number of final co-operators, whilst 
increasing it to 3 or 4 neighbours means that the average percentage of final 
co-operators drops to near zero.  
The potential effects of community heterogeneity were investigated, by 
varying percentages of community A over community B. A rule of preference 
was constructed for following the successful strategy of a neighbour of your 
own community, rather than a neighbour from a different community. A 
- 113 - 
simple rule such as this only assumes a preference, not that there is an 
active distrust or increased likelihood of defection towards others. 
Community heterogeneity under the circumstances tested has a strong 
effect on diminishing the degree of co-operation that evolves (Figure 23). A 
community that is homogenous or mostly homogenous has a greater 
likelihood of co-operation evolving than a mixed community. The more mixed 
the community, i.e. when there is no clear majority, the smaller the 
probability of co-operation.  
5.3.3 Community level payoffs of social co-operation versus 
individuality 
The relationship between payoff and strategy was also assessed using the 
‘average’ model scenario. The per capita payoff of all landholders in a 
community increases as the final number of co-operators within the 
community at equilibrium increases (Figure 24). Further, co-operators 
receive a better payoff than individuals, which increases as the final number 
of co-operators increases (Figure 24) above a threshold of approximately 
25% co-operators.  
 
 
Figure 24. Payoffs by the percentage of co-operators at equilibrium, for (a) 
total payoff for all landholders; (b) per capita payoff for co-
operating/individual landholders. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Model findings and applicability to community-based 
mitigation schemes 
Social contracts require a measure of trust between co-operators that the 
others will not defect. In this case, a modeled community-based co-operative 
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scheme, such as electric fencing, improves the chances of maximising loss 
reduction due to conflict. Individual methods of protection, the status quo, 
are relatively ineffective, but carry a known cost and a known risk, and 
success is independent of other people’s actions. Those who invest in the 
co-operative strategy stand to lose when others defect, which in real-life 
could be either in refusal to participate, failing to contribute to set up costs, 
or failing to contribute to maintenance – all with economic consequences for 
other participants. Variation in parameters at the strategy-level, landholder-
level and community-level produces different effects on the evolution of co-
operation. Results show that (1) variation in individual risk has a significant 
effect on likelihood of co-operation; (2) co-operative risk reduction is more 
important for more affluent landowners whilst cost is more important for 
poorer landowners; (3) limited initial interest, more landowners, pre-defined 
constraints and community heterogeneity all hinder the evolution of co-
operation; (4) co-operation can dramatically increase the productivity of a 
landscape if risks from conflict are high.  
The importance of individual risk for co-operation 
The cost of the co-operative strategy is the main constraint to the evolution 
of co-operation (Figure 22), rather than the effectiveness of risk reduction. 
This happens in the model because the cost of participating in a community-
based scheme has been set according to a particular single attribute of the 
landholder, to reflect real-world situations. People are usually required to 
contribute according to their means, often measured in terms of land area to 
be protected, in the interests of establishing a ‘fair’ scheme. However, this is 
unexpectedly problematic because the model clearly reveals that the 
benefits of the co-operative scheme are variable, not according solely to an 
individual’s demographic but also according to the spatial variability of risk. 
Risk may be random or driven by socio-ecological factors, but it is not 
usually related to the measures typically ascribed to establish cost. 
Therefore, people may pay costs according to a particular landholder 
attribute, such as land, but actually receive benefits in a more stochastic 
fashion related to risk. So, when deciding on a strategy, for an individual the 
cost becomes a much more important factor than how much more effective 
that strategy might be, due to risk being variable and often unpredictable.  
In situations where cost is linked to means rather than risk, when full co-
operation is needed it would therefore be necessary to bring the cost of co-
operating down in line with the risk faced by the member of the group who 
faces the smallest risk of conflict, or accept that these members will often 
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defect to an individual strategy as their co-operative payoff is less. If the 
scheme aims to provide poorer farmers with improved protection, defection 
can have grave implications and so the most important outcome would be 
for many to participate to benefit from reduced costs due to economies of 
scale. For example, in a group where smaller landholders lie in closer 
proximity to the PA than larger landholders, the larger landholders may be at 
a lesser risk than the smaller but would be paying more to co-operate if 
contributions depended on area – hence subsidising the losses of those at 
greater risk. Even if landholding size is fairly constant, those at reduced risk 
will still be ultimately paying relatively ‘more’ to co-operate as their trade-off 
results in a smaller payoff, subsidising the losses of those at greater risk. A 
scheme designed to be ‘fair’ by basing contributions on area can actually be 
indirectly unfair if it results in a lower participation rate. This also has 
important implications for the maintenance of co-operative schemes, where 
continued payments or another form of ongoing cost is required – those who 
believe their progressive gains are less than other participants may become 
more likely to defect.  
Ideally, to avoid these problems, contributions to a community scheme 
should be individually based on the level of risk each landholder is likely to 
face. This could follow actuarial models of insurance premiums, of which 
there are many crop insurance financial mechanisms applied on larger 
scales for other types of risk, e.g. in India (Clarke et al. 2012). In cases 
where risk can be strongly predicted by a small number of socio-ecological 
drivers (e.g. proximity) this may be feasible, but in more unpredictable 
conflict situations it may be impractical for communities or other local 
institutions to calculate individual risks. An alternative way of assessing 
costs, if risk is unknown, could be to means-test costs based on 
contributions proportional to multiple landholding values, as a more inclusive 
measure of economic productivity (e.g. with both crop type and landholding 
size). This is important because the model results also show that variations 
in crop value actually have a greater influence on the level of co-operation 
for given costs/benefits than landholding size. This would enable those of a 
greater economic status to contribute more than those less able, providing a 
clearer association between cost and benefit, and can be a more 
immediately practical method of assessing contributions when the 
calculation of risk alone is not feasible.  
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When co-operative risk reduction becomes important 
The model shows that economically better off communities with higher value 
crops and larger landholdings are more able to support paying an increased 
cost for participating in co-operative schemes (Figure 22). For these higher 
costs the model shows that there is actually a demand for a consequentially 
much more effective risk reduction strategy. Economically poorer 
communities, with extremely small or low value landholdings, simply cannot 
afford a co-operative cost much greater than their individual strategy, 
regardless of the increased benefits, hence in groupings of poorer 
landholders costs must be low in order for co-operation to develop. 
Consequently, and counter-intuitively, for these communities and at these 
costs effectiveness does not actually need to be much higher than the 
individual strategy.  
Estimating the costs of co-operation 
Costs can be translated into real terms by comparing the cost of co-
operation to the cost of acting individually. The lower the cost differential 
between these two activities, the more likely co-operation is to evolve. As 
can be seen from the model results, for poorer landholders a scheme that 
focuses solely on the benefits of co-operating – i.e. the effectiveness of the 
strategy – is unexpectedly less likely to promote co-operation if improved 
benefits come at greater cost.  
Governments or NGOs assisting in the implementation of co-operative 
schemes should therefore focus on reducing the cost of co-operating as 
much as possible to encourage inclusiveness, rather than focusing on 
effectiveness which often comes at greater expense. This is not a 
suggestion that these schemes should be free, as lack of ownership or 
expectations of subsidies may bring their own problems of sustainability, but 
that as previously stated, determining the cost of participation must bring it in 
line with those in the group that suffer the least risk if it is necessary for them 
to be involved. This runs counter to conventional strategies which often 
focus on helping the individuals suffering the greatest risk, but in these 
cases help should be granted at an individual level or in much smaller co-
operative groups. Larger co-operative schemes will be forced to follow the 
lowest common denominator of risk to achieve the greatest participation.  
Community level factors driving co-operation 
At a community level, the model showed that initial interest in co-operation is 
an important factor, because it is difficult to pull away from the natural 
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equilibria of all acting individually or all co-operating. Interest needs to be at 
or above a natural threshold of approximately 20% for there to be a 
reasonable likelihood of co-operation developing (Figure 23). This could be a 
useful gauge to judge whether initial interest is sufficient before embarking 
on such a scheme. This follows previous analyses of the stag hunt, which 
found that because of the difficult transition from individuality to co-operation, 
if a community is very individualistic the chances of instituting a social 
contract are poor (Skyrms 2004).  
The model also showed that when the initial number of co-operators is fixed, 
more participants hinder the evolution of co-operation (Figure 23). This is 
one avenue for further research to compare the impacts of varying the initial 
numbers versus percentage of co-operators, and in determining where the 
co-operation threshold (Figure 23) might lie for different community sizes. 
This result does indicate caution in the frequently occurring drive to make 
community-based schemes bigger and more inclusive for economies of 
scale. Game theory also posits that there may be an upper limit for a self-
contained and sustaining commons, and that in fact multiple small-scale co-
operative schemes may be more successful than fewer large-scale schemes 
(Santos and Pacheco 2011). However, there is ongoing debate on the effect 
of group size given that evidence from empirical studies on collective action 
is conflicting (Poteete and Ostrom 2004).  
Establishing a constraint on co-operation, in that it must include a certain 
number of neighbours, results in a dramatic decrease in the final degree of 
co-operation (Figure 23). This means that co-operative schemes which 
formally require a set number of participants or minimum area to be included 
in the scheme may be reducing their chances of success. These constraints 
are usually important from an economic or ecological perspective e.g. for 
economies of scale or simplifying management, but unexpectedly may not 
be socially desirable. However, even without these constraints, the evolution 
of co-operation often subsequently meets these criteria as the model 
showed a strong tendency to form fairly large clusters, so these pre-
requirements can be self-defeating. 
Community heterogeneity is a major obstacle to co-operation 
Community differentiation as considered here could represent any means by 
which people might differentiate themselves from one another resulting in a 
difference in the likelihood of imitation or co-operation, such as religion, 
caste, income stratification or land use differences. Increasing community 
heterogeneity diminishes the evolution of co-operation (Figure 23), under the 
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simple rule that the diffusion of co-operation is influenced by a preference for 
your own community. This alone has a strong effect on co-operation, without 
incorporating any theoretical potential for increased defection between 
communities. Failed community-based approaches have been criticised as 
having misunderstood communities as being “a small spatial unit, as a 
homogenous social structure, and as shared norms” (Agrawal and Gibson 
1999). Co-operation can prosper in a community with already established 
co-operatives, because people learn to interact with others who wish to co-
operate, hence schemes that force inclusivity with new or different groups 
are unlikely to be successful due to a lack of knowledge or trust in other 
participants’ likely choices (Skyrms 2004). The mechanism by which 
heterogeneity influences co-operation, and its effect under different 
circumstances is another divisive debate (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). The 
model does, however, support the general view that in heterogenous 
communities, external agencies wishing to promote co-operation need to 
actively engage with each faction to encourage trust and positive 
interactions. Communities should not be expected to overcome these issues 
independently, and external support of local decision-making institutions in 
this respect has been identified as an important criteria for community-based 
conservation and development projects (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Balint 
and Mashinya 2006). 
Co-operation can benefit both conservation and development 
Both the community and landholders can benefit from co-operation, as 
according to the model the economic productivity of a landscape can 
potentially be improved once significant risks of conflict are minimised 
(Figure 24), particularly once co-operation becomes more mainstream, 
above approximately 25%. This threshold also indicates that very small co-
operative schemes, or schemes in areas where conflict risks are small, may 
not be worthwhile investments, either to individuals, communities, or to 
implementing agencies. It is more beneficial at a landholder level to be a co-
operator unless your level of risk is particularly low (Figure 24).  
This potential for increased productivity can be considered a form of 
conservation incentive, through reducing dependency on PA resources with 
the stabilisation of agricultural productivity as a profitable livelihood option. 
Reduced conflict can also lead to improved attitudes towards wildlife and 
reduced retaliation. Facilitating the use of more effective but more expensive 
mitigation technologies at a community level avoids the multiple problems of 
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implementation of these methods at higher levels, which include poor 
maintenance, lack of ownership, and stakeholder conflicts.  
5.4.2 Model generality 
This model has been used to illustrate a community co-operative scheme 
such as electric fencing, but could equally be applied to intangible co-
operative schemes such as insurance, where the cost is fixed but the 
individual benefits are variable. As a concept, this type of model can be used 
to study any form of community-based conservation and development 
scheme that meets the requirements of the stag hunt game, where the 
greatest payoffs are delivered through co-operation, but at the risk of gaining 
nothing when others defect. This is in opposition to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
where the best payoff is to defect against a co-operator, which explains the 
exploitation of common pool resources, rather than situations where co-
operation is necessary for success.  
The model can be expanded to accommodate more detailed parameters in 
site-specific case studies. For example the current indices used can be 
changed to real values in a real-world spatial context. Further, this model 
used risk as a function of proximity and a measure of stochasticity, which 
could be altered to incorporate one or more known drivers affecting risk for 
particular sites. It is also possible to expand these models to include more 
comprehensive ecological functions for conflict-causing species, or to 
include other types of stakeholders.  
This model solely focuses on the means to reduce risks from conflict, not to 
improve tolerance, although both activities should be part of effective 
mitigation approaches (Dickman 2010). Debates over the particular method 
proposed as a basis for community co-operation, e.g. electric fences, are 
beyond the scope of this paper, but see (Hayward and Kerley 2009).  
5.4.3 Game theory and community co-operation 
The stag hunt and other games of co-operation show that social norms 
evolve slowly even when co-operation is obviously beneficial, and that the 
risks of co-operation can cause the social contract to spontaneously 
degenerate. In order to co-operate, participants must believe that others will 
co-operate rather than defect. Analyses of the stag hunt have shown that 
other factors can influence co-operation, which can also be related to the 
implementation of community-based co-operatives, as described in (Skyrms 
2004). Reputation is important, in that people learn to co-operate with co-
operators and not with known defectors, and these people will naturally be 
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excluded. People will usually follow a key person or group in the community, 
and identifying and enlisting their participation from the outset can facilitate 
co-operation. This also leads on to the imitation of other co-operators, hence 
if people can view working schemes they are more likely to want to imitate 
them.  
Often, natural resource and conservation management may require 
consensus decisions among and within stakeholder groups, but this has 
been highlighted as inappropriate or even futile when there are major 
conflicts of interest (Berkes 2004, Colyvan et al. 2011). This study 
demonstrates the difficulties inherent in obtaining full co-operation within 
only one stakeholder group where the conflicts of interest are much less 
than between groups. This study supports Colyvan et al.’s (2011) claim that 
understanding the underlying structure of conservation decisions using 
game theory can provide management insights, indicate likely outcomes, 
and suggest actions to improve conservation outcomes; and Berkes’ (2004) 
perspective that community-based conservation can be better informed by 
interdisciplinary studies of socio-ecological systems. 
5.5 Conclusions  
In summary, a game theory approach can be used effectively to assess the 
management of conflict mitigation, in particular the likelihood of persistence 
of co-operative strategies that enable individuals to benefit from typically 
expensive but more effective technologies usually restricted to use by 
government or external agencies.  
Here, results suggest that for poorer landholders the most important factor 
influencing degree of co-operation is the cost of the co-operative strategy, 
while effectiveness becomes more important as the economic status of 
landholdings increases. Contributions to a community scheme should ideally 
be based on an assessment of risk to ensure the greatest levels of 
participation, or acknowledging that this may be unattainable in some 
situations, on a wider measure of means testing than simply area, for 
example. There needs to be a sufficient level of initial interest in co-operation 
in the target community landscape, otherwise co-operative initiatives cannot 
succeed, and schemes should not be too ambitious in large community 
landscapes. External agencies devising co-operative schemes are 
discouraged from setting too many official constraints from the outset, such 
as the minimum numbers of people required, as this increases the likelihood 
of defection. Greater community heterogeneity must be recognised as a 
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factor that can impede co-operation and external action will need to be taken 
to assist in overcoming this. 
Co-operative mitigation schemes can benefit both landholders and the wider 
community and significantly increase the productivity of landscapes even 
with the additional cost of installation and maintenance of such technology. 
The benefits to conservation that such mitigation schemes can bring include 
reduced reliance on PA resources, improved attitudes to wildlife and 
reduced retaliation, and hence could be considered a potential form of 
conservation incentive.   
- 122 - 
6. Conservation, conflicts and costs: conclusions 
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It is clear that human wildlife conflicts are one of the greatest threats to 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable development in today’s world. 
Threats to human life, livelihoods and property are major causes of conflicts 
in fragmented landscapes surrounding protected areas, undermining 
conservation efforts and reinforcing the social inequalities of those who bear 
the costs (Redpath et al. in press).  
In the geo-climatically and culturally diverse landscapes of the Nilgiri 
Biosphere Reserve in the Western Ghats, South India, people and wildlife 
live cheek by jowl in a mosaic of protected areas interspersed with 
anthropogenic land uses that range from subsistence agriculture and 
pastoralism to corporate plantations and hydropower developments. Here, 
conflicts are inevitable despite a long history of religious tolerance and 
reverence for wildlife in India (Rangarajan 1998).  
6.1 Stakeholder relations in the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve 
The main stakeholder group focused on in this study were local communities 
who bear the costs of conflict. It is important to recognise that this group is 
not homogenous, despite some clear consensus in their decision-making 
over mitigation measures. A combination of settlers and Adivasi groups, 
there is a disparity in economic wealth and social status, some of which is a 
consequence of India’s caste system although Government instituted 
positive discrimination efforts are in place.  
However, other major groups include the Forest Department, responsible for 
managing protected areas. They implement mitigation measures such as 
electric fences and trenches around parks and manage the compensation 
scheme, providing recompense to those suffering crop and livestock losses, 
property damage, and ex-gratia payments for injuries and deaths. 
Independent conservation and development NGOs also work in this area, 
and while there are notable exceptions in many cases they operate as 
advocates for their causes rather than as neutral organisations. This colours 
the beliefs of other stakeholders, who often assume that there is an agenda 
of wildlife protection in the case of conservation NGOs and that their needs 
must come second.  
Tourists and tourist resorts also play a role, given that they receive the 
financial and other benefits from wildlife while paying very little of the costs. 
There are also issues of land displacement and employment between 
resorts and local communities, and accusations of unsustainable exploitation 
- 124 - 
of wildlife or natural resources from both sides. Furthermore, implementation 
of the Forest Rights Act permitting the reinstatement of traditional access 
and rights over forest resources continues to be disputed by conservationists 
and tourist operators6, while the presence of tourist operators in core parts of 
protected areas is under legal investigation7
The primary stakeholder conflict lies between communities and the Forest 
Department, held responsible for curtailing traditional forest uses, displacing 
indigenous communities outside of parks, and maintaining exclusive 
property rights over wildlife. Communities believe the Forest Department 
should be primarily responsible for managing conflict, diminishing their own 
responsibility and actions over protecting themselves and their livelihoods.  
, adding to already strained 
relations. However, despite this the unanimous view from communities was 
that tourists and resorts were least responsible of all for managing conflicts.  
6.2 Predicting vulnerability to conflict 
In the NBR, key predictors of the likelihood and intensity of conflict in terms 
of crop raiding and livestock depredation were forest degradation, forest 
proximity, cropland extent and livestock numbers. Species primarily 
responsible for crop raiding were elephant and wild boar, while leopard was 
the main predator on livestock. Seasonal peaks correspond with particular 
growing seasons for crops, and availability of forage for livestock in the dry 
season.  
The risk conflict poses to livelihoods can therefore be broadly assessed at a 
landscape scale given knowledge of village locations and holdings as well as 
the quality and locations of remaining forest fragments. Knowledge of where 
depredation is likely to occur and to what level is important for planning and 
implementing mitigation measures at a regional level. This is useful when 
considering how and where to reduce or compensate for actual losses. 
Mitigation measures can be timed to target reductions around typical 
seasonal peaks in loss.  
However, this study found that perceptions were actually associated with the 
proportion of loss suffered rather than any absolute measures of loss. This 
                                            
6 http://www.conservationindia.org/articles/whose-forest-is-it-anyway 
7 The interim order of the Supreme Court in Writ Petition 12351/2010 (Ajay 
Dubey vs the National Tiger Conservation Authority) 
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has particular importance for the appropriate targeting of conflict mitigation 
measures; and implications for measures such as compensation which 
cannot change perceptions as they fail to address the impact of high 
percentage losses. It also explains why perceptions often seem to be 
counter-intuitive to losses, if the context of loss is not accounted for, and 
mitigation measures will often fail to achieve changes in perceptions. 
Furthermore, there is a link between perception of conflict and 
commercialisation, where villages that grew more commercial crops and less 
subsistence crops perceived wildlife as being a greater threat to livelihood 
productions. This can and does confuse priorities in conflict management, 
where the focus is often on those who lose the greatest economic value, not 
those most impacted by the loss. The results indicated that the economic 
value of damage alone, although often used as a typical measure of conflict 
particularly when comparing across sites, is not a suitable means for 
prioritising conflict interventions or assessing losses unless comparisons are 
only made between similar holdings. In general, the emphasis placed on 
value disadvantages some of the poorer communities in this study, who 
often lose less to wildlife in terms of value, but typically lose a larger 
percentage of their holding. 
This information can be of use to practitioners and managers, for example 
the livelihoods NGO the Keystone Foundation works closely with the Indian 
Forest Department to produce regional recommendations for managing 
these issues, while the conservation NGO the Nature Conservation 
Foundation implements conflict mitigation measures at a village level. 
Unfortunately, the drivers identified mean that a consistent increase in 
conflict is likely as agricultural and pastoral livelihoods in these fragmented 
landscapes continue to increase, placing further demands on forest 
resources. This, coupled with a move from subsistence to commercial 
livelihoods will inevitably result in greater losses to wildlife and a 
corresponding increase in the perception of threat.  
6.3 Effectively managing conflicts 
Investigations of conflict and proposed mitigation measures must be clear 
about which aspect of conflict they intend to address, whether it is by 
reducing the probability of conflict occurring, reducing intensity when it does 
occur, reducing the value of loss, or by changing people’s perceptions, as 
results show that different factors drive each of these aspects. It explains 
why schemes such as monetary compensation which only address the 
- 126 - 
economic value of loss, without any effect on reducing actual losses, cannot 
influence perception as it does not address the impact of high proportional 
loss.  
The Forest Department is evidently not managing conflict in a way that 
reduces losses or provides adequate compensation. The electric fences and 
trenches around parks are not effectively maintained, often breached by 
those taking livestock into the park, and the recent Elephant Task Force 
report recommended a moratorium on further barriers until regulatory 
standards can be introduced (Rangarajan et al. 2010). The state-awarded 
compensation scheme is little better, with problems of inadequate 
remuneration, delays and corruption (Madhusudan 2003, Ogra and Badola 
2008a, Rangarajan et al. 2010). In this study, for crop–raiding, only 18% of 
households experiencing loss applied for compensation, and of those only 
47% of households applying received monies that amounted to only 9.6% of 
the loss they claimed for. For livestock only 16.5% of households that 
experienced loss applied, with only 24.5% of these receiving funds worth 
less than half of the loss they claimed. This indicates that compensation is 
either not available to the majority that suffer from loss, or for those who do 
apply, it only covers a small fraction of the loss suffered. Despite this, fair 
compensation was considered the least important criteria when it came to 
choosing a mitigation scheme, although better compensation was 
considered to be slightly more acceptable for addressing livestock losses 
than for crop losses.  
Mitigation measures therefore need to be not only effective at reducing 
losses, but acceptable to stakeholders to improve the chances for 
sustainable conflict resolution (Messmer 2000). The most effective 
interventions were found to be electric fences around fields, as has been 
found in other parts of India (Davies et al. 2011), and the use of guarding 
and sheds / corrals to keep livestock, consistent with other studies (Ogada et 
al. 2003, Marker and Dickman 2004, Woodroffe et al. 2007, Inskip and 
Zimmermann 2009a). The assumption that all or the majority of losses occur 
on forest lands is also controversial given that there was no significant 
differences in the number of incidents in the forest and the village. Hence 
improved guarding and husbandry methods are likely to yield reduced losses 
regardless of where households continue to graze livestock, an important 
consideration as although grazing in protected areas is illegal, many 
households have no alternative source of fodder.  
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In terms of acceptability to stakeholders, clear consensus was reached 
despite the economic and social diversity within the household sample, 
indicating consistent views on livelihood protection which could be 
incorporated into management planning for conflict. Households considered 
the direct costs and benefits of mitigation measures to be of primary 
importance, which explains the continued use of less effective methods or 
no protection given comparatively high monetary costs and labour effort. 
Households preferred to utilise electric fences surrounding fields, or improve 
their guarding practices, but are obviously hampered by the issues of start-
up and maintenance costs and labour effort.   
Community participation in management decisions is vital (Western 1994, 
Redpath et al. 2004, Redpath and Thirgood 2009), but in this case there is 
some reluctance to assume responsibility for conflict on the part of local 
communities, which has been highlighted as a factor in conflict mitigation 
failures (Ogra 2009, Rangarajan et al. 2010). Creating a sense of 
responsibility and empowerment at a community level can be a mechanism 
for implementing community-based schemes (Kellert et al. 2000, Berkes 
2004, Ogra 2009) that can overcome the challenges of cost and effort 
associated with more effective measures.  
It was therefore possible to construct a model of crop-raiding conflicts using 
the predictors of conflict and knowledge of household decision-making, to 
explore how co-operative community strategies to mitigate conflict can be 
facilitated by scheme managers. Landholder demographics play a key role in 
the cost-benefit trade-off of co-operation, with costs most important for 
poorer landholders and benefits most important for richer landholders. Co-
operation can be maximised by basing contributions on risk rather than 
simplistic measures of means testing. Co-operation cannot be imposed by 
external agencies or subject to too many pre-constraints, community interest 
must be genuine and participation allowed to develop freely. Community 
heterogeneity is likely to be the main obstacle to co-operative schemes and 
communities cannot be expected to resolve this issue alone. However, co-
operative mitigation schemes can have the potential to increase the 
productivity of landscapes even with the additional cost of installation and 
maintenance of such technology, benefiting both individuals and the wider 
community. As a consequence, improved agricultural productivity can lead to 
reduced reliance on forest resources, and clearly implementing such 
schemes as conservation incentives may help to improve attitudes to 
wildlife.  
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6.4 Issues of interdisciplinarity  
 “To see the whole is to see it in breadth, but without access to the particular 
vision; to see the part is to see it in depth, but in the absence of the general 
overview” 
- (Becher 1989) 
Although human wildlife conflict is an interdisciplinary problem in 
conservation biology, it is only recently that mitigation efforts and the 
literature have begun to effectively take an interdisciplinary approach. 
Problems of definition, terminology, and consistency have resulted in a 
disparate and diverse literature and slow progress towards unifying concepts 
and themes that permit a more standardised and comparable approach 
towards understanding and managing conflicts.  
Since many existing conflict mitigation measures have so far failed to 
successfully address conflict issues and resolve the situation, exploration 
and utilisation of interdisciplinary approaches and methodologies can 
facilitate better understanding of conflict situations and enable the 
emergence of mitigation measures with greater chances for success.  
In this study, an interdisciplinary approach was taken from the outset to 
incorporate ecological, social and economic contexts to explore the problem 
of conflict and suggest potential solutions. In each research piece, the 
terminology and measurement of conflict was clearly defined, but there were 
obvious restrictions to the depth and breadth of interdisciplinarity that can be 
achieved in a single thesis study. However, this serves to show that further 
studies that build on these results would be productive lines of research. 
Ecological surveys of wildlife movements, habitat use, and density in the 
forests and protected areas surrounding villages prone to conflicts would 
generate a deeper understanding of the consequences of problems such as 
habitat degradation, and the strong seasonality of crop and livestock 
depredation. More detailed social and attitudinal surveys using techniques 
such as conjoint analysis (Alriksson and Öberg 2008) or multi-criteria 
decision analysis (Kiker et al. 2005) would elicit more detail on the decision-
making process behind choosing and using mitigation measures. Finally, the 
agent based model of co-operative crop protection schemes can be broadly 
expanded to model different types of livelihood production systems subject 
to conflict to evaluate mitigation measures in different situations, both using 
theoretical parameters and empirical data. Additionally, the benefits of 
interdisciplinarity have been clearly demonstrated through the use of the 
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game theoretic agent-based model to evaluate co-operative crop protection 
strategies. This supports the claims that game theory can provide insights 
into conservation decision-making (Colyvan et al. 2011) and that 
interdisciplinary studies of socio-ecological systems can improve community-
based conservation (Berkes 2004).  
6.5 Contexts to conflicts 
It is important to consider conflict in the context of other problems to 
livelihoods and the dangers of wildlife. Although livestock depredation was 
the main cause of livestock loss, disease was a close second, and the 
weather caused more problems to crop production than was lost to crop 
raiding. Perceptions of threats to wildlife production can also be influenced 
by general fears, for example during the study period 27 deaths and 33 
major injuries were recorded from encounters with wildlife, mostly due to 
elephants. Reasons for venturing into the forest included for NTFP 
collection, firewood collection, and guarding grazing livestock; while attacks 
on village lands were linked to the lack of electricity at night and walking 
home after dark. Clearly safety is a major concern for those living in these 
areas and measures to reduce risks are socially necessary.  
These latter issues of electricity provision and transport correspond to some 
of the major problems identified by villagers as facing their village. Conflict 
with wildlife was considered one of the least important problems, overtaken 
by issues of water availability, transport, healthcare and livelihoods, and as 
important as electricity provision. Wildlife conflicts, land disputes, and access 
to education were last, these three being the issues most focused on by 
conservationists aiming to reduce environmental conflicts and promote 
tolerance (Dickman 2010, Nagendra et al. 2013). The main problems cited 
are the true indicators of social inequality demonstrated by these 
marginalised communities, and emphasise that the ‘pressing’ problem of 
wildlife conflicts may simply be the imposition of conservationist privilege. 
However, this could be viewed as an opportunity for conservation 
interventions to link issues of economic development and social justice to 
the conservation of wildlife (Sachs et al. 2009). 
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List of Abbreviations 
HWC Human wildlife conflict 
NBR Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve 
NP National Park 
NTFP Non-timber forest products 
PA Protected Area 
TR Tiger Reserve 
WLS Wildlife Sanctuary 
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Appendix A 
Maps 
A.1 Map of the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve and the Western 
Ghats in India  
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A.2 Map of the Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve, showing protected 
areas and 62 sampled villages 
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Appendix B 
Village-level Perception Survey 
1.  
a. Village name  b. Zone   c. District 
 d. State 
2.  
a. Altitude  b. Aspect 
3. Description of ecological region and locality, with reference to major 
topographic features 
4.  
a. Annual rainfall  b. Pre-monsoon season rainfall  
 c. Monsoon season rainfall 
d. Post-monsoon season rainfall  e. The monsoon 
normally falls in which months? 
f. Information source 
5. Description of natural habitat in the area, details of vegetation, including 
extent/size remaining, dominant species present, level of human 
disturbance and encroachment into the natural habitat. 
6. Village proximity to the forest (to the nearest km). 
7. Description of water sources in the area (including name, type, size, 
whether seasonal/permanent). 
8.  
a. Large mammal species present   
b. Historical records of large mammal species no longer 
present. 
9. Published information sources on the area (ecological & social). 
10. Length of time Keystone worked in village. 
11.  
a. Date   b. Name of village c. Names of communities d. 
Latitude/Longitude 
e. Size of group interviewed (aim for at least 4-5 main contributors with 
both men and women) 
12. Particulars of people interviewed (mark with one or more * those who 
contributed to the answers most, you should allocate a minimum of 5 * to 
indicate level of contribution) 
Name Age M/F Occupation Status                                
13.  
a. Village population size  b.  Total number of households 
c. Numbers of households per community 
14. Main sources of livelihoods and numbers of households (per community)  
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a. What are the main sources of livelihood? b. How many 
households utilize each source? 
Livelihood Numbers of 
households 
Months practiced                       
Agriculture   
Livestock   
Labour   
Forest Products   
Leasing of land   
Other   
 
Livestock 
15.  
a. What types of livestock do you keep?  
b. How many households keep each type of livestock, by community? 
c. How many of each livestock type are kept in total? 
d. What is the value of an individual animal of each type? 
e. What are the uses of each type of livestock? 
Type Number of  
households  
Total numbers  
of livestock kept 
Value of 
animal 
Uses 
Cattle     
Goat     
Sheep     
Buffalo     
Chickens     
Other      
16.  
a. What are the main problems for livestock, ranked in order of 
seriousness (1 = most serious)? 
b. How many households are affected by these problems, by 
community? 
c. How many livestock have been lost in the past year in the village? 
Problem Rank (1=most 
serious) 
Number of 
households affected 
Number of livestock 
lost in the past year  
Disease    
Fodder 
availability 
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Drought    
Livestock 
depredation 
   
Other    
 
17. Where do most instances of livestock depredation occur? 
Village land Protected Forest Reserve Forest  
Forest Department Land (if difference between types of protection unknown) 
Other:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
18.  
a. Which species of wildlife depredate livestock, ranked by most 
serious (1 = most serious)? 
b. How many livestock were lost in the past 12 months to wildlife? 
c. How many households are affected, by community? 
d. Which months do these species depredate livestock?  
Species Rank (1 =  
most serious) 
Number of 
livestock lost 
in past year 
Number of 
households 
affected 
Months 
Tiger     
Leopard     
Dhole     
Other     
19. Has livestock depredation changed over time, and why do you think this is? 
Increased  Decreased  Same 
Timescale:………….…………… 
Why:………………………………………………………………………………… 
20. How do your livestock losses compare with other villages, and why do you 
think this is? 
Relatively low  Similar levels  Relatively high 
Why:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Crops 
21.  
a. How much land is there in the village (acres)? 
b. How much land has been abandoned by the village or given over to 
wildlife (acres)? 
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c. How much land is leased to other villages or communities outside 
the village (acres)? 
d. How much farmland is there in the village (acres)? 
e. How much farmland is irrigated (acres)? 
f. How much farmland is rainfed (acres)? 
22.  
a. How many households own their own land and how many acres in 
total? 
b. How many households lease their land and how many acres in total? 
c. How many households sharecrop their land and how many acres in 
total? 
d. How many households farm on unrecorded land and how many 
acres in total? 
e. If none practice agriculture, why? 
23.  
a. What sources are there for investment in farming?  
b. How many households per community have access to these different 
sources?  
Type of crop 
grown by 
household 
Personal 
Savings 
in Banks 
Personal 
Savings 
in other 
form 
Loan 
from 
Banks 
Loan 
from 
other 
sources 
Investment 
from other 
person 
Other  
Subsistence 
crops  
      
Commercial 
crops  
      
24. What is the interest rate for money lent: 
a. From banks?  b. From other sources? 
25.  
a. What types of crops are grown in the village? 
b. How many households per community grow each type of crop? 
c. What is the intended use of each crop (subsistence, commercial or 
both)? 
d. How much land does each type cover (acres)?  
e. What season is the crop grown in? 
f. How much on average do villagers invest in Rupees in each crop per 
acre per growing season? 
g. What is the maximum return villagers expect to gain in Rupees for 
each crop per acre per growing season?  
h. What was their return in the last year, in Rupees for each crop per 
acre per growing season? 
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Type of 
crop 
Number 
of  
house-
holds 
Use:  
S / C 
Both 
Land 
cover 
(acres) 
Months Investment   
per acre per 
season 
Max.  
return 
Last 
year’s 
return 
Millets        
Pulses        
Vegetables        
Beans        
Rice        
Cereals        
Tea        
Coffee        
Ginger        
Cotton        
Corn/Maize        
Other        
26.  
a. What are the main problems for crops, ranked in order of 
seriousness (1 = most serious) 
b. What proportion of all crops have been lost in the past year? (This 
does not need to add up to 100%) 
c. How many households are affected by each problem, per 
community? 
d. What times of the year does each problem occur? 
Problem Rank 
(1=most 
serious) 
Proportion of crops 
lost in past year  
Number of 
households affected 
Months 
Disease     
Insects/pest     
Rodents     
Crop raiding     
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Drought     
Heavy rainfall     
Other     
27.  
a. Which species of wildlife raid crops, ranked by most serious (1 = 
most serious)?   
b. Which crops do each species raid (listing by names as in question 
25)? 
c. What proportion of crops have been lost in the past year to each 
species? 
d. What is the area damaged (in acres) in the past year? 
e. How many households have been affected by each species, per 
community? 
f. Which months do each species raid crops? 
Species Rank  
(1 = 
most 
serious) 
Types of 
crops 
affected 
Proportion 
of crops 
lost in the 
past year 
Damaged 
area  
(in acres) 
Number of 
households 
affected 
Months 
Elephant       
Gaur       
Sambar       
Wild Pig       
Chital       
Birds       
Primates       
Porcupine       
Other       
28. Has crop depredation by wildlife changed over time, and why do you think 
this is? 
Increased  Decreased  Same 
Timescale:………….…………… 
Why:………………………………………………………………………………… 
29. How do your crop losses compare with other villages, and why do you think 
this is? 
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Relatively low  Similar levels  Relatively high 
Why:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Attacks on people 
30.  
a. Which species of wildlife attack people, ranked according to the most 
serious (1=most serious)? 
b. When was the last incident that occurred for each species? 
c. How many incidences have there been in the last year for each 
species, and when do these occur? 
d. What is the severity of these incidences (death, major injury, minor 
injury)? 
e. Why do you think these incidents happen? 
Species Rank 
(1 = most 
serious) 
Date of 
last  
incident 
Number of 
incidences in 
last year 
Months Severity 
(death, major 
injury, mild 
injury) 
Elephant      
Gaur      
Tiger      
Leopard      
Sloth bear      
Other      
31. Where do most instances of  wildlife attacks occur? 
Village land Protected Forest Reserve Forest  
Forest Department Land (if difference between types of protection unknown) 
Other:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
32. Have the numbers of wildlife attacks changed over time, and why do you 
think this is? 
Increased  Decreased  Same 
Timescale:………….…………… 
Why:………………………………………………………………………………… 
33. How does danger from wildlife compare with other villages, and why do you 
think this is? 
Relatively low  Similar levels  Relatively high 
Why:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Damage to infrastructure 
34.  
a. Which species of wildlife damage infrastructure, ranked according to 
the most serious (1=most serious)? 
b. When was the last incident that occurred for each species? 
c. How many incidences have there been in the last year for each 
species, and when do these occur? 
d. What is the total cost of these incidences in Rupees per species in 
the last year? 
e. Why do you think these incidents happen? 
Species Rank 
(1 = most 
serious) 
Date of 
last  
incident 
Number of 
incidences 
in last year 
Months Total cost of damage 
in last year (Rupees) 
Elephant      
Gaur      
Other      
35. Have the levels of damage to infrastructure changed over time, and why do 
you think this is? 
Increased  Decreased  Same 
Timescale:………….…………… 
Why:………………………………………………………………………………… 
36. How does infrastructure damage from wildlife compare with other villages, 
and why do you think this is? 
Relatively low  Similar levels  Relatively high 
Why:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Responses to conflict 
37. What do people in your village do when they experience conflict with wildlife 
by species? 
Actions can include: Complain to Forest Dept; Complain to elected representatives; 
Retaliatory actions; Compensation claim to Forest Dept; Increase in protection 
measures; Scare away or deter animals; Other  
Species Village responses (e.g. Complain to Forest Dept; Complain to elected 
representatives; Retaliatory actions; Compensation claim to Forest 
Dept; Increase in protection measures) 
Elephant  
Gaur  
Sambar  
Wild Pig  
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Chital  
Birds  
Primates  
Tiger  
Leopard  
Dhole  
Sloth Bear  
38.  
a. What measures are currently available to prevent or reduce wildlife 
damage?  
b. What level are these measures set up and managed at – household, 
community or government?  
c. Rank the measures per type of protection by cost /year (1=most 
expensive)?  
d. How many households per community use this measure? 
e. What is the effectiveness in reducing conflict (1=most effective)? 
Conflict 
prevention 
measures 
employed  
Management 
level 
(household, 
community, 
government)  
Rank order of 
expense 
(1=most 
expensive)  
Number of 
households 
using this 
measure 
Rank 
effectiveness 
in reducing 
conflict 
1=most 
effective) 
LIVESTOCK PROTECTION 
Time 
accompanying 
livestock 
    
Stop keeping 
livestock 
    
Other…………     
CROP PROTECTION 
Electric fence     
Wire fence     
Trench     
Time personally 
protecting crops 
    
Deterrents 
(chilli, 
firecrackers, 
etc) 
    
Stopping     
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agriculture 
Other…………     
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
Other…………     
INJURY AVOIDANCE 
Not going to 
work 
    
Not going to 
school 
    
Moving away     
Other…………     
39.  
a. What measures are currently in place to compensate for wildlife 
damage?  
b. What level are these measures set up and managed at – household, 
community or government?  
c. If benefits are obtained from compensation schemes, how much in 
Rupees is obtained per year by the village? 
d. How many households apply for compensation measures per 
community? 
e. How adequate are these compensation measures in compensating 
for conflict (very effective, somewhat effective, not effective), what is 
the value of the compensation compared to the value of the item 
lost? 
f. Note down any relevant further details. 
Compensation 
measures  
Management 
level 
(household, 
community, 
government)  
Money (Rupees) 
obtained per 
year in village  
Number of 
households 
applying for 
compensation 
Value & 
adequacy of 
compensation 
Livestock 
compensation 
    
Crop 
compensation 
    
Personal 
injury 
compensation 
    
Infrastructure 
damage 
compensation 
    
Other     
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40. Do you know whether any people from your village take action against 
wildlife that damage their crops or threaten their livestock or lives? If so, do 
you know what kind of actions have been taken against different species, 
and how many of each species have been killed in the past year? 
Interviewer should note the reliability of this information.  
Species Actions (eg poison, guns, snares, 
electrocution) 
Number killed in past year 
Elephant   
Gaur   
Sambar   
Wild Pig   
Chital   
Birds   
Primates   
Tiger   
Leopard   
Dhole   
Sloth Bear   
 
Attitudes 
41. What is your opinion of wildlife? 
It is a good thing It is a bad thing We don’t care ⁯   
42. What do you think needs to be done to reduce conflict with wildlife? Which 
of these options do you agree with? 
Better fencing  Killing problem animals Killing all wildlife 
Stop killing prey species Reduce forest degradation 
More money in compensation Insurance schemes ⁯ 
43. Who should take responsibility for reducing conflict with wildlife? 
Local communities Forest Department  Local NGOs ⁯ 
Other:……………………………………………………………….………………………… 
44. What are the major problems faced in your village, and rank  these in order 
of importance to the village (1=most important), e.g. access to water, access 
to health care, access to education.  
Problems faced by the village Ranking (1=most serious) 
  
45. Other notes the interviewer feels important to be documented and relevant 
to conflict.  
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Appendix C 
Household-level Evaluation Surveys 
C.1  Questionnaire 
INTERVIEWERS: 
SECTION 1: ALL HOUSEHOLDS 
Interviewer 
Name:…………………………………………………………………………………………  
Household Particulars 
1.  
a. DATE   b. VILLAGE c. Latitude: 
    Longitude: 
d. NAME OF PERSON 
INTERVIEWED (HEAD OF 
HOUSEHOLD IF POSSIBLE) 
e. HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS  
 ……..males ……..females     ..….. children     
…………total members 
Names of other members of 
household……………………………………… 
f. COMMUNITY g. TIME RESIDENT IN VILLAGE h. OCCUPATION 
i. AGE j. GENDER k. STATUS 
 
2. Level of income / possessions 
a. ANNUAL CASH 
INCOME  
b. NUMBER OF KIDS IN 
SCHOOL/COLLEGE 
C. OWN WATERSOURCE & 
TYPE 
d. CABLE  TV     
(BOUGHT / GOVT) 
d. VEHICLE  (TYPE) e. PHONE 
(LANDLINE/MOBILE & HOW 
MANY) 
 g. TYPE OF ROOF 
 
3. Main sources of livelihood and months practiced 
Livelihood Months practiced                       
Agriculture  
Livestock  
Wage Labour  
Forest Products  
Leasing of land  
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Other…………………………..  
 
4. Have your traditional livelihoods changed?  
Over what timescale?................................................................................................. 
 
Natural Resource Knowledge and Use 
5. Do you think natural areas around your village have changed over the last 
10, 20, or 30 years? 
6. Do you think the climate has changed over the last 10, 20, or 30 years? 
7. How do you use the forest? 
Resources Type of forest 
(administrative) 
How important is this 
activity/resource to you? 
Quantify if possible 
Honey   
Medicinal plants   
Firewood   
Wood for building   
Stone for building   
NTFP for subsistence   
NTFP for trade   
Water channels   
Religious ceremonies   
Burial grounds   
Cattle corrals/patties   
Other   
 
8. Use of fuels 
Fuel Proportion (percentage) 
Firewood  
LPG  
Kerosene stoves  
Other:  
 
9. Firewood collection 
Home:    Distance……………… Amount (kg,headloads)………...  
Sale: Distance……………… Amount (kg, headloads)……….. 
Value……………………………………. 
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Attitudes to wildlife and conflict 
10. Do you believe you have a problem with wild animals? 
11. Attitudes to wildlife conservation 
Statement Agree Disagree Neutral 
Wildlife should be conserved    
Protected areas are too large and should be 
reduced in size 
   
People who harm wildlife should be punished    
People who traditionally use natural resources in 
protected areas should be allowed to continue to 
use them 
   
Wildlife should be confined to protected areas    
It would not matter if large mammals were lost from 
the environment 
   
Further comments:…………………………………………………………………… 
12. Attitudes to human wildlife conflict 
Statement Agree Disagree Neutral 
People who have problems with wildlife should be 
able to stop them with any methods. 
   
It is the fault of farmers and livestock herders that 
there are problems with wildlife.  
   
Wildlife should be controlled by the authorities 
using lethal methods to lower population 
numbers. 
   
Wildlife should be controlled using non-lethal 
methods such as barriers, deterrents and 
relocation. 
   
The Forest Department should manage wildlife to 
stop conflict.  
   
The Government should take a greater role in 
mitigating human wildlife conflict. 
   
Tourists coming to see wildlife should contribute 
to their conservation.  
   
Wildlife is valued over human livelihoods.     
Some losses from wildlife are to be expected and 
should be tolerated.  
   
Further comments:…………………………………………………………………… 
13. Who should take responsibility for reducing conflict with wildlife?  
Stakeholder Ranking of responsibility (1=most 
responsible) 
Local communities  
Independent conservation and  
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development groups 
Forest Department  
Government  
Tourists  
Tourist resorts  
Urban citizens  
 
14. Do you believe wildlife should be protected? Yes  No 
Value  Ranking 
(1=strongest 
reason) 
They have as much right to live as we do  
Religious/cultural   
For future generations  
Education   
Tourist income  
Value of wildlife products to the economy  
Other reasons  
 
15. What factors do you believe are most important when choosing a conflict 
mitigation scheme?  
Criteria Ranking (1=most 
important) 
Proven Effectiveness 
 
 
Low Startup Costs (Financial) 
 
 
Low Maintenance Costs (Financial) 
 
 
Low Labour Effort 
 
 
High level of Household control of scheme 
 
      
 
 
 
Minimal negative effects on wildlife 
 
 
High level of Acceptability to other people 
 
 
Fair level of Compensation 
 
 
Other factors:…………………………………………………………………… 
16. Do you have any traditions related to the wildlife or the forest? 
17. Identify people/ positions/ institutions responsible for community decisions 
(who Keystone will need to work with if conflict resolution measures could 
be implemented) 
18. Do you see a role for yourself in conflict resolution, if yes, what is that role? 
19. Other notes the interviewer feels important to be documented and relevant 
to conflict.  
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SECTION 2: Households that experience Livestock Depredation 
Village Name:………………………….Name of Person Interviewed:…………… 
20. Livestock kept now, and numbers bought/sold in the last two years 
Type Total numbers 
of livestock kept 
Value of 
individual animal 
Number 
Bought  (last 
2 years)  
Number Sold  
(last 2 years) 
Cattle     
Goat     
Sheep     
Buffalo     
Chickens     
Other      
If no livestock, why?........................................................................................ 
21. Where do you obtain food for your livestock? 
Personal land/fodder  Unprotected common land 
Reserve/Protected forest 
Other:…………………………………………………………………………………… 
22. Livestock lost in the last 2 years to wildlife 
Livestock: 
Animal-
age-sex  
Time:month
/season 
/year  
Predator  
identity  
Location: 
village/ 
forest  
Distance 
from 
village 
Value 
of 
animal 
(Rs) 
Reason 
for loss  
 
23. Livestock protection measures 
Livestock Protection 
 measures 
Management 
level:  
household 
/community 
/govt) 
Cost (wage 
Rs or 
unpaid 
person-
days) 
Money 
lost  
through 
time  
spent 
protecting 
Effectiveness: 
 Little, 
Moderate, 
Very 
Cattle      
Goat      
Sheep      
Buffalo      
Chickens      
Other       
 
24. Other reasons livestock have been lost in the last 2 years 
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Other cause  Livestock type (animal-
age-sex)  
Numbers lost 
Disease   
Drought   
Fodder availability   
Other   
 
25. Why does depredation occur? 
Details:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Statement Agree Disagree Neutral 
There are too many wild animals    
Livestock owners have been negligent    
There are too many livestock    
There is not enough wild prey in the forest    
Livestock are taken because they graze in the 
forest  
   
The government fails to keep wildlife in the Park    
 
26. How can human-wildlife conflict over livestock be reduced? 
How:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Scheme Preference Ranking (1=most 
preferred) 
Insurance   
Compensation   
Improved herding/livestock guarding  
Improved fencing for stock corralling  
Stopping hunting/poaching in the protected 
areas 
 
Stopping livestock grazing in the protected 
areas 
 
Improving the habitat within the protected 
areas 
 
Control of problem animals by the Forest 
Department 
 
 
27. What do you do when you lose livestock to wildlife? 
Complain to Forest Dept  Complain to elected representatives 
Retaliatory actions   Compensation claim to Forest Dept 
Increase in protection measures Scare away or deter animals 
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Nothing 
Other:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
28. Compensation for loss 
a. Have you ever sought compensation for livestock killed by wild 
animals? Yes ⁯ No ⁯  
Livestock 
Animal-
age-sex 
Compensation 
sought from  
Date 
compensation 
claimed 
Date 
received 
Amount 
received 
Satisfaction 
with 
compensation? 
b. If you have not sought compensation, why not? 
 
SECTION 3: Households that experience Crop Raiding 
Village Name:………………………….Name of Person Interviewed:…………… 
29.  
a. LAND OWNED                              
acres 
b. LAND OWNED 10 YEARS AGO            
acres 
c.LAND ABANDONED                            
acres 
d. Land bought/sold or received under Government schemes in the last 
5 years  
Land bought 
/sold 
/received 
(acres) 
Cost 
per 
acre 
 Within/outside 
village  
Why 
bought/sold/received? 
Plans for / 
Proceeds to? 
     
Further Details:………………………………………………………… 
e.    Land leased to someone else:….….acres and income per acre per 
year……………..……………… 
f. Land rented from someone else: ………..acres and cost per acre per 
year………………..………… 
g. LAND CULTIVATED                        
acres 
h. LAND SHARECROPPED                         
acres 
i. UNRECORDED LAND CULTIVATED      
acres 
j. LAND RAINFED                            
acres 
k. LAND IRRIGATED                          
acres 
l. IRRIGATION SYSTEM 
m. If you do not practice agriculture, why not?........................................ 
30. Agricultural investment 
a. ANNUAL CASH 
INVESTMENT  
b. SOURCE bank/family/co-
operative/money 
lender/other…………………………  
c. INTEREST RATE    
………………per month 
………………per year 
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31. Crop loss to wildlife 
Type of 
crop 
Acres Investment   
per acre 
per 
season 
Yield 
kg/ 
Season 
/acre 
Proportion 
Used:Sold 
Acres 
lost to  
wildlife 
in last  
2 
years 
Value lost to  
wildlife in last  
2 years (Rs 
& 
subsistence) 
Millets       
Pulses       
Vegetables       
Beans       
Rice       
Cereals       
Tea       
Coffee       
Ginger 
 
      
Cotton       
Corn/Maize       
Other       
 
32. Crop protection measures used 
Species Methods 
used 
(guarding,  
barriers, 
deterrents) 
Household 
unpaid 
time spent 
(person 
days) 
Money 
lost 
through 
time 
spent 
protecting 
Cost in 
Rs 
(on 
wages or 
materials 
Management 
level: household 
/community 
/govt 
Elephant      
Gaur      
Deer  
(sambar 
/chital) 
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Wild Pig      
Primates      
Porcupine      
Other      
 
33. What other reasons have caused crop loss in the past 2 years? 
Other cause  Crop types  Value lost in last 
2 years (Rs & 
subsistence) 
Acres lost in 
last 2 years 
Disease    
Insects/pests    
Rodents    
Drought    
Heavy rainfall    
Other    
 
34. Why does crop raiding occur? 
Details:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
Statement Agree Disagree Neutral 
There are too many wild animals    
Farm owners have been negligent    
There is insufficient food in the forest    
Livestock that graze in the forest push the wildlife 
out 
   
The government fails to keep wildlife in the Park    
 
35. How can human-wildlife conflict over crops be reduced? 
Scheme Preference Ranking (1=most preferred) 
Insurance   
Compensation   
Natural fencing (thorn bushes, stone 
walls) 
 
Wire fencing  
Electric fencing around fields  
Electric fencing around park  
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boundaries 
Trenches around fields  
Trenches around park boundaries  
Deterrent techniques (firecrackers, 
noise) 
 
Stopping livestock grazing in the forest  
Improving the habitat within the 
protected areas  
 
Control of problem animals by the 
Forest Department  
 
 
36. What do you do when you lose crops to wildlife? 
Complain to Forest Dept  Complain to elected representatives 
Retaliatory actions   Compensation claim to Forest Dept 
Increase in protection measures Scare away or deter animals 
Nothing 
Other:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
37. Compensation for loss 
a. Have you ever sought compensation for crops destroyed by wild 
animals? Yes ⁯ No ⁯  
Crop 
type and 
acres 
/value 
lost 
Date 
compensation 
claimed 
Compensation 
sought from 
Date 
received 
Amount 
received 
Satisfaction  
with  
compensation? 
b. If you have not sought compensation, why not? 
 
SECTION 4: Households that experience Attacks on People 
Village Name:………………………….Name of Person Interviewed:……… 
38. Attacks on members of household in the last two years 
Month 
/season 
/year  
Wildlife  
Identity 
Location 
(village/forest 
etc)  
Distance 
from 
 village  
Severity 
(minor 
/major 
/death) 
Reason  
 
39. Are you afraid of wildlife? Yes No  
Why:………………………………………………………………………………………… 
40. Have you changed your behaviour because of this fear? Yes No 
Details:……………………………………………………………………………………… 
41. Compensation for loss 
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a. Have you ever sought compensation for attacks by wild animals? 
Yes  No  
Injury & 
wildlife 
responsible 
Date 
compensation 
claimed 
Compensation 
sought from 
Date 
received 
Amount 
received 
Adequacy of 
compensation 
b. If you have not sought compensation, why not? 
 
SECTION 5: Households that experience Damage to infrastructure 
Village Name:………………………….Name of Person Interviewed:…………… 
42. Attacks on property/infrastructure 
Month 
/season 
/year  
Species Property 
location 
Property 
type       
Value of 
damage (Rs) 
Reason  
43. Compensation for loss 
a. Have you ever sought compensation for attacks on property?  
Yes No 
Property 
description 
Date 
compensation 
claimed 
Compensation 
sought from 
Date 
received 
Amount 
received 
Adequacy of 
compensation? 
b. If you have not sought compensation, why not? 
 
  
- 174 - 
C.2  Monitoring Data 
Sheet 1: Dates 
Village Keystone 
Staff 
Village 
Informants 
Start 
Date 
End 
Date 
 
Sheet 2: Livestock Depredation Incidents 
Data 
Collector 
Incident 
No. 
Date Householder Wife/Husband 
Name 
Village Latitude Longitude Location of 
loss 
Guarding measure 
Dist. from 
Forest 
Livestock 
species 
Number 
owned 
Number lost Age/sex 
Loss (Rs) Total 
Monetary 
Loss 
Predator 
responsible 
Notes Photo No 
 
Sheet 3: Crop Raiding Incidents 
Data 
Collector 
Incident 
No. 
Date Householder Wife/Husband 
Name 
Village Latitude Longitude Irrigation Fence Type 
Deterrents / 
Other 
protection 
used 
Dist. from 
Forest 
Crop Area 
Cultivated 
Crop Area 
Damaged 
Loss (kg) Loss (Rs) Fodder 
Lost 
Fuel Lost Total Monetary 
Loss 
Species 
responsible 
Notes Photo No   
 
Sheet 4: Attacks 
Data 
Collector 
Incident 
No. 
Date Householder Wife/Husband 
Name 
Village Latitude Longitude Location of 
attack 
Person / Property 
Dist. from 
Forest 
Severity of 
injury 
Value of 
property 
damage 
(Rs) 
Wildlife 
species 
Notes 
Photo No     
 
